


JPRS 80069

10 February 1982

# Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2485



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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10 February 1982

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No. 2485

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## INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

### BRIEFS

AGRICULTURAL COMMITTEE CREATED--Tel Aviv--An international development committee on agricultural cooperation has been established by Israel, Egypt and the U.S. This is the first official body to be established by the three countries in the agricultural field. Its purpose will be to locate, evaluate and find funds for potential projects, especially in research and development, in any of the three countries. [Text] [TA250601 Jerusalem POST in English 25 Jan 82 p 2]

CSO: 4400/119

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

PLO LEADER ON POSSIBLE ISRAELI ATTACK ON LEBANON

NC240705 (Clandestine) Voice of Palestine in Arabic 0530 GMT 24 Jan 82

[Text] Fatah Central Committee member brother Abu Iyad [Salah Khalaf] said yesterday that the zionist leaders are venturing to attack Lebanon to regain their status which has been shaken before Israeli public opinion because of the return of the Sinai to Egypt.

In an interview with the AFP Abu Iyad said that an Israeli attack in Lebanon is not inevitable, although the climate that is prevailing in Israel is ready for war since the statements being made by the zionist leaders will result in escalating the situation.

Brother Abu Iyad said: The Israelis are about to offer a concession which they consider to be huge; they also want to regain their position before Israeli public opinion by scoring victories over the PLO. On the size of this attack, brother Abu Iyad said: Israel might cross the borders of south Lebanon to reach the coast by way of launching regular raids up to the areas lying between Ad-Damur and Ar-Rawshah. He pointed out to the possibility of the scope of the battles expanding to reach the capital and said: I hope that [Lebanese forces Commander] Bashir al-Jumayyil will not follow the example of the Israelis this time and will remember the lesson he learned from previous experiences.

CSO: 4404/233

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

PALESTINIAN OFFICIAL ON ISRAEL'S 'INVASION' PLANS

PM261523 Riyadh AR-RIYAD in Arabic 21 Jan 82 p 1

[Report by Mustafa Nasir from Beirut: "Palestinian Military Official in the South Tells AR-RIYAD: 'The Attack Plan is Ready for Implementation in the Very Near Future'"]

[Text] A Palestinian military official in the south [of Lebanon] has stated that the Israel plan for the invasion of southern Lebanon is now ready for implementation (in the near future). He said that he expects the enemy to attack on three axes in the south and at the same time impose a naval blockade on Tyre, Sidon and Tripoli and hit the [Palestinian] command headquarters in Beirut.

He emphasized that units of the joint Palestinian-Lebanese forces are deployed in all these areas and are ready to repulse any aggression.

In an interview with AR-RIYAD, the Palestinian official said that according to the information of the Palestinian resistance, the enemy has mobilized three divisions (30,000 men) for this purpose and has provided air support for these divisions. The air force is expected to play an important role in the attack.

The Palestinian official, who refused to be named, said: Our military, political and information sources indicate that the Israeli plan is ready for implementation in the near future. Our Palestinian assessment is that Israel will take military action on three axes: The al-Biqa' axis, the al-'Ayshiyah axis, and the Jazzin axis. It will impose a naval blockade on Tyre, Sidon and Tripoli. It is also preparing to strike at the Palestinian headquarters in Beirut. The attack will be launched from the sea, land and air in accordance with a complete plan for the occupation of the south, especially the area south of az-Zahrani River.

The enemy has two objectives: The first is to deal a blow to the Palestinian presence in the south only. This will not lead to any Israeli-Syrian battle in the first stage. Israel will then work for wider deployment of the UN forces and for turning these forces into deterrent forces through diplomatic pressure at the United Nations. Its aim is to restrict Arab presence and limit the Syrian role in Lebanon.

The second objective is to hit both the Palestinians and the Syrians and shift the battle from southern Lebanon to al-Biqa' where the Syrian forces have installed Soviet-made missiles.

The Palestinian official added: The Israeli forces only have to reach al-Qir'awn Heights and the two peaks overlooking the valley to bring eastern al-Biqa' within the range of the Israeli artillery. This will compel the Syrian forces to move their missiles and units to areas further away from al-Biqa'. This operation would bring the Israeli forces to Ra's al-Wadi and al-'Urqub, in fact closer to Damascus than the forces on the Golan Heights.

It is possible for the Israeli forces to enter these areas without having to clash with UN forces, because of the gaps in these areas, such as those in the al-Qualay'ah, al-Khardali, an-Nabatiyah and az-Zahrani areas. There are also gaps in the al-'Urqub area. The Israelis may land forces from the sea. There is also a gap in the Shab'a area through Mount Hermon in the west leading to Ra's al-Wadi. The Israeli forces would not come in contact with the UN forces in any of these gaps.

He added: The Palestinian-Lebanese joint forces are deployed in all these areas and gaps and stand ready to confront any Israeli aggression and inflict the heaviest possible losses on the enemy. We are in a state of maximum alert. According to our information, three Israeli divisions, consisting of 30,000 troops, have been prepared for the operation together with air force units which are expected to play an important role.

The Palestinian military official added: The enemy cannot settle the battle within a specific period of time. In other words, in our fight against Israel we do not rely on any particular limited weapons that mean that the battle would end as soon as our forces are destroyed. We are fighting a guerrilla war and depend on the individual and his own weapon, in addition to artillery and missiles which are deployed in an unconventional way. We can operate behind enemy lines and inside enemy lines too. We resort to tactical flexibility.

Under our plan for confronting the aggression, our aim will be to prolong the battle as much as possible to create battle conditions and political conditions that will force the enemy to withdraw, if he manages to reach certain positions.

Answering a question by AR-RIYAD on the difference between the Palestinian military situation now and in 1978 when the Zionist forces stormed the south, the Palestinian official said: The military situation of the resistance is much better than it was 4 years ago. This is quite natural for all those who engage in battles against the Israeli enemy.

He added: However, we do not have effective weapons to use against the Israeli air force, weapons of this type are subject to international political considerations and therefore are not available to all the forces in the region.

The Palestinian official expressed the view that it is unlikely that the coming battles will extend to areas beyond the areas in Lebanon where Palestinian and Syrian forces are deployed.

CSO: 4404/233



## PERSIAN GULF AREA

### COOPERATIVE EFFORTS ON DESALINATION PLANS EMPHASIZED

Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 1 Dec 81 p 15

[Article by Muhammad al-Sulayman: "Countries of the Council of Cooperation to Work Together in Areas of Water Desalination; Kingdom To Present Results of Its Experiments to Countries Who are Members of the Council"]

[Text] Major strides have been achieved in water desalination cooperation in the Gulf for the purpose of achieving a unified format and common coordination. Meetings in this regard between officials of the six countries of the Gulf Council of Cooperation have been continuing for the purpose of drawing up a future plan for this cooperation, sharing experiences and benefiting from past experiences. These meetings are taking place in the Gulf in the context of the cooperation that is being experienced in all areas by the six countries that are members of the council. [These meetings] are considered one of the fruits of this cooperation.

The kingdom is making the results of its experiences and consultations available to the countries of the Gulf since it is considered a pioneer in the area of water desalination, not only in the Arab world but also throughout the world. The kingdom has been producing the largest amount of desalinated water in the world.

It is worth noting that the six countries of the Gulf, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, the Sultanate of Oman and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as well, have experienced considerable progress in the area of water desalination to provide fresh drinking water and preserve ground water. To achieve that objective Kuwait has recently established a huge water desalination plant on the shores of the Arabian Gulf. That plant has begun pumping water and supplying fresh water into fresh water storage tanks.

An official source in the Public Organization for Water Desalination in the kingdom stated that this cooperation in the area of water desalination will yield good results that will have positive effects on the future of desalination projects in the area.

It will also produce integrated coordination, allowing opinions and

suggestions to be exchanged in the light of projects that have been established. This would yield better results and [demonstrate] the concern [that exists] for choosing what is best.

The ministers of the Gulf countries who have something to do with water attended the first opening sessions of the International Conference on Water and the Environment which is being held now in al-Manamah in Bahrain. The conference began yesterday morning, and it is to last for 4 days. Several studies and experiments about desalination will be presented at the conference in which more than 20 countries, represented by 500 members, are participating. The ministers of the Gulf countries are attending the conference to benefit from the studies that are being presented and proposed at the conference and also to benefit from the experiences and the steps that were taken to implement huge projects in that area. Among those experiences are those of the kingdom which is presenting two papers. One is about the project of transporting desalinated water from Jubayl to Riyadh. The other paper is about desalination projects in the western area.

The conference was inaugurated by His Excellency al-Shaykh Khalifah ibn Salman al-Khalifah, the prime minister of Bahrain. [The inauguration of the conference] was attended by His Excellency Dr 'Abd-al-Rahman Aal al-Shaykh, the minister of agriculture and water and by the ministers of water and electricity in Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and the Sultanate of Oman. Besides, a number of experts in the field were also present.

The conference will consider during its sessions 113 studies that have to do with desalinating and re-cycling water and the vital importance that trend constitutes to countries that suffer from a water shortage.

In a statement he made at the conference, Mr Majid al-Jishi, Bahrain's minister of public works and electricity emphasized the importance of adopting the method of re-cycling water after treating and purifying it. The Bahraini minister explained that thinking about emphasizing efforts to confront the problem of water shortage is essential for unifying organizations that specialize in water affairs [and bringing them together] in the context of a single organization that has strong support.

Mr al-Jishi expressed his hope that a meeting for all water desalination organizations in the world be held so they can consider unifying their organizations under the framework of one world-wide organization whose activities would comprise everything that these organizations do now by themselves. He also expressed his hope that an annual conference be held to look into water affairs in general and water desalination in particular.

In his statement Mr Majid al-Jishi asked that qualified Gulf national cadres be trained so they can operate and maintain the technologically advanced desalination plants that the Gulf countries have. He indicated that the companies which manufacture the desalination plants can play a significant role in helping the countries of the area prepare and carry out

training programs by offering their experiences and their technologies in that regard.

He affirmed that the time had come for the countries of the area to take serious and practical steps toward involvement in the process of manufacturing technologically advanced desalination plants and developing their capabilities in that direction. In concluding his statement he also affirmed that if the countries of the Gulf area were to adopt a policy of giving companies priority in implementing desalination plans, that would contribute to giving those companies the incentive to cooperate with us so as to ensure the achievement of this objective.

8592

CSO: 4404/208

# RESULTS OF TWO YEARS OF WARFARE CRITIQUED

Brussels LA LIBRE BELGIQUE in French 23 Dec 81 p 4

[Article: "Afghanistan: Two Years of Impossible Warfare for the Soviets"]

[Text] This is a distressing anniversary for the Soviet Army. Some 2 years ago, on 27 December 1979, it invaded Afghanistan, convinced that it could easily install a government headed by Moscow's man, Babrak Karmal. Now, 2 years later, Soviet strategists must admit they were mistaken and that those who were saying back then that the USSR was going to have "its own Vietnam" were right.

Like the Americans in Indochina, the Soviets are bogged down in a war they cannot win regardless of the powerful forces they have deployed.

Nearly 100,000 soldiers, heavily equipped with, among other material, highly formidable armored helicopters, are hardly sufficient to control the cities. When Soviet troops sally out of Kabul, they find that Moslem guerrilla's command the terrain.

In Vietnam, the United States had used defoliants to prevent the Vietcong and North Vietnamese from hiding under the trees. In Afghanistan, the Soviets and the Kabul government are having all trees cut down and all houses razed within 150 meters of roads and highways so as to prevent the rebels from ambushing military convoys. Work on clearing areas of trees and houses is said to have already begun along the highway leading from Kabul to the north, the main supply route from the Soviet border. According to rebel sources, thousands of Afghans have been driven from their homes all along this highway so that their houses can be destroyed.

Babrak Karmal's communist regime is becoming increasingly isolated. Desertions are rapidly thinning the Afghan Army's ranks. Recruiting is difficult because most young men are fleeing to escape military service. Government offices are losing their most qualified personnel. In regions threatened by Soviet repression, the peasantry is disappearing, seeking refuge in Pakistan where there are already 2 million refugees. Moslem rebels are constantly harassing Soviet troops who have suffered heavy losses.

Yet the rebels are divided into various factions often violently hostile to one another. Fighting between these groups is not a rare occurrence. This is of small consolation to the Soviets.

One of the regions where resistance is stiffest is the Panjshir Valley north of Kabul. Despite numerous attacks by Soviet troops and Afghan regulars, the rebels still control the valley and ensure that Moslem fundamentalism is the ruling force.

The AFP reports, however, that nothing in Kabul indicates the Soviets are worried. They are determined to stay in Afghanistan as long as necessary. They are convinced that by so doing they will inevitably succeed in imposing their views, even if this takes years.

But the guerrillas proper appear to be free of the divisions existing among the factions whose leaders are in exile in Pakistan. Amin Wardak, an envoy of the internal resistance movement who recently completed a trip to Europe, revealed that there is growing solidarity among combatants of the different groups. Wardak came to the West seeking weapons and especially surface-to-air missiles for use against Mi-24 armored helicopters that are almost invulnerable--except to sophisticated weapons--and most effective in repressive strike operations in the mountains. According to Wardak, the situation will become untenable for the Soviets within the next few months.

#### Rebel-Held Soviet Prisoners

A few Western reporters were recently able to meet with three Soviet soldiers held prisoner by the rebels. The prisoners told them they expected to be executed if they refused to become converted to Islam. Only one of them, a native of the USSR's Moslem provinces, agreed to convert.

Speaking in front of the cameras of an American television crew, a spokesman of the Hezb-i-Islami rebel movement explained that Moslem law required that prisoners become converted. He also said that exchanging Soviet prisoners for rebels held in Kabul was out of the question because such bargaining would prompt the Soviets to arrest as many Afghans as necessary to retrieve their personnel being held prisoner by the rebels. On the other hand, he said, rebels captured and tortured by Kabul's soldiers will be rewarded in the hereafter, "in Allah's paradise."

However, a dissident faction of Hezb-i-Islamic did enter, on its own, into negotiations for the release of some 50 Afghan prisoners in exchange for a Soviet geologist kidnapped in Kabul.

According to the rebels, many Soviet soldiers of Moslem ancestry are deserting. The Western reporters were shown three young Soviets who had fled their country to avoid being drafted, had joined the rebel forces and were receiving guerrilla training. The AFP reports that the three young men said they wanted to fight along with the Afghans so that later they could return to the USSR and liberate their native Tadzhikistan.

8041

CSO: 4619/41



EGYPT

TEXT OF GRANT AGREEMENT WITH JAPAN PUBLISHED

Cairo AL-JARIDAH AL-RASMIYAH [The Official Gazette] in Arabic No 47, 19 Nov 81  
pp 3090-3096

[Article: "Decree No 330 of 1981 by President of Arab Republic of Egypt"]

[Text] Decree No 330 of 1981 by the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt approving the special letter exchanged in Cairo on 30 March 1981 between the governments of the Arab Republic of Egypt and Japan on the grant to alleviate the 1980 loan interest burdens:

The President of the Republic,

After perusing paragraph two of article 151 of the constitution,

Has decided:

Singe Article

To approve the letter exchanged between the governments of the Arab Republic of Egypt and Japan and signed in Cairo on 30 March 1981 on the grant to alleviate the 1980 loan interest burdens, with the reservation and on the condition of ratification.

Issued at the presidential office on 9 June 1981.

Anwar al-Sadat

Cairo, 30 March 1981

Your excellency,

"I am honored to refer to resolution No 165, dated 11 March 1978, of the third part of the ninth session of the UNCTAD [UN Conference on Trade and Development] concerning the developing countries' problems of debt and development and to the discussions which took place recently between representatives of the Government of Japan and the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt on the issue of advancing Japanese economic aid to the Arab Republic of Egypt with the aim of strengthening the relations of friendship and cooperation between the two countries and I am honored to propose the following arrangements on behalf of the Government of Japan:

1. Taking into consideration the debts of the Arab Republic of Egypt in accordance with the loan agreement concluded according to the letters exchanged between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and which has been in effect since 29 April 1973, the Government of Japan will make available to the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt in accordance with the Japanese laws and regulations governing this aspect a grant of 29,632,000 yens (hereafter referred to as the "grant") with the aim of contributing to the development of the economy of the Arab Republic of Egypt and of enhancing the prosperity of its people.

"2-1. The Arab Republic of Egypt will use the grant and its accumulated interest to purchase products specified in a list to be agreed upon by the authorities concerned in the two governments and the services necessary for such products, on the condition that the products are produced by the (proper countries of origin).

2. Agreement shall be reached on the proper countries of origin mentioned in the above sub-paragraph 1 by the authorities concerned in both governments.

3-1. The Arab Republic of Egypt will open a regular free deposit account in the Japanese yen (hereafter referred to as the "account") in one of the Japanese banks licensed to deal in foreign exchange. The account shall be opened within 14 days as of the date on which these arrangements go into effect and the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt shall notify the Government of Japan in writing of completing the transaction to open the account within 7 days of opening the account.

2. The sole purpose of the account is to receive the payments of the Japanese Government, made in yens and referred to in paragraph 4, and to make the necessary payments for the purchase of the products and services referred to in sub-paragraph 1 of provision 2 and any other payments that may be agreed upon by the authorities concerned of the two governments.

4. The Government of Japan shall put the grant into implementation by making payments to the account in Japanese yens and in the sum referred to in paragraph 1 as of the date of receiving the written notification referred to in sub-paragraph 1 of provision 3 [and until] 11 July 1980 [date as published], unless the period is extended on mutual agreement between the agencies concerned in the two governments.

5-1. The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt shall take the measures necessary:

A. To use the grant and its accumulated interest within a reasonable period after the grant is put into implementation.

B. To guarantee that no customs fees, local taxes or any fines are imposed in the Arab Republic of Egypt for the use of grant money for the purchase of the products and services referred to in paragraph 1 of provision 2.

C. To guarantee the preservation and the proper and effective use of the goods purchased within the framework of the grant to develop the economy of the Arab Republic of Egypt and to enhance its people's prosperity.

D. To submit a written report to the Japanese Government in a form acceptable to this government on the transactions concluded in this account, with copies of the contracts, bills and any other documents pertaining to these transactions without any delay and as soon as the grant and its interest are drawn in full from the account in accordance to the stipulation of sub-paragraph 2 of provision 3 or in response to the request of the Japanese Government.

(2). Not to re-export the products purchased within the framework of the grant from the Arab Republic of Egypt.

6. Consultations shall be held between the two governments on any issue that may develop in connection with these arrangements.

It honors me to propose that this memorandum and your excellency's reply memorandum, in which you confirm the above-mentioned arrangements on behalf of the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt, form an agreement between the two governments becoming valid as of the date of your excellency's reply.

I take this opportunity to express to you my deepest appreciation.

(Toshi Yamazaki)  
Ambassador Extraordinary of the Japanese  
Government to the Government of the Arab  
Republic of Egypt

Cairo, 30 March 1981

Your excellency,

I am honored to inform you that I have received your excellency's memorandum dated today and stating the following:

[Text of ambassador's memorandum, already translated, omitted]

I am honored to confirm on behalf of the Arab Republic of Egypt the aforementioned arrangements and to agree that your excellency's memorandum and this memorandum form an agreement between the two governments becoming valid as of the date of this reply.

I take this opportunity to express my deep appreciation for your excellency.

'Abd al-'Aziz Zahawi  
The Ministry Undersecretary for Economic  
Cooperation Affairs

8494  
CSO: 4504/106

AL-SADAT ASSASSINATION PLOT, SUBSEQUENT EVENTS DETAILED

Cairo AKHIR SA'AH in Arabic No 2453, 28 Oct, 18, 25 Nov 81

[28 Oct 81 , p 18]

[Text] They wanted destruction, ruin and chaos for Egypt in the form of a Khomeyni-style revolution that consumes the green and the dry, that destroys in an instant a civilization that has lighted the world throughout a 5,000-year journey and that transforms all that is right, good and beautiful in this good country into ruins where owls hoot and in whose sky the ravens of black malice and terrorism caw.

God wished Egypt to escape the catastrophe and so their black and bloody schemes were exposed at the right time and the mask fell from the face of the bloody terror.

How did the plotters fall? What is the story of this terrorist organization which has sought to create chaos and fear?

The bloody events did not begin on Tuesday, 6 October, when suddenly and amidst bewilderment the bullets of treachery rained down on the chest of leader Anwar al-Sadat. There had been movement before the painful event and there were other movements which followed the event in Asyut and in other places.

It has become evident that there was a strong relationship between 'Abbud al-Zummar and Khalid al-Islambuli who led the operation in which the late leader was assassinated. It has also become evident that there was a relationship between the two operations and that they were carried out within the framework of one scheme aimed at creating a so-called Khomeyni-style revolution.

Let us return to 25 September when the first group of the terrorist organization was arrested 11 days before al-Sadat's assassination. Seized with the group were documents and drawings [maps] outlining the dimensions of a major plot to assassinate the political and executive leaderships during convocation of the second congress of the party [ruling National Party] at Cairo University on the 28th of last September.

When the first group was arrested on 25 September, Sayyid Mahmud al-Sayyid, one of the terrorists, stabbed one of the intelligence officers who took part in the arrest and two of the officer's men with a pocket knife after his colleague Nabil al-Maghribi had been arrested. The policemen then opened fire on al-Sayyid who was hit in the side and arrested.

Nabil al-Maghribi, who was arrested on the same day, is one of the organization's most dangerous leaders. He was a student at the College of Languages, an employee at the Popular Culture [office] in Bayt al-Sharabiyah and a translator at AL-I'TISAM magazine which had been shut down because of the instigative material it had been publishing. When the two were arrested, they were carrying two submachineguns.

In his confessions during the interrogation, Nabil al-Maghribi said that at the outset (early 1981) he used to meet with 'Abbud al-Zummar once every 3 days and that then the meetings increased to more than one meeting daily. The meetings used to take place in a mosque near al-Haram. The security police have also arrested in this place another man who was carrying a submachinegun and a pistol and who was later proven to be a member of the organization.

#### Beginning of Downfall

The fall of Nabil al-Maghribi, or Shaykh Nabil, as they used to call him, was the beginning of the thread which led to three sites that the organization members were using as dens in which to meet to hatch their plots, namely:

Apartment No 5 in property No 9 on 'Afifi Street in al-Jizah.

Zayn al-Din mosque on Martyr 'Abd al-Mun'im Zayn al-Din Street in al-Haram.

Al-Anwar mosque in 'Arab al-Jisr area in 'Ayn Shams.

The matter then began to be unravelled by the security men. The meetings were not just for the purpose of hatching plots but went beyond to training on arms. The security men were able to determine the training site in the area between kilometers 8 and 9 on al-Wahat [Oases] highway where the security men found the discarded shells of the ammunition used by the organization members in target shooting and the target boards which they used.

#### Voice and Photograph Recordings

The security men's investigation efforts continued and they were able to record three meetings, with photographs and voice recordings, between Shaykh Nabil and the other members of his group:

The first meeting was on 21 September. In this meeting, Shaykh Nabil expressed his wish to purchase rapidly any quantity of weapons and ammunition and his willingness to pay any amount for the purpose. Shaykh Nabil also stressed to the group members the need to train in sites other than al-Wahat area.

The second meeting took place on 24 September. At this meeting, Shaykh Nabil appears examining a submachinegun which he had acquired with a number of rounds in a manner that confirmed that he had experience with the weapon, considering that he disassembled and reassembled the submachinegun. At this meeting, Nabil expressed his readiness to purchase eight submachineguns of the Port Sa'id type with thousands of rounds, saying that the first bullet fired from this machinegun will be directed at al-Sadat's heart.



The third meeting included Nabil al-Maghribi and another person called al-Sayyid Mahmud al-Sayyid and showed them both examining two submachineguns which had been purchased.

After assessing the situation, the security men decided to arrest the terrorist organization members, especially in view of their frank statement that the first bullet would be directed at President al-Sadat's heart and in view of the urgent request for weapons before President al-Sadat's visit to al-Daqahliyah on 26 September and of the subsequent convocation of the National Party congress on 28 September.

Thus, the assault on the dens of terrorism began.

Quantities of weapons and of ammunition, the details of President al-Sadat's movements until 9 November 1981 and the photographs of some high-ranking officials were seized in the apartment in al-Jizah. It also became evident for the first time that this apartment belonged to 'Abbud al-Zummar.

Some clothes, including a soldier's military uniform, were seized in Zayn al-Din mosque. In an ambush laid inside the mosque, Hasan 'Atif (has a B.A. in arts) was apprehended while carrying a (briefcase) containing a Port Sa'id submachinegun, a pistol and a number of rounds.

#### Terrorists' Confessions

In his confessions during the interrogation, Nabil al-Maghribi revealed all the dimensions and goals of the organization. He said that he had met 'Abbud al-Zummar for the first time in 1979 and that they did not meet again until early 1981 when he visited 'Abbud at his house where the two discussed some religious matters. The meetings, attended by Tariq al-Zummar, recurred and the ideas of the three men materialized in an organization which included the three as members. The roles and tasks were then divided. 'Abbud took charge of the planning and armament affairs, Tariq took charge of advocacy affairs and member recruitment and Nabil carried out whatever tasks were entrusted to him by 'Abbud to gather information on some sites, installations and persons.

In fact, Nabil was able to recruit a number of new elements, including: Al-Sayyid Mahmud al-Sayyid and, Hasan 'Atif Ziyadah (a graduate of the School of Arts). Tariq was also able to recruit 6 persons. Meanwhile, Hasan 'Atif recruited others, including driver Muhammad Muhammad Husayn.

President al-Sadat was acquainted at the time with all the details, in addition to the videotape exposing all the dimensions of the organization.

In the wake of al-Zawiyah al-Hamra' riots, the security authorities arrested a large number of the organization members. This caught the terrorist organization by surprise and so the organization's leaders decided to move immediately to carry out a series of assassinations against the political leaderships to signal the start of the implementation of their scheme.

They thus committed their black crime of assassinating leader al-Sadat.

They followed the assassination with the Asyut incidents. Other acts of terrorism were also carried out in all the Egyptian cities.

But God's care saved Egypt from destruction and ruin.

The terrorist leaders have fallen, the latest being 'Umar 'Abd al-Rahman from the Principles of Religion College, the organization mufti who issued to the organization members the religious interpretations characterizing the rulers as atheists and stating that the monies of others are spoils [for the organization members to plunder] and the women of others are captives over whom the members have the right to ownership and disposal.

What is surprising is that the mufti, who is a blind man, had on him \$20,000 concealed in the waistband of his pants at the time he was arrested. Moreover, a sum of 50,000 pounds was seized at the home of one of the organization members, along with papers indicating that 40,000 pounds had been deposited in the Islamic Bank. This member said that the money was to be used for spending on the organization.

The terrorists have also confessed that there was a secret plan to storm the radio and television building to cut off transmission and to combine the various wavelengths to broadcast the proclamations of the Khomeyni-style revolution on the air.

God has wished Egypt to escape the oppression of terrorism and has spared it destruction. The terrorist groups have fallen and their ugly bloody face has been exposed.

[11 Nov 81, pp 12-14]

[Article by Usamah 'Ajja]

[Text] What was happening in the terrorists' dens? How did they hatch their terrible schemes in the bowels of darkness? How did these dens, along with the leaders of terrorism, fall from al-Buhayrah to the mountain caves in Upper Egypt?

AKHIR SA'AH has conducted a large-scale investigation which exposes the hidden secrets of these dens in al-Dilinjat District where Muhammad 'Abd al-Salam Faraj was hiding, in the village of Nahya where 'Abbud al-Zummar was engaging in his radical activity and in al-Minya where the terrorists failed to carry out their criminal scheme to repeat what had happened in Asyut. What does the mother of terrorist Najih say and what do eyewitnesses in Asyut say now that the dust of the storm has settled? What is behind al-Islambuli family in Naj' Hammadi? The investigation also includes other interesting facts about the leaders and dens of terrorism in al-Ma'adi and al-Kalifah where Nabawi Isma'il, the deputy prime minister and the minister of interior, accompanied personally the security forces in their assault on those dens. Here is the complete picture:

Al-Dilinjat is a small town in al-Jizah and is located only 30 kilometers from Damahur.

It is a quiet town. But suddenly it started to live in an atmosphere of terror because of a small minority of no more than 20 of the town's inhabitants who tried to impose their opinions and their beliefs on the good people of al-Dilinjat.

Al-Dilinjat witnessed the childhood of Muhammad 'Abd al-Salam Faraj, one of the dangerous leaders of the terrorists and the commander of the Bulaq al-Dakrur organization.

In al-Dilinjat, the leads concerning the true identity of this leader of the terrorists were gathering in the hands of Ibrahim Hindi, the head of al-Dilinjat Town Council who has said:

"The story of Muhammad 'Abd al-Salam Faraj doesn't begin today. Its roots date back to more than 20 years ago when his father was an employee of the bilharzia control section of the Ministry of Health. The father was also a distinguished member of the Muslim Brotherhood who had been arrested several times in cases concerning the Brotherhood. The father came to al-Dilinjat from al-Wardan village in Imbabah District, al-Jizah Governorate, more than 25 years ago. He settled here and began to engage in his activities."

#### He Has No Relatives There

Even though al-Dilinjat is a society which has the qualities of a village insofar as blood relationships and big family affiliations are concerned, the father was able to marry the daughter of one of the town's merchants. However, Muhammad 'Abd al-Salam Faraj has no relatives there, except for his two married sisters and their husbands in al-Dilinjat and a third sister in the neighboring village of al-Tur where the dangerous defendant was apprehended. One of the sisters is married to a merchant, the second to an air force officer and the third to a sergeant in the air defense forces. He has a fourth sister who works in the radiology section of the Ministry of Health.

Completing the details, Ibrahim Hindi, the head of al-Dilinjat Town Council, added: "Faraj lived his early life imbibing radical thought from his father. However, he showed no signs [of radicalism] after enrolling in the Cairo College of Engineering where he completed his studies. He got married in Cairo and was appointed in the Engineering Department of Cairo University. His permanent residence was in Bulaq al-Dakrur and he often visited the village to coordinate its planning activities. His main activity was not in al-Dilinjat town itself but at the level of the top leaderships of the organization.

"Al-Dilinjat organization received special attention from all the terrorist leaderships. This is why the town was visited by many of the terrorists leaders, including many prominent clergymen who are now under detention, such as Shaykh al-Mahallawi and Mahmud 'Id who visited the town only a few weeks before he was placed under detention.

"I can assure you that all the movements of the terrorists were watched and counted and that the security agencies were fully aware of the terrorists' schemes. We were only waiting for the right time to move in."

#### Robbery of al-Dilinjat Gold

It seems that al-Dilinjat organization was not confined to the (group) of terrorist of Muhammad 'Abd al-Salam Faraj and that it extended its efforts in an attempt to

set up other organizations in the district villages, especially in the village of al-Wafa'iyah which is 3 kilometers from al-Dilinjat.

In the past few days, the security agencies were able to apprehend all the members of al-Dilinjat organization, headed by Hatim Zaki Nasir, a 37-year-old flour merchant in al-Dilinjat. His house was searched for the gold stolen from various goldsmiths in all parts of the republic, especially since Nasir had displayed the signs of sudden wealth and had purchased a number of trucks, semi-trucks and grocery shops. After President al-Sadat's death, Nasir's house was searched twice. But the gold was found in the house of 'Ismat al-Sayyid Ramadan, one of Nasir's aides and the owner of a car dealership. When Ramadan's wife was asked about the source of the gold, she admitted that she had gotten it from defendant Hatim Nasir.

It is well-known that 'Ismat began to display the signs of wealth only 2 years ago. Previously, he worked as a driver and he now owns a villa valued at more than 300,000 pounds and car dealerships. 'Ismat was arrested a few days ago whereas Hatim was arrested at the end of last month.

Hatim has 3 brothers who have also been arrested. They are Karam, 'Ali and Muhammad. The third was engaged in serious terrorist activity. The group leader is Muhammad 'Abd al-Hamid Sa'd, al-Dilinjat supply inspector. He managed to join the supply department in a crooked way as an employee delegated from the Ministry of Agriculture. It is well-known that his father, 'Abd al-Hamid Sa'd, is a member of the Muslim Brotherhood. The father was also arrested in the past few days.

The organization and its leaderships tried to exploit the financial resources of the members themselves, in addition to other external resources that have not been uncovered yet, in an attempt to win over al-Dilinjat public opinion by slaughtering animals [and distributing the meat to the inhabitants] and by distributing cloth material to the public. However, the popular base continued to reject them completely.

#### Threads of Plotting Revealed

Important information concerning the terrorists aiding Faraj has been gathered.

It has been revealed that the leader of the organization there is Hatim Zaki Nasr [sic]. Nasr used to work as a taxi driver. Two or 3 years ago, he became the owner of car dealerships. This was the result of his activity in the black market and of his smuggling flour from Alexandria. This is why many of the organization members tried to recruit him in the organization so that immediate financial support may become available to them. He refused to listen to the advice of many friends to stay away from those terrorists. The financing then started to exceed Hatim's capabilities, thus proving the presence of external aid for the organizations.

The inhabitants have cooperated with the police in an unprecedented manner, especially in the arrest of 'Abd al-Hamid Sa'd Shukri, one of the organization's prominent members. Shukri's brothers led the police to his place [of hiding].

No losses were incurred by the police forces during the arrest operation. Were it not for traditions and for the inhabitants' eagerness to solve their problems



by themselves, the masses would have actually gotten rid of the terrorists. The number of those arrested has now reached 34 members.

'Abd al-Sattar 'Abd al-Ghaffar 'Ata, a grain merchant, said:

"We can now rest assured and we can breathe after long days of anxiety. The terrorists did not pray to the prophet, may God's prayers and peace be upon him. They prevented Koran readings before and after the Friday prayers and tried to control the mosques by leading the faithful in prayer and by ascending to the podiums to spread their poisons. Finally, the lectures of Wajdi Ghunaym, the biggest terrorist and one of the advocates of Renunciation and Repudiation Society who used to come here from Alexandria, have ended.

"Their occupation of al-Mahattah mosque, their disputes with our Christian brothers over a government-owned piece of land, and their suspicious meetings at the mosque which they built on a plot of land belonging to al-Fath mosque have ended."

Mahmud 'Asal, the deputy chairman of the local town council and the cousin of Hasan 'Asal, one of the arrested organization leaders who used to teach in the girls preparatory school, has said:

"There were attempts by strange radical elements to mislead the town youth. We tried to refute their ideas with different concepts but they refused to abandon their opinions.

"Hasan's accession to the organization was the cause of disagreement between him and all his brothers, most of whom are followers of the Sufi ways and one of his brothers is the shaykh of al-Barhumiyah way. Hasan has been in constant arguments and fights."

Finally, we left al-Dilinjat whose inhabitants have heaved a sigh of relief after long days and nights of terror and tension.

Nahya, the home village of 'Abbud and Tariq al-Zummar, is located 15 kilometers from the headquarters of al-Jizah Governorate. The story started a month ago, according to Nahya Mayor al-Hajj Mukhtar al-Zummar, when the activities of the Islamic group intensified in the village. Tariq and 'Abbud al-Zummar were in direct contact with those groups. 'Abbud al-Zummar had been expelled from the village with his father, 'Abd al-Latif 'Abbud al-Zummar, when the father was accused of a murder crime at the time he was the village mayor. However, the village inhabitants expelled him in the wake of the increase in murders and in acts of terrorism in the peaceful village. 'Abbud al-Zummar used to come to the village to collect the revenues of 6 feddans of land which his father had left him upon his death. With his repeated visits, the activity of the radical groups escalated to the point where they usurped a plot of land belonging to farmer 'Atiyah Nasr 'Abd al-Shafi, claiming that they were going to build a mosque on it. They fenced the land. But then the inhabitants found out that the radical groups used the land as a training center. Weapons were found on them. They started to control the village mosques and began to reiterate that whoever failed to follow them and to grow his beard was an infidel.



The history of al-Zummar family, according to Makram Mukhtar al-Zummar, the member of the Imbabah Local Council and of the National Party, abounds with honorable stances. "Tariq and 'Abbud al-Zummar have tried to soil our history and our patriotism. We disavow them because they don't belong to us. Any time we asked 'Abbud al-Zummar to help whenever a misfortune befell one of us, he used to accuse us of atheism. This is why the village inhabitants expelled him and why we no longer have any relationship with him.

"The centers of power imposed sequestration on us, denied us our political rights and prevented us from nominating any family member to a local popular council or to the People's Assembly. When President al-Sadat came, he lifted the sequestration, nominated al-Hajj Mukhtar al-Zummar to become the mayor of Nahya and appointed al-Hajj 'Aziz al-Zummar as member of the Consultative Council. Our family also includes members of the People's Assembly. However, all we want to say is that we have rejected the conduct of 'Abbud and Tariq al-Zummar. The father of Tariq al-Zummar, namely 'Abd al-Mawjud Ibrahim al-Zummar, shot the brother of Najib al-Zummar to death on a night when we were celebrating the cotton harvest."

#### They Accused Us of Atheism and Seized Mosque

'Atiyah Nasr 'Abd al-Shafi, a farmer in the village of Nahya, Imbabah District, said: "When I started to build a mosque in the village on a plot of land I own in front of my house, the hand of the village radical groups which were headed by Tariq and 'Abbud al-Zummar extended to this mosque and prevented me from entering it and the group members accused me of not worshipping God "because I watch television and refuse to grow my beard." When I asked them to depart from the mosque and leave it to me, they refused and one of them tried to strangle me. I did actually lose consciousness and the man thought I was dead. When my wife tried to defend me, they beat her with a cane. They also broke my brother's arm and tried to kill my son. All this was perpetrated against me by 'Abbud and Tariq al-Zummar."

Sami Jamal al-Zummar, a student at the Cairo University School of Business, has said: "A blood relationship binds me to 'Abbud al-Zummar. He is from my family and I used to be friends with him. But when I found out his radical tendencies and inclinations, I stayed away from him and tried to advise him. But Tariq al-Zummar had succeeded in recruiting him to the Islamic groups. 'Abbud is Tariq's cousin and is married to Tariq's sister. What is surprising is that recently, 'Abbud came to the village infrequently to visit his brother Ahmad who is the exact opposite of 'Abbud and who is loved by all the village people whereas 'Abbud is hated by them because of his radicalism and because of his accusing them of atheism. 'Abbud used to invite some clergymen and some members of the Islamic groups to deliver sermons during the Friday prayers and to attack the government. But the inhabitants confronted the invited preachers and this is why the Islamic groups members threatened to kill whoever opposed them."

Hasan al-Sayyid 'Abd al-Shafi, the Nahya village chief, said: "'Abbud al-Zummar has no power in Nahya village. He tried to gain such power by attempting to impose terror on the village while hiding behind the protection of the Islamic groups which turned the mosque into a center for training on acts of violence, carate and target shooting. They tried to kill my brother but fled before they could be

arrested. I mean here Jad Abu Sari' al-Qassas, 'Abdallah Basyuni and Mahmud 'Abd al-Fattah Abu al-Majd. However, the entire village is waiting for them and we will not permit them to enter the village or to hide in it.

[11 Nov 81, p 15]

[Article by 'Abd al-Razzaq Husayn]

[Text] Al-Minya official authorities have discovered serious evidence confirming the violence and ferocity of the terrorist groups' schemes, the interrelationship between these groups throughout Egypt's governorates and the groups' connections with other circles outside Egypt under the canopy of well-studied schemes drawn up by leaderships experienced in organizational activity.

The efforts of al-Minya security agencies have also resulted in the seizure of a letter from Ayatollah Khalkhali, one of the leaders of Khomeyni's regime in Iran, in the house of a radical youth in al-Minya. The letter contains a promise from Khalkhali to marry his daughter to the radical group member in al-Minya.

The recent concerted efforts have also exposed the true nature of the armed robberies to which goldsmith shops in Naj' Hammad had been exposed. The stolen goods have been seized in the home of radical (Yabni) Mazar. The youth has justified the robbery by saying it was carried out on the orders of al-Samawi, the terrorist organization leader there, to purchase weapons.

The security efforts have also resulted in uncovering four dens of the terrorist groups where serious papers and documents exposing the terrorist organization's plan in al-Minya have been seized. The papers include graphs [presumably meaning maps] of the locations of the security directorate, the governorate and the governor's resthouse and papers outlining the size and volume of the weapons defending each position and papers containing ciphers which the security authorities are currently deciphering. Other papers containing the names and addresses of the terrorist organization members have also been seized.

The papers expose the plans drawn up for the attack on the security agencies in al-Minya. The plans divide the terrorist groups into teams, each including 10 members, and assign some of these members to pick up the weapons dropped by killed and wounded soldiers, as has happened in Asyut.

Beginning in 1975

The story of al-Minya with the radical groups dates back to 1975. At the time, the first group retreating to the mountain caves under the pretext that society was atheistic was discovered. These groups then started to spread among al-Minya University students and its high school students. The group leadership followed an organized and well-studied method to mislead those youths until it was able to control them completely. This led to the disappearance of family control over the children. The proof is what happened on the eve of the holiday when orders were issued to those youth to proceed to Asyut. The families were not able to find out the purpose of traveling to Asyut on the eve of the holiday. Those youth included law students who took part in the bloody incidents in Asyut.

The security forces were able to arrest the members of the groups upon their return from Asyut. Most of them returned wearing blood-stained clothes.

The distinguishing characteristics of the leaderships of these groups are malevolence, attention to detail, and caution, as in the case of Madi Abu al-'Ula, an engineering student in al-Minya who comes from a poor family supported by a father who works as a blacksmith.

Despite their dangerous leaders, the groups, most of them stationed in al-Minya, were not able to carry out their schemes in al-Minya due to the precautions taken in the wake of the assassination of the late leader Anwar al-Sadat. The security agencies had detained the members of the radical groups and this paralyzed the ability of the groups to engage in any action. Four or five members of each group had been detained and, consequently, the groups lost the efficiency they needed to carry out their activity.

#### Exploited Free Time of Youth

AKHIR SA'AH has interviewed Salah al-Din Ibrahim, the Governor of al-Minya, who has revealed other aspects, saying:

"We have noticed that the radical groups have exploited the free time of the youth, especially youth lacking a political or social background. Most of the youth are students in scientific colleges. This made the task of gaining control over them easier for the radical groups. Meanwhile, we have found that this phenomenon is not spread in the theoretical colleges because the students of these colleges study the logic. This is why the radical groups have found it difficult to infiltrate the students of the theoretical colleges.

"The movement of the groups started in the form of a protest against the university regulations and against co-education. They also demanded that prayers be held on time in the auditoriums. At this phase of their activity, the groups were careful to put the official agencies in a difficult position.

"The state's view was that of exerting efforts to correct the youth as immature individuals and of not resorting to violence against them. It is noticed that during this phase of their activity, the Marxists infiltrated their ranks according to a premeditated plan. Marxism is inclined toward creating conflicts in society. Those Marxists pretended to have repented, returned to God's path and to acknowledged God's presence. Thus, the radical groups agreed to include those Marxists in their ranks.

"The communist current was able to incite differences among the radical groups and to lead the groups toward confrontation with the government because this, in the view of the communists, realizes one phase of their goals through the presence of rioting and lack of security. The communist currents can then make their move.

"These groups then started to exploit the vacuum existing in the mosques. I have conducted a survey of the mosques existing within al-Minya Governorate jurisdiction and have found that there are 2,000 mosques. One-quarter of these mosques have their imams whereas the rest are left to personal interpretations.

"The radical groups were able to gain control of these mosques and their schemes reached their peak when they engaged in attacks exceeding the simplest rules of courtesy. This compelled us to detain them. We had to broaden our suspicions insofar as those elements were concerned. So all the elements proven by the investigations to have had a connection with the recent events were arrested. As a former police officer, I established coordination between the security agencies on the basis of my experience in security and political action. The measures spared al-Minya a repetition of the incidents which had taken place in Asyut. It was also found out that some individuals from al-Minya has taken part in the Asyut incidents. They were arrested and they have confessed to the presence of some individuals [organization members] and dens. Important papers have been found in these dens, especially papers pertaining to the plans that had been drawn up to undermine security in al-Minya. It had been expected that riots would be staged in al-Minya simultaneously with the Asyut riots."

#### Atheistic Society and Illicit State Money

Salah al-Sayyid, a member of the Lawyers Union (from 'Alwa), said: "I have volunteered, in my capacity as a member of the Lawyers Union and as rapporteur of the governorate's Liberties Committee, to attend [defend] the cases in which these youths are accused. In 1975, a small group was arrested in the mountain caves to which they had retreated on the grounds that society was atheistic and that they had to stay away from that atheistic society until a given time when they would descend and purge society. The group included 30 university and high school students.

In 1979, they staged a sit-in strike in the university towns, with the participation of the Asyut university leaderships. They were reiterating that society was atheistic and that the state money was illicit and they insisted on attending classes in their jilbabs because wearing [western-style] suits is sinful.

"I reminded them of the hadith of the Prophet, may God's peace and prayers be upon him: "He who does not respect his elders and show compassion for his juniors is not one of us." I tried to initiate with them a dialogue based on the Koran and the Sunna but they rejected all dialogue, as if they were preaching a new religion.

"They also relied on some unconfirmed hadiths, 'Islam was born in an alien society and will be reborn in an alien society.' This is why some of them say that Islam has returned as such and that they represent the Muslim vanguards which will liberate the Islamic society from the pre-Islamic ways. This requires, according to them, preparing with all the possible means, including money and weapons, to destroy the atheistic society and to declare all the existing executive, political and popular leaderships and agencies atheistic."

#### Final Authority

No member of these groups may express his opinion before consulting with the group amir [leader]. When they staged their sit-in strike at the university town, they detained the Christian students. But the police agencies managed to gain control and to arrest them. Then the late leader issued his orders for their release in the summer of 1977.



Salah al-Sayyid adds: "Then there was last year's case which was similar to the sectarian sedition incident in al-Zawiyah al-Hamra'. That case occurred in Jad al-Sayyid village and its developments affected the social relations in al-Minya Governorate. This urged me to present the matter to the Lawyers union Council. Colleague Fahmi Nashid, a union member, came and proved his presence with [defended] the Islamic groups and Mahir Khamis proved his presence with the Christians to underline the concept of national unity in the defense."

Truth of Khalid al-Islambuli

Shakir al-Jabali, the lawyers doyen in al-Minya, said:

"It has been reported that Khalid al-Islambuli who carried out the ugly assassination act is from the district of Mallawi in al-Minya Governorate. The truth is that he left Mallawi when he was a child and settled in Naj' Hammadi. His father, Ahmad Shawqi al-Islambuli, practiced law in Mallawi until 1970 and then took a legal job with the Naj' Hammadi Company. Ahmad Shawqi al-Islambuli moved and settled there in 1970. His visits to Mallawi have been infrequent and exceeded no more than a few days a year. His son, Khalid, was a student in Mallawi in his early life.

"Al-Islambuli family in Mallawi is a small family and the only well-known member of this family is 'Ali al-Islambuli who served in the judiciary corps until he was retired. He then again registered his name in the lawyers list and now works as a lawyer in Mallawi. Khalid's relationship with his uncle is almost non-existent. I met 'Ali al-Islambuli after the painful event and learned from him that he would not know Khalid if he met him in the street due to the absence of any contact between them."

I then asked al-Minya governor about the measures taken by the governorate to fight the devious ideas. He said:

"Priority in the governorate plans has been given to filling the free time of the youth and to revitalizing the youth outfits in the university, in addition to establishing coordination between the authorities concerned with the Islamic call, led by al-Azhar, the Ministry of Religious Trusts and the Ministry of Education. We are currently drawing up a plan in al-Minya to enhance the standard of the mosque imams and to implement al-Azhar's plan to hold discussions with the youth on an educational basis."

[11 Nov 81, pp 16-17]

[Article by Ra'fat Butrus]

[Text] The situation in Asyut is very calm. now that the storm has subsided and that the dens of terrorism have fallen. If the security forces are stationed here and there, then this is a precaution and not because other riots are expected to happen.

With the calm and stability in the situation, and with the dust clearing from the sky of the capital of Upper Egypt, the picture has become fully clear.



The first question that dictates itself is: Why did Asyut in particular witness the start of the movement of the terrorist scheme?

Maj Gen Mahmud 'Id, the Asyut security director, gives the answer on the basis of the reality:

"Because Asyut is in the center of Upper Egypt and because it has a university with a large student base that has come to it from the various governorates. The leaderships of the devious groups infiltrated this base and spread their poisons among the students who are fully aware of the conditions of the governorate in which they live. Moreover, Asyut sits at the foot of the mountain and this made the delinquents believe that it is easy to take refuge in the mountain when necessary."

"As for the timing of the riots, Brig Gen 'Abd al-Hamid Jalal, the director of the Asyut Criminal Investigation Department, asserts that the delinquents thought that the police forces would be busy on the eve of the holiday with the holiday services. They also believed that the fact that a number of the governorate officials were on leave would facilitate their terrorist operation.

The surprise which they did not expect was the security forces' decisive and firm confrontation of the terrorist scheme--a confrontation which upturned the terrorists' calculations.

After the dust settled, strange things became known. For example, upon examining the bodies of the 5 persons who were killed during the assault on Asyut's first precinct police station, it was found that the bodies were those of well-known criminals, some of whom had committed acts of robbery and looting and who were included in the list of criminals dangerous to security. Moreover, it was discovered that more than one of the criminals had come from the governorates of Qina and Sawahaj for the purpose after being hired by the radicals.

One of the regrettable incidents is the death of 5 children who were celebrating the arrival of the holiday in the street.

One of the more painful stories is the story of agricultural engineer 'Isam Bakri who was standing on the roof of his house which is located across the Asyut Security Directorate to slaughter the holiday sheep and to celebrate his first week wedding anniversary. He was shot to death by the terrorists who thought that he was a security man.

Asyut also tells the story of the ambulance man who asked to be excused from his duty during a surgery in order to extract a bullet lodged in the leg of a terrorist, and who was rewarded for this by being shot to death in the street and before the people.

There are other stories and they all recount the tale of those dark hours which Asyut experienced because of events imposed on it by dangerous criminals.

Naturally, the security forces were able during the events to arrest some members of the groups, especially those who went to the security directorate in an attempt to occupy it and to seize the weapons it contained. Maj Gen Hasan 'Ali, the deputy security director, snatched a submachinegun from a soldier and chased those members.

Meanwhile, Brig Gen 'Abd al-Hamid Jalal, the intelligence director, and Col Husni al-Dab', the intelligence chief, were able to enter the directorate from a back-door, thus completely paralyzing the movement of the terrorists and closing off all available exits.

One of the most dangerous terrorists arrested was Sha'ban 'Ali Ibrahim, the leader of al-Salam mosque group in al-Harra' area.

The story of Sha'ban is that after getting his B.A. in business, he joined the leaderships of the organization and was appointed the amir [leader] of al-Salam mosque group. When his father discovered the truth, he tried all means to dissuade him from persisting in this path, but to no avail. The man cries because he had denied himself medicine for his heart ailment and had taken all his children out of school to spare every piaster he could for the education of Sha'ban.

Amidst the dust of the bloody events, Sha'ban managed to flee to Cairo and to stay there several days before the security authorities arrested him while hiding in a furnished apartment which contained large quantities of weapons and explosives.

The members arrested by Brig Gen Rif'at Mahmud and colonels 'Abdallah Hilal and Mustafa al-Siba'i in the caves of al-Ghanayim District include: Karam Dhuhni, the official in charge of the Upper Egypt organization and the leader of Najib Ibrahim, the escaped doctor, Muhammad 'Isam Dirbalah, the official in charge of al-Minya, Hammam 'Abd al-Rahman, a preparatory school teacher, and Ghadban 'Ali al-Sayyid, an employee in the Animal Resources Department.

During the search for escaped defendant Muhammad Yasin Ibrahim, the security men found Istishhad al-Banat--this is her name--the wife of the late [terrorist] leader Shukri Mustafa in the house of the escaped defendant and it was discovered that she is Muhammad Hammam's cousin. Istishhad married again after the execution of her husband Mustafa but her husband had been arrested as one of those included in the latest detention decrees [issued by al-Sadat].

The dangerous members arrested also include Usamah Hasan Abu al-'Iyal. This youth had failed in his studies and joined the delinquent groups. He managed to get hold of an apartment and turned it into a weapon storehouse, storing in it a number of defensive and offensive grenades and a large quantity of flammable chemicals. He has confessed that he had hosted Najih Ibrahim, the escaped doctor, in the apartment for several days and that when the two felt the imminent arrival of the intelligence men, Najih was able to flee, leaving Usamah behind.

#### Najih's Mother Reveals His True Story

AKHIR SA'AH has been able to interview the mother of Najih, the escaped doctor. She is a woman in the autumn of her life and her name is Ruhiyah Jalal 'Abd al-Bari.

She recounted sorrowfully how she has suffered grief on the hands of her son Najih. He is one of seven sons I have produced. But he has always been away from home and he has always fought with his brothers, even though he has surpassed them in his studies. In recent years, I have noticed that he has become introverted, began to grow his beard and to absent himself from his place of work, thus causing him to be threatened with expulsion.

The mother tried to advise him repeatedly but he always scolded her severely and told her to stop talking to him and meddling in his affairs.

Sitting in the interrogation room was a lean and quiet man. He is expressionist artist Kamal Ahmad Muhammad, the brother of Shaykh Sa'd Ahmad, the imam of Abu Bakr al-Siddiq mosque, and the uncle of youth 'Id Sayyid Ahmad. The man is deeply grieved by what he hears and sees. His brother the imam and his young nephew have been arrested.

He recounts how his brother seized his apartment and his movable property on the grounds that Kamal is an atheist and that, therefore, it is permissible to loot his property. As to why he is an atheist in the eyes of his brother the imam, it is because he is a sculptor who makes statues.

There are numerous other tales in Asyut. The inhabitants there fully believe that there is bad blood between them and the members of these groups and that they must avenge the blood of inhabitants killed by these groups, be it the blood of the policemen or of the ordinary citizens.

Even though security has been restored to Asyut, the instructions which Maj Gen Husayn al-Samahi has received from Nabawi Isma'il, the deputy prime minister and the minister of interior, call for purging the remaining pockets of these outlaws. The mountain area adjacent to Asyut has been cordoned off and the mountain caves are subjected to ceaseless mopping up operations so that Asyut may become a city totally clear of terrorists and delinquents.

#### Roots of Terrorism in Sugarcane Town

We can assert that calm has been fully restored to Naj' Hammadi which has experienced only one incident that disturbed the security of this town which lives on sugarcane cultivation.

We must backtrack a little. Circumstances brought together youths Hilmi 'Abd al-Mughith and Khalid al-Islambuli in Naj' Hammadi. The first completed high school and enrolled in the veterinary medicine college in Asyut where he met Shukri Mustafa and joined him, being dazzled by Mustafa's faulty ideas and devious beliefs. Hilmi then became the right arm of his teacher, Shukri Mustafa, at the university.

Meanwhile, Hilmi returned during the school holidays to Naj' Hammadi after having turned into an advocate of radicalism. In Naj' Hammadi, he met with youth Khalid al-Islambuli who had enrolled in the Military College. Quickly Hilmi began to show off his knowledge of religious matters before Khalid who had the propensity for this radicalism.

The seed of religious radicalism was thus planted in the soil of Naj' Hammadi. It grew quickly and the members of these groups increased.

Secretly, contacts were begun between these members and the leaderships of the terrorist organization, and the members of the Naj' Hammadi group expressed their willingness to contribute to the scheme with anything.

This anything turned out to be the request that the Naj' Hammadi group contribute to financing the terrorist scheme. But how? This is where the idea of breaking into goldsmith shops in Naj' Hammadi, killing their owners and stealing the gold and jewelry to finance the organization emerged.

On the set day, the masked members of these groups attacked the goldsmith shops with submachineguns, killed, seized the gold and fled to the desert and the caves.

With the revelations following the recent events, the explanation to the Naj' Hammadi crime emerged and the mask fell from the face of the actual perpetrator: Terrorism.

[18 Nov 81, p 11]

[Article by Usamah 'Ajja]

[Text] Do you believe that 'Umar 'Abd al-Rahman, the blind terrorist who is the mufti of the terrorist organization, delivered the formal legal opinion permitting the assassination of the late leader Anwar al-Sadat while praising al-Sadat's wisdom, faith, support for the oppressed and closure of the detention camps?

The mufti is the same man who was expelled from Pious and Charitable Society which accused him of embezzling donation money and of mistreating the society members. He is also the man who took control of a mosque in al-Fayyum, ordered that the mosque custodian be expelled, prevented from praying at the mosque and be beaten.

How did 'Umar 'Abd al-Rahman turn from a detainee released by al-Sadat to a clergyman advocating terrorism and permitting murder?

The story of the organization's blind mufti, 'Umar 'Abd al-Rahman who was an instructor at the Principles of Religion College, starts years ago. He was born in al-Manzilah, in al-Daqahliyah Governorate, which witnessed the beginnings of his radicalism. He suffered a lot with his social conditions and this is where the roots of his radical activity lie.

Ibrahim Farahat, a neighbor of terrorist mufti 'Umar 'Abd al-Rahman, had been accused by 'Umar of atheism because he listens to the radio and watches television.

'Umar was arrested in all the campaigns launched against the Muslim Brotherhood in 1954 and 1965. He then moved and settled in the city of al-Fayyum. In 1966, and as a result of becoming aware of the vigilance of the security man, he fled to Saudi Arabia where he lived for 4 years.

Upon his return, he was appointed to the Principles of Religion College in Asyut where his activity extended and branched to al-Manzilah, his home town, Cairo, where his relatives live, al-Fayyum, where he lived for a time and Asyut, where he has been teaching.

Night Vistors

Ibrahim Farahat, the mufti's neighbor and a drug company employee, has said: "After marrying a teacher from al-Fayyum Trade School, the mufti settled down completely in al-Fayyum even though his wife is from Bani Suwayf.



"He often tried to interfere even in our private life by attempting to stop us from listening to radio and watching television and by putting pressure on us to get rid of us.

"I was surprised to find that his visitors used to come at late hours of the night. But I thought at the time that they came to seek religious advice from him.

"But the stunning thing which we had never expected was the formal legal opinion he delivered permitting the assassination of martyr al-Sadat. All of al-Fayyum still remembers the numerous sermons he delivered from this mosque praising Anwar al-Sadat for releasing the political detainees, of whom 'Umar was one, at the outset of his presidency in 1971.

"One of the surprising things that draw attention is that 'Umar was the chairman of the Islamic Renaissance Society in al-Fayyum and that he collected numerous donations for this society. But disagreement developed suddenly between him and the society members and so he left the society and shifted his entire activity to al-Taqwa mosque in al-Fayyum."

#### Fight Over Mosque

At al-Taqwa mosque, which witnessed all of 'Umar's activity recently, Sayyid Abu al-'Aynayn, the mosque worker, complained to me about the conduct of 'Umar 'Abd al-Rahman and his followers and their attempt to oust him from the mosque in any possible way. Sayyid said that even though the mosque land belongs to the charitable society of al-Nuwayri and even though I was entrusted with guarding the mosque, 'Umar and his followers seized the mosque and refused to allow a follower of the society to be present there. This is why I was often insulted by his followers, was prevented from performing my prayers at the mosque and was even beaten by them.

Ahmad (Wanli) Abu Khazin, an employee in the irrigation department and one of those frequenting the mosque, said: "Many members of the congregation abandoned that mosque because the followers of 'Umar 'Abd al-Rahman got control of the mosque, especially since those followers performed in it strange religious rites different from the customary religious rites. Because the mosque was not controlled by the [Ministry of Religious] Trusts, it was easy for 'Umar 'Abd al-Rahman to assume its imamship and to spread through the mosque his poisons that are totally unrelated to our orthodox religion. All his recent talks and sermons contained open attack on the regime and cast doubts on the government's decisions and positions."

While in al-Fayyum, we were able to gather numerous pieces of important information explaining many of the actions of the mufti of the terrorist organization. It is known that he was expelled from the Islamic Renaissance Society 5 years ago after being accused of stealing all of the charitable society's monies, consisting of donations and grants. Moreover, his activity included receiving many individuals known for their radical activity, such as 'Abd al-Rashid Saqr and Mahmud 'Id. Numerous weapons of destruction, such as pistols, submachineguns, semi-automatic rifles and grenades, were seized in the possession of many of his followers in al-Fayyum. The security forces in al-Fayyum have been able to arrest tens of these followers in the wake of the arrest of 'Umar 'Abd al-Rahman at the home of one of his brothers in law in al-'Imraniyah, al-Jizah governorate.



One of the surprising things discovered in al-Fayyum was a tape recorder which the organization used to record and distribute rapidly tapes containing legal opinions delivered by the mufti, in addition to the sermons of the radical religious leaderships which were distributed to the masses in an attempt to incite them in case the terrorists' horrible schemes had succeeded.

[18 Nov 81, pp 12-13]

[Article by Ra'fat Butrus]

[Text] Karam Muhammad Zuhdi, the sixth defendant, is one of the most dangerous defendants in the ugly assassination crime. He was the amir [leader] of the Upper Egypt terrorist groups and commanded the other governorate leaders from al-Jizah to Aswan. He was born in September 1953 and was a student of the Asyut Agricultural Cooperation Institute. What is his story and how did he fall to the abyss of terrorism?

What is his role in the treacherous assassination of leader al-Sadat and in the dangerous scheme of the bloody terrorism?

Karam Zuhdi's record contains several other cases, including a case of an illegal gathering, and resisting the authorities. His activity extended to assaulting peaceful citizens on the pretext of urging them to follow the teachings of religion in implementation of his radical thinking.

He also assaulted the university guard stationed in the institute in which he has studied and often fabricated fights and clashes with the guard members to attract the student's attention to himself and to attract more followers to his thought.

He even went beyond all this to play a major role in inciting the sectarian sedition.

He looked for a right arm to help him with his movements and actions and his choice fell on Fu'ad al-Dawalibi. To guarantee al-Dawalibi's loyalty, he married his sister to Fu'ad so that the latter may become his confidant.

As for Fu'ad al-Dawalibi, a furniture merchant, his full name is Fu'ad Mahmud Ahmad Hanafi. He has been given the nickname al-Dawalibi because he sells old-fashioned clothes cabinets which his father, a carpenter, makes.

Al-Dawalibi thus became the deputy of Karam Zuhdi, the leader of Upper Egypt. Al-Dawalibi used to be one of the leaders of the Salafis, a group which broke away from the other radical groups which call for realizing their destructive goals with the force of arms.

Fu'ad al-Dawalibi was born in December 1963 and was a senior in the Business College. But he was expelled from the college because of the many incidents he had been involved in, incidents recorded in the official files.

Fu'ad is considered one of the main leaders who contributed effectively to inciting the sectarian sedition incidents in Upper Egypt. He was in constant movement to set up destructive organizations among the student base and to prepare the students

to give his benefactor, Karam Zuhdi, the reception befitting the Upper Egypt leader whenever Zuhdi paid a visit to check on the conditions of his followers.

Fu'ad played a positive role with Karam Zuhdi in the Asyut events. When his family became aware that the police were looking for him because of his involvement in those events, they hastened to post a sign on the door of his house announcing that he had been killed in Asyut. His father, the furniture merchant, hastened to receive mourners expressing their condolences on the death of his son. This theatrical was no more than a naive endeavor to convince the police of his death so that Fu'ad may be able to escape the arm of justice.

#### Accession by Force

'Asim 'Abd al-Majid Muhammad Madi, the eighth defendant, was born in July 1959 and was a student at the Asyut Engineering College. 'Asim is considered a member of the military wing of this organization and was the official in charge of the military command of Asyut Governorate.

'Asim got into a lot of fights because of his extreme physical strength and his ferocious character. His sole interest was to incite the student element and he used to roam the university and high schools to instigate the students to attack the regime and hate the government. He advocated disobeying the rules in the educational institutes, not saluting Egypt's flag and renouncing any actions abiding by the law or the constitution. Whenever he noticed that some students turned away from his thoughts, he would assault them, relying on his physical strength and his ferocity.

'Asim began to hold sessions inside mosques, especially the Shari'a Society mosque in al-Minya and al-Manshiyah mosque in al-Walidiyah subdistrict in Asyut. He used the sessions to incite hatred for the regime. He would then proceed [from those sessions] to the university with a number of his supporters to assault people inside the university. As a result, a decision was issued dismissing him from the university for 2 years.

The name of the ninth defendant is Usamah Hafiz Ibrahim, a 27-year-old student at Asyut Engineering College. Usamah started his journey with radical thought 3 years ago when he decided to move away from his family and enroll in the Asyut Engineering College. Usamah is an inhabitant of al-Minya Governorate.

Usamah's father, an employee in al-Minya Governorate, managed to find housing for his son in the university town and then left the son to his studies and returned to his work and family in al-Minya. In the university town, Usamah joined the radical groups which exploited his presence inside the university town to spread poisoned ideas in the student base.

It seems that Usamah felt that he was being watched by the security authorities and so he left the university town and rented an apartment to prepare it for use as a den for these groups. Usamah also stopped visiting his family in al-Minya. His father, Hafiz Ibrahim, was compelled to go to Asyut. There, he found his son spending extravagantly. When he asked him about the source of the money, the son said that he was trading in musk perfume--the only perfume not prohibited [by the religion of radical groups].

The father was thus compelled to leave his son and return to al-Minya. A few days later, the police found Usamah hiding in a den in al-Ma'adi district.

#### Suspicious Sources of Financing

What is surprising is that the activity of the groups extended to the society beyond the university and that the groups started to interfere in different ways in various matters. For example, the members of the Board of Directors of al-Minya Islamic Awareness Society were surprised by a group of these youths storming into one of their meeting on the pretext of taking part in the meeting to set matters aright. When Muhammad 'Abd al-Hakim, the society chairman, got enraged by this action, the group members notified him that they decided to seize the society. Before leaving, they asked the chairman to prevent the enrollment of girls in the improvement classes conducted by the society to help school students on the grounds that women's education is sinful.

'Abbas Husayn, the society deputy chairman, added: "The society members rejected the demands of the terrorists. A few days later, the members were informed that they had been sentenced to death by the terrorists and so they hastened to notify the police."

Some inhabitants of al-Minya tell the story of how the members of these groups purchased a big quarry next to the Nile and hung the name of a false cooperative over it. When the other groups learned of the matter of this quarry, which was yielding a big profit, they became full of envy and decided to break away from the group which purchased the quarry on the pretext that the quarry's success will lead to dealing with the government and that this is atheism and infidelity.

Many assert that there have been many sources financing these groups with vast sums of money and that the first of these sources was the big campaign conducted by the members of the groups under the pretext of collecting donations for the Afghan freedom fighters. All have asserted that the members of the groups used to storm business places and markets carrying weapons to collect large sums of money from the merchants and the citizens.

The second source was the campaign conducted to collect donations for the construction of imaginary mosques. The members of the groups used to carry boxes and solicit donations for nonexistent mosques. The inhabitants rushed to make their donations because they thought that the campaign was serious, and also because they were afraid of the groups.

The third source was the funds of the university student unions. The unions supplied the groups with large sums of money after the group members had managed to gain control of the unions and to seize their funds without any controls or checks.

[18 Nov 81, pp 13-14]

[Text] The death sentence for whoever participated, either by action or by instigation, in the assassination of the late leader Anwar al-Sadat.

This is what the military prosecution is demanding for 24 main defendants in the treacherous act. The charge does not stop at premeditated murder but goes beyond

to numerous other charges revealed by a small pamphlet written by Muhammad 'Abd al-Salam Faraj, the leader of the terrorist scheme. The pamphlet contains bloody rules and instructions which had been preparing for a dangerous terrorist scheme against Egypt.

What are the full details of the terrorist scheme and of the treacherous crime? How did they start and how were those frequenting the houses of worship misled to participate in terrorism under the guise of religion? What is the role of the main terrorist leaders in the armament, training and financing operations? How did 24 defendants, including two officers, a sergeant, three engineers, nine students, a teacher, a university instructor, a carpenter, a driver and an engraver, agree to carry out this treacherous crime?

The military prosecution has charged the first four defendants, namely Khalid Ahmad Shawqi al-Islambuli (a first lieutenant), 'Abd al-Hamid 'Abd al-Salam 'Abd al-'Al (a bookshop owner), 'Ata Tayil Rahil (an engineer), and Husayn 'Abbas Muhammad (a volunteer sergeant), with the treacherous assassination of the late leader on the main review stand during the military parade of 6 October--a crime punishable by death. The military prosecution has also charged 20 others, including Muhammad 'Abd al-Salam Faraj, 'Abbud al-Zummar, Karam Zuhdi and 'Abd al-Rahman 'Umar, with being accomplices in the crime through agreement, instigation and preparation--a crime also punishable by death.

#### In al-Islambuli Apartment

A few days before the military parade, 6 October had not been set or thought of as the date for carrying out the plan to assassinate the late leader. They had been planning to assassinate him in al-Qanatir al-Khayriyah resthouse at a later date and according to a complete plan for carrying out the abortive terrorist revolution.

But a large number of the scheme leaderships and leaders of the radical groups were arrested.

The primary reason for selecting the date and the occasion was the participation of Khalid al-Islambuli in the parade.

In al-Alf Maskin, [a section] in Heliopolis suburb, the final meeting to plot the crime was held at the residence of Khalid al-Islambuli's brother in law. Muhammad 'Abd al-Salam Faraj, the leader of the scheme, gave his final instructions and orders to al-Islambuli. Faraj also defined for two others who attended the meeting, namely Fu'ad Mahmud al-Dawalibi, a merchant, and Samawi Ibrahim Hafiz, a student at the Asyut Engineering College and the leader of the group there, their roles in the events beyond the parade.

The detailed plan was drawn up to execute the crime by opening fire and hurling grenades on the stand. The conferees assessed their success chances at 80 percent.

On the eve and morning of the parade, First Lt Khalid al-Islambuli exploited the opportunity of his being appointed in charge of the elements of the artillery unit in which he served and managed, through trickery and forgery, to replace three members of the crews of the vehicles by the three defendants the terrorists had



prepared in advance. Al-Islambuli was also able, through the misuse of his position, to bring into the parade grounds the ammunition he had prepared and to keep the firing pins, which are prohibited in parades. He also brought in four extremely explosive grenades, two of which he kept personally while giving the other two to the second and third defendants, namely 'Abd al-Hamid 'Abd al-Salam, the bookshop owner, and 'Ata Tayil Hamidah [sic], the engineer.

#### Moment of Treachery and Assassination

At the moment of treachery, al-Islambuli was sitting next to the driver while the three other terrorists were among the other crew members in the back of the vehicle. Al-Islambuli was able to force the driver to stop in front of the main stand directly and got out of the vehicle quickly, throwing his hand grenade. Meanwhile, the second and third defendants opened quickly a burst of fire from their automatic rifles and hurled the two other grenades. This caught those sitting on the stand and the men guarding the president by surprise.

Within moments, the second defendant snatched the submachinegun from the driver and the three jumped to the stand and were able to aim their weapons from right across the stand and from the two sides and to fire all their ammunition, focusing on those sitting in the front rows. The late leader fell in a pool of blood and seven others sitting on and standing next to the stand were killed, including Maj Gen Hasan 'Allam, Engineer Samir Hilmi Ibrahim, Anbal Samuel and photographer Muhammad Rashwan. Twenty eight others were wounded, including Engineer Sayyid Mar'i, Fawzi 'Abd al-Hafiz and Mahmud 'Abd al-Nasir.

#### Roots of Bloody Scheme

But do the threads of the terrorist scenario stop at the meeting in al-Alf Maskin and at the execution of the abominable crime of 6 October?

It is a horrible operation backed up by a large-scale terrorist scheme whose goal was to seize power, to turn the peaceful life of Egypt into bloody chaos and to turn Egypt into a theater for acts of violence and radicalism.

A small booklet written by Muhammad 'Abd al-Salam Faraj, the leader of terrorist scheme, and called "The Missing Ordinance Of God" includes black lies and faulty rules, which he claims to be derived from the Shari'a, and exposes serious facts which point to the first roots of the terrorist scheme.

Role of Muhammad 'Abd al-Salam Faraj or the prime planner and leader of the terrorist organization: Faraj is a recently graduated engineer who was working at the Cairo University administration. The idea of forming the organization started at the end of 1979 after the fall of the main cells of al-Jihad Organization which started with the organization in the Technical Military College. The last cell of this organization was the subsidiary al-Jihad Organization which was apprehended at the end of 1979. At the beginning of 1980, terrorist Faraj decided to break away from the apprehended al-Jihad and to work in complete secrecy, even without the knowledge of two other organizations which broke away from al-Jihad after it was uncovered. Faraj had also decided to seek the help of these two organizations in the last moments before carrying out his abortive bloody coup.



His views and aspirations met with the inclinations and ambitions of 'Abbud al-Zummar, a lieutenant colonel dismissed from the armed forces. The two agreed with dangerous terrorist Nabil al-Maghribi and a number of other terrorists to carry out subsequent executive roles.

At the end of 1980, terrorist Faraj and his group decided to form a consultative council for the organization to issue formal legal opinions and to distribute the main roles among the terrorist leaders in the various governorates of Egypt. They selected Dr 'Umar Ahmad 'Abd al-Rahman, a blind professor at the Principles of Religion College in Asyut, as chairman of the council to formulate the destructive opinions and principles which they wanted to spread through the organization. The consultative council included:

'Abbud al-Zummar for Cairo and Lower Egypt.

Karam Zuhdi as general officer in charge of Upper Egypt.

Fu'ad al-Dawalibi, 'Asim 'Abd al-Majid and Muhammad 'Isam [last name indistinct] for al-Minya Governorate.

'Ali al-Sharif and Tal'at Fu'ad Qasim for Qina Governorate.

Najih Ibrahim for Asyut Governorate.

Hamdi 'Abd al-Rahman for Sawhaj Governorate.

They also formed three other committees for the recruitment of new members and for armament, finances and training.

#### Plan to Occupy Broadcasting Station Failed

Even though the plan to assassinate the late leader was carried out ahead of time in order to exploit the circumstances of the military parade and out of the organization's fear of being discovered after the arrest of a large number of radicals who had taken part in the sectarian sedition incidents, the terrorists prepared a plan to seize the radio and television building, in addition to seizing the security centers and the sensitive government positions, in order to announce the bloody revolution for which they had been planning in the long run.

Instructions were actually issued to 50 terrorists to get ready to occupy the broadcasting building on the day of the crime and to declare the revolution on the same day. Those terrorists did actually come to Cairo on 5 October but because of the failure to assassinate the military and political leaderships on the stand, they were unable to carry out the plan. Their leader, a dentist named Muhammad Tariq Ibrahim Muhammad who is under precautionary detention, was forced to take the terrorists to al-Haram den where 'Abbud al-Zummar was hiding. Abbud held a meeting with those terrorists and drew up a plan to attack the central security patrols and seize their weapons. But that plan also failed.

As a result of this failure, the organization bases in the governorates were struck with confusion and fragmentation, especially since they did not hear the "revolution proclamation" after the assassination of the late leader.

Role of 'Abbud al-Zummar: 'Abbud is the one who drew up the plan to attack the security patrols after the failure of the plan to occupy the broadcasting station. 'Abbud was a lieutenant colonel in the armed forces whose opinions and inclinations agreed with those of the organization which was planned by Muhammad 'Abd al-Salam Faraj who included the main concepts of this organization in the abovementioned booklet. In addition to taking part in the leadership, 'Abbud al-Zummar undertook the task of supervising the training and armament operations and of planning the terrorist acts. He was assisted in this respect by Nabil al-Maghribi who demanded, on the instructions of 'Abbud al-Zummar, that every new recruit take an oath of allegiance before him.

'Abbud al-Zummar was one of the people directly responsible for the assassination of the late leader. He was also the liaison with Khalid al-Islambuli. The two drew up the detailed executive plan for the day of the parade. They were also the ones who came up with the idea of replacing three soldiers by the three terrorists and the idea of bringing weapons into the grounds of the military parade.

Al-Zummar also participated with Faraj and Nabil al-Maghribi in drawing up the organization's complete plan for staging the bloody revolution. The plan called for assassinating al-Sadat at al-Qanatir al-Khayriyah, but at a time when the organization was to be adequately prepared in terms of recruitment, training and financing.

The plan also called for seizing power after assassinating al-Sadat and the leaderships assisting him and then for occupying the security centers, the public security building, the State Security Intelligence building, the radio and television building, the central security command and the public telephone centrals. The plan further called for broadcasting false statements--pre-recorded on tapes--in support of the revolution and urging the masses to support the terrorists' movement.

Before being arrested, 'Abbud al-Zummar did actually assign a group of the organization to survey the positioning of the central security vehicles in Cairo's streets and squares and the State Security Intelligence building in al-Jizah with the aim of planning to seize the weapons of the central security patrols and of spreading a climate of terror among the citizens on the day of the referendum on the presidency. 'Abbud also assigned other groups to execute the plans. But those groups were arrested.

'Abbud al-Zummar was also a member of the primary group which purchased and supplied weapons for the organization in Lower Egypt and Cairo as of the first days of the organization.

[25 Nov 81, p 15]

[Text] There are strange tales about them in al-Sharqiyah. Why did the terrorists flee from their homes to al-Khatatibah desert? What were they doing in the desert? What do the members of their families say about their radical behavior before the escape?

The father of one of the terrorists, a clergyman, advised his son to behave moderately in accordance with the tolerant teachings of Islam but the son insisted [on his radicalism] and the father was compelled to disavow him.

One of the terrorists asked his father for money to go to one of the Arab countries to build his future and to steer clear of radicalism but they [his family] were surprised to find his name included in the list of defendants in the black terrorism case.

Four of the 24 defendants mentioned in the military prosecution's statement are from al-Sharqiyah Governorate. They are: Usamah al-Sayyid Muhammad, 'Ala' al-Din 'Abd al-Mun'im Muhammad, Anwar 'Abd al-'Azim 'Ali and 'Ali Muhammad Farraj 'Ali.

The four used al-Khatatibah desert as a den for their activity. They abandoned their families and their studies to devote their time to engaging in acts of terror and to preparing for the implementation of the black and bloody terrorist scheme. The fourth, 'Ali Farraj who is defendant No 21 on the prosecution list and who is a carpenter, owns a piece of land in al-Khatatibah. He used to claim that he was reclaiming this land and that the other three were helping him.

Usamah al-Sayyid Qasim, the 16th defendant on the list, is a student who was dismissed from al-Zaqaziq School of Arts to which he had been transferred. He abandoned his family and his studies finally and got married to a nomadic woman who had already been married before and who had four children. His father is a clergymen and the imam of a well-known mosque who works as an Arabic teacher. After numerous endeavors to correct his son's radical conduct, the father was compelled to disavow him. The devious terrorist left his father's house and settled with his nomadic wife in the desert as of 1976.

Usamah's colleague 'Ali Farraj is the one who informed on him and is the one who lured Usamah to the desert in the first place. When the other terrorist groups were arrested, Farraj informed on the place in which Usamah lived with his nomadic wife.

The military prosecution is demanding the death sentence for Usamah, along with the other 24 [23] main defendants in the assassination act and in the schemes to seize power.

#### Two Terrorists From Education College

The second is 'Ala' al-Din 'Abd al-Mun'im, defendant No 18, who was a student at the College of Education of al-Zaqaziq University. He left the college more than a year ago and worked as a self-employed engraver [also sign painter] in different parts of the various governorates. He put himself at the command of Muhammad 'Abd al-Salam Faraj, the organization leader, who was urging assassination of the country's president and those supporting him. When Faraj presented the assassination scheme scheduled for the military parade day to 'Ala', the latter approved it immediately. 'Ala' also took part in the training on the use of weapons, in addition to advocating and spreading the organization's destructive principles.

The third is Anwar 'Abd al-'Azim 'Akashah, defendant No 19. He is from the village of al-Judaydah in Dayrab Najm [subdistrict], al-Sharqiyah Governorate. He was a student at the College of Education but failed to sit for the general examination. He engaged in his terroristic activity with his other colleagues in al-Khatatibah desert. He took part with the 20 instigators through agreement with and assistance for the four who carried out the crime of assassinating the late leader.

He devoted himself and his efforts to serving the organization's goals. He also took part in transporting weapons, hiding the other defendants, concealing information and establishing contacts between the organization's members and leaderships.

#### Dangerous Carpenter

The fourth is 'Ali Muhammad Farraj 'Ali, defendant No 21 on the military prosecution's list. He is a carpenter from al-Zaqaziq who owns a furniture workshop at the entrance of the town. The history of his connection with the radical terrorist groups dates back to the time when he got married to the sister of terrorist Taha al-Samawi who is one of the organization leaders.

He had been arrested before because of his participation in his brother in law's terrorist activity and involvement with the previously arrested organizations-- such as the Renunciation and Repudiation Society and al-Jihad Organization. But he was released for lack of sufficient evidence against him.

But this time, his activity was noticeable and direct. His wife and his five children were awaiting his return but were surprised to find that he was one of the 24 for whom the prosecution has demanded the death penalty because of their participation in the crime, in addition to taking part in planning and carrying out terrorist operations and seeking to seize power and to spread destructive ideas, chaos and terror.

#### We Have Disavowed Him

At the home of Muhyi Hasan Salih and in the tense atmosphere of a simple family, we tried to interview the family to learn the reasons behind the deviation of a university youth from a family that awaits his graduation.

Hamadah Qasim, Usamah Qasim's brother, said: "His father is a religious scholar who graduated from al-Azhar and who is known for his learning, his faith, his intellect and his compassion. He has refused to re-marry after our mother's death so that he may devote himself to raising us. Sometime ago, Usamah's obsession with religion intensified. My father tried to advise him, debate with him and make him listen to reason. But he refused to change his ideas. This compelled my father to seek the help of a group of clergymen. They conducted a clam dialogue with Usamah in our house and discussed matters with him in the hope that he would change his violent ideas which had led him to prison with the Renunciation and Repudiation group. At that time, he was a student at the veterinary medicine college and my father went to Usamah and told him that he had transferred him from the veterinary medicine college to the School of Arts so that this transfer may constitute a new start in his life, especially since the court had found him innocent. But Usamah refused and left us more than 7 years ago and we knew nothing about him. He had no place, no work, no connection and no education. However, he used to come here at long intervals and in the night. He would sleep until the morning and when we asked him about his conditions he would answer that he was living in this vast world. Every time, we would try to tie him to the family so that he could resume his studies and his normal life but he refused.

He even refused to see his friends and he would ask us every time not to tell them about his arrival or presence.



My father, adds Hamadah--the brother of the radical Usamah--went many times to the carpenter 'Ali Farraj to ask him to stay away from Usamah.

During Usamah's latest visit, we all rejoiced because Usamah was wearing ordinary clothes (pants and shirt) and had shaven his beard. He asked his father for some money to go abroad, work and make his future.

This happened last August. Since then, we have been awaiting a letter from him to tell us of his arrival in one of the Arab countries. Instead, we have been surprised with his name being included with the 24 defendants accused of several crimes.

8494

CSO: 4504/108



IRAN

TEHRAN OFFICIAL EXPLAINS FUNCTIONS OF LOCAL COUNCILS

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 11 Jan 82 p 11

[Interview with Engineer Mahmud Sane'ipur, head of the Tehran Governor-General's Office]

[Text] Political Service of KEYHAN

Engineer Mahmud Sane'ipur, head of the Tehran Governor-General's Office, explained in an exclusive interview the formation and activities of local councils. In this interview, he announced that starting this spring, rationed foodstuff and goods will be distributed using booklets and that Tehran will be the first place in which goods will be distributed without coupons.

In this interview, the head of the Tehran Governor-General's Office emphasized that despite the fact that rationing coupons have helped ensure a just distribution of goods, this method does not conform with the nature of revolutionary Moslem people. He also announced his regular visits to the villages of Tehran Province.

This interview will be printed in two issues, today and tomorrow. Below is the first part of the interview.

[Question] Could you explain the issues concerning the councils in Tehran Province which you have proposed?

Engineer Sane'ipur: The issue of the just distribution of goods throughout the country, especially with the economic embargo and the side effects of the war, is one of the important problems that we face at this time. In the beginning, especially after the war, it seemed necessary to make basic changes in distribution, to free it from the market situation which would only end in stockpiling, inflation, and overpricing. Coupons were tested as a preliminary experiment. Of course, they greatly helped improve the situation

and prevented the stockpiling of large amounts of goods, stopping one group of profiteers. But, it was not a system which could blend with the nature of our people. It brought many fears along with it which made pertinent our putting coupons aside. The problem of counting and distributing coupons through the banks especially made violations and profiting from coupons possible. All of these were reasons for our discontinuing distribution through coupons.

The Prime Minister's Office and the national economic mobilization, headed by brother Behzad Nabavi and other brothers; as well as those who were in charge of this issue, including the economic mobilization headquarters of Tehran and this humble servant, after many studies, mostly considering the activities and experiences of the people through the local councils of mosques as well as booklets the people had prepared, trying to do what had been conferred on them in their neighborhood, as well as taking into consideration the scientific and statistical studies by the statistics organization and those who were experts in this area, arrived at the conclusion to put goods at the disposal of the people through family ration booklets. From our studies, we concluded that the job of the distribution of these booklets and the necessary continuing supervision over the just distribution of goods must be in the hands of the people themselves. If we were to do all this with government employees or through a bureaucratic system, it would require a large number of employees and much equipment, not to mention the great expense to the government. Considering that, essentially, in Islam, the government of the people by the people must be realized and considering, as well, the imam's decisive directive on this issue, the Introduction to the Constitution dictates that we must organize the people. The method of God's government is that we should gradually come out of bureaucracy and a Westernized administration to bring the people on the scene to act and to supervise and, in accordance with Principles 100-106 of the Constitution, which deal with the councils, the resolutions and decisions of the people and the councils should be given so much legal power that even a governor-general would have to obey them, not to mention a city governor or other government employees and authorities. Hence, we had to do our planning in such a way that this job could be done by the people, especially the dear clergy and committed, responsible individuals. The primary instructions reached us through the headquarters for national economic mobilization. We started the job from the bottom, from those councils whose nuclei had already been formed within the mosques. But, for many reasons, this was not successful. Although we distributed about 80 percent of the questionnaires through these councils and many of our committed brothers and sisters did their jobs appropriately, uncalled for interference, misconduct, and instructions which did not conform with the realities of the society in certain places--for instance, concerning divisions of blocks, streets, and regions--the statistics did not afford the information required.

## Change in the Method of Implementing the System

All of these problems forced us to implement the system from above. Fortunately, for the first time, the "Islamic Supreme Council of Supervision over Goods," which, in my opinion, can be a preliminary nucleus for the councils referred to in the Constitution, was established. I became the head of this council; Mr Sami'i, the secretary of the headquarters for national economic mobilization, became one of the active members of this council; and the clerics, who came on the scene through the kindness of Ayatollah Mahdavi-Kani, also became members of the council.

Mr Kani [as published] sent representatives and emphasized greatly that the clerics must come forward as pioneers and help us in this important work. And, in truth, they helped us very much. Hojjatollah Baka'i and Ayatollah Golpayegani became the core members of the Supreme Islamic Council. We formed the Supreme Council together with the supervisor or deputy head of the special guild court, Mr Nazemzadeh; Hojjatoleslam Ya'qubi, his deputy; the fully authorized representative of the Ministry of Commerce; the mayor or his deputy, who, in most meetings, was Mr Seyfian; the fully authorized representative of the Islamic revolution committee of the capitol, Mr Hazaveh'i; and the city governor of Tehran, who is not a core member but has taken part in the meetings. After the Supreme Council, the regional council had to be formed. We immediately formed the regional councils with preliminary meetings that we held with the clerics and the mayors of Tehran regions and other members.

## Regional Councils

[Question] In how many regions are these councils going to be formed?

Answer: In Tehran, there are the same 20 regions that national divisions have created. These regional councils started work with six active members: One member of the clerics, who is the supervisor of the council in the region; the mayor of the region, as the secretary of the council; the fully authorized member of the special guild court, who is like a prosecutor for examining offences and violations of sales agents; the fully authorized representative of the Governor-General's Office; the representative of the revolutionary committees of the region; and a local trustee. These six persons, who have legal power and are approved by the proper channels, began work by decree of the Supreme Islamic Council of the Province of Tehran.

At the present time, the regional council will meet several times and, later, once a week. They are connected with the local councils.

Rare issues that cannot be solved in the regional council, such as examining the budget of regional or local councils, will be examined by the Supreme Council.

To hold a meeting of the local council, three to five persons must be present, headed by the local clergyman.

We have 351 locals in 20 regions which form 13-33 councils. At the same time, the local mosques have varying numbers of people. In terms of quality and activity, there exist other issues which will be studied and, with consideration for the realities, the councils will be formed. The councils which I mentioned having been formed early on are fairly good.

#### Council Members

[Question] Who are the members of the councils?

[Answer] There is the local cleric, who is appointed by the regional cleric; there is the local trustee; there is an inspector and two others appointed by the local cleric.

On the whole, we have abolished the election system. All of these are appointees. Hence, if the existing members of local councils are good, they will remain; otherwise, they must be changed. All of these gentlemen get their instructions from the Supreme Islamic Council for supervision over the goods of Tehran Province.

In fact, the people deal with these local councils. Distributing questionnaires and collecting statistics and information from the people are all done by these councils. These councils will distribute the booklets. We will have 350 inspectors in the future for all of Tehran, which will be in 20 regional councils. They will do inspections on the general, overall level.

From an organizational perspective, this is a very interesting and important job. In other words, the government will be of the people by the people so that the government is gradually reduced quantitatively and not qualitatively, since the emphasis of the policy of the government of the Islamic Republic is on the people and a 36-million-member Cabinet which has the power of the people and of God and has much potential. The work will be entrusted to the people in this form.

[Question] Have these actions been implemented in Tehran alone or in other places as well?

[Answer] Thusfar, we have done this only in the city of Tehran, for obvious reasons. If this model succeeds in Tehran, it will be done easier in other places.



[Question] Have these councils been formed?

[Answer] About 80 percent of the local councils have been formed. But, most of them have not been formed exactly as I mentioned and have not been given official permits either. They should be formed in accordance with the instructions for which we have sent the charter. They should receive an official notice from us to begin work with legal power.

One of the good things that we did in this project is we appointed sales agents to sell to the people. In other words, in every location, determined by the needs of the location, there will be a number of needed sales agents.

The number of needed butchers, green grocers, poultry sellers, and all the agents who have been licensed will receive foodstuff and goods on the basis of the number of people and according to the size of their capital; we have based it on the needs of the people. Therefore, the councils have been appointed and the appointments will soon be announced to the local councils to determine in each location with a certain population, for instance, how many butcher shops are needed, how much meat every butcher shop should receive per person, and on the basis of what regulations and to whom the meat should be given. In this way, control will be easy and all the people will receive the goods provided by the Islamic Republic at the price determined by the government. The people themselves will do the supervision and no one will be allowed to misuse the system.

If anyone should misuse it or commit violations, the first time, he will be warned by the council and the second time, he will be investigated and fined by the special guild court which participates in the council.

Question: Considering the coupons which have been distributed, when will the date be to begin using the booklets?

[Answer] Tehran will start before all other provinces and cities with the booklets. These booklets will be distributed by the end of Jan or the beginning of Feb and must be used from 21 Mar 82. That is, the coupons distributed in Tehran will be valid through 20 Mar 82.

Question: What are the statistics on Tehran residents and migrants at the present time?

[Answer] The latest statistics on Tehran that are available to us indicate 6.5-7 million people. Due to the war and tribal problems, migration alters the figures. However, the minimum number is 6.5 and the maximum is 7 million people. In Tehran Province, the

population reaches 9 million, which is a quarter of the country's population.

Question: Do you intend to implement other projects through these local councils?

[Answer] Exactly. Once these councils exclusively handle the distribution of goods, we will have, in fact, done the duty of the government of the people by the people. In our opinion, since the councils are made up of committed, responsible individuals of the Hezbollah, who have made a revolution and created this system and who are on the scene, they are better able to do most of the work. Hence, through these councils, we got involved in religious endowments and requested a series of statistics through these councils. One thing the government needs is statistics. The councils are the best census takers, which can provide the government with the most reliable statistics. They also carry out the duty of rationing. In social and developmental affairs, political issues, and all other issues concerning the society, especially after laws related to the councils have been devised, which will be announced to the government by the Majlis in the future, these councils will be able to carry out in a more organized and coordinated manner the affairs of the Islamic Republic. We believe that the present councils are the preliminary nuclei of those councils. That is, they will pave the way for the great work which will materialize in the future. Therefore, we expect much from the councils and consider them more important than merely a vehicle for dealing with goods.

#### Differences in Rationing

Question: In some locations, there exist differences in rationing. Of course, this might be due to the fact that the booklets you have in mind have not yet been distributed. In some places, they allot 500 grams of meat per week and in others, 1 kg. Why? Will the councils have a specific plan in this regard?

[Answer] Actually, the issue is as you describe it. Due to these inefficiencies and problems, we were forced to distribute booklets. The booklets are the solution to these problems.

[Question] In recent months, you have traveled a great deal to study first hand the difficulties of the villagers. What steps have been taken and what programs have been devised for the villagers in regards to allocating funds to the villages and dealing with their problems?

[Answer] I have devoted two days per week to visiting the villages, Wednesdays and Fridays. Some villages are much worse off than others in other provinces. This might not be tangible to other brothers, but during the time I have been in this position and have regularly visited the various villages of this province, I have seen there are many difficulties. We have areas which were natural forests 30 years ago. Today, however, there is not even a hint that these places had been cultivated or trees had been planted [as published]. The land is not ready for farming, regardless of the fact that we have no water. If we are able to collect the water and prepare the land, we will be able to develop Tehran very quickly. These are the things that I could recognize because of these visits. One of our successes is that when one wants to make a decision from behind a desk, he at least has a point of reference and has already visited the location. This can be considered a management issue, which can be beneficial to other authorities; in other words, confronting the issue visually helps you in management.

Of the budget put at our disposal, which is allocated to regional development projects, 10 percent is put at the disposal of the governor-general. Of these regional funds, which amount to 4,800 million rials, 10 percent is put at the disposal of the governor-general for emergencies. We must spend two-thirds of this fund in the villages. This is the decision of the government and the economic policy of the government is based on it. We have spent more than this amount in the villages. With consideration for the plan to depopulate Tehran and have people migrate from Tehran to other provinces, which is another plan and can be considered elsewhere, we have decided not to spend any money in Tehran. We have allocated most of the money to the cities and especially to the deprived villages. On these visits to the villagers on the roads, on mountains, and even in places which one cannot get to on mules and we had to go on foot, we observed them, saw their problems close up, and decided very quickly to spend this amount through a plan which would please God.

9593

CSO: 4640/118

PLANS OF EMIGRES TO OVERTHROW KHOMEYNI REGIME REVIEWED

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 97 19-25 Dec 81 pp 8-9, 11-13

[Article by Amir-Taheri: "The First Investigation of Its Kind in the Turkish-Iranian Border Area; AL-MAJALLAH Enters Secret Bases of the Iranian Army in Exile, Interviews Its Leaders and Officers about Their Plans To Overthrow Khomeyni's Regime and Take Over Power in Iran"]

[Text] A large number of Iran's military men set up secret bases and centers in the Turkish-Iranian border area where they are training in preparation for a march on Tehran to overthrow the regime of Imam Khomeyni. Those military men make up what is called the Iranian army in exile, and their number is somewhere between 8,000 and 12,000 men. This is the first time that a journalist visits the Turkish-Iranian border area, tours these secret military bases and talks with those military men and their leaders about their plans against the present regime in Tehran. The journalist is Amir-Taheri, the well-known Iranian writer who is now writing for several world-famous newspapers, among which is the British newspaper, THE SUNDAY TIMES and the European edition of the American newspaper, THE HERALD TRIBUNE. In addition, he writes for AL-MAJALLAH. Amir-Taheri wrote this special report for AL-MAJALLAH. It is the first such report in the Arab press about this secret Iranian army.

The soldiers were wearing their field uniforms, and they were standing in line, performing their daily salute to the flag. This meant the beginning of another day of arduous training.

It was a little before dawn. The camp was an abandoned adobe schoolhouse like those isolated structures which characterize American western movies. Photography is forbidden in this arid, mountainous area, located in east Anatolia where, it is said, Noah's ark stopped after the flood.

The soldiers, all of whom have thick moustaches, look like Turks but they are not. One glance at the flag they are saluting reveals their identity. That flag has three colors: green, white and red. In the middle of the flag there is a golden logo showing a lion and the sun. It is the flag of Iran under the Shah, the flag which was abolished by Ayatollah Khomeyni's Islamic Republic.



But what are these Iranian soldiers doing in Turkey? At the present time they are training, waiting and hoping. Their camp is one of 22 camps scattered throughout the Iranian-Turkish border area. No one knows exactly how many soldiers there are, and everyone is careful to keep that a secret. Nevertheless, different estimates indicate that their number is somewhere between 8,000 and 12,000. They are the men of the late Shah's imperial army. They are led by about 50 generals, among whom are four senior former four-star generals. These generals spend most of their time in Ankara or Istanbul where their favorite place is either Büyük Hotel in Ankara or the Hilton [in Istanbul].

Officers of lower rank undertake the direct command in the camps, and they do everything they can to preserve the morale of their men. This is not an easy task. The camp I saw was located on a steep side of a storm-swept mountain. There were no means for providing heat at that camp, and one cannot consider the period of time these men are spending there to be an enjoyable vacation. The temperature there sometimes falls to 20 below zero.

#### The Camp Commander Speaks

The commander of this camp is Brig A.B. He is a 50-year old veteran warrior, who was a member of the Iranian force that fought in Zafar. Brig A.B. is a tall, broad-shouldered man with a gruff voice. When he talked with us, he insisted that his name not be mentioned. "I am not asking this because of fear, but rather because all of us here are unknown soldiers. We seek neither fame nor glory. All we want is to save our country from total destruction."

Brig A.B. says that he left Iran about one and a half years ago. He had served the Imam's regime for a period of 6 months in the hope that the "Islamic Revolution serve national interests." But with the execution of 300 senior officers and the arrest and retirement of 8,000 others in the first 6 months that followed the proclamation of the republic, it became evident that Khomeyni considered the task of "doing away with the army" to be one of paramount importance.

Most of the other officers and soldiers also relate similar stories. They all tried to live under Khomeyni's government, but they discovered that that was impossible. Many of them told me that they left Khomeyni's army because they did not want to kill Iranian Kurds or members of other ethnic minorities.

Some of them spent a period of time fighting with the Kurds before coming into Turkey. The matter got to the point that Capt Akbar Sultani, an air force officer who does not object to his name being mentioned, became the minister of defense for a Kurdish group led by 'Abdolrahman Qassemli. According to him, he left that group when he realized that Qassemli was a secret agent for Moscow.

I met another officer, Maj Morad Rahna-Fard of the artillery. He had slipped out of Iran only 3 months ago to join his colleagues in Turkey. He claims that most Iranian officers are sympathetic with the counterrevolution, and had it not been for the war with Iraq, the Iranian army would have actually "terminated Khomeyni's regime."

#### Two Secret Bases inside Iran

None of these officers shows a desire to discuss the army's plans "to liberate Iran." The officers claim that these plans depend on their Iranian leaders who are living in Ankara and Istanbul. These plans also depend on their political leaders in Paris. All the officers are saying also that not even the war with Iraq can now be considered a reason for not moving against Khomeyni.

Despite their apparent isolation from the outside world, these adventurous soldiers appear to be extremely well-informed about ongoing events in Iran, especially ongoing events in the Iranian armed forces. This is due to the fact that a large number of communications personnel go on secret and regular visits to Iran to carry messages and bring back the latest news. One of those messengers, a 22-year old soldier, says that he carried out 6 such missions last year only.

But where do these messengers go? It seems that the provinces of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan which are located on the border do not constitute a problem for these secret messengers. "Besides," adds Maj Rahna-Fard, "there is no government in Iran. Nobody is protecting the borders of the country. Khomeyni entrusted the al-Shaqaq tribes with the task of protecting Iran's borders with Turkey, and he is giving them 3 million dollars a year to do so. But the elders of this tribe look the other way when anyone puts something in their pockets."

There are at least two secret bases inside Iran which are reconnaissance and espionage centers for the counterrevolutionary army in Turkey. News indicates that these two bases are located in Salmas and in al-Naqdah. These two bases have 1,400 regular army officers and soldiers from all over Iran. They wear the clothing of Kurdish tribesmen so as not to be discovered.

In Turkey I also met Capt F.B., a 33-year old paratrooper, who had previously served in the Iranian force that was affiliated with the United Nations [forces] in Lebanon. Capt F.B. was the commander of one of these two bases until last August when he was seriously wounded in a clash with the men of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. He was transported outside Iran and treated in West Germany. He arrived in Turkey early last November to work as a communications officer with the internal forces.

Capt F.B. said, "The whole nation is ready for an uprising against Khomeyni." He went on to say, "The people are tired of the present situation. They are waiting for a signal from the army. Last time the people abandoned the army, and look at what happened to the country as a result."

This time the Iranians realize the need for not separating the army and the people."

Capt F.B. denied what is being said about the Iranian army which is at present fighting against Iraq. It is being said that this army is loyal to Khomeyni. He wondered, "How can this happen? All the command officers are our colleagues. We were students together at the Military College, and we served together for many years. All the officers are an indivisible unit."

#### Prisoners of War in Iraq

It is on this basis that the Iranian army in exile views the army in Iran. The army in Iran would play the principal role in bringing about the end of Khomeyni's regime. This is what I understood from the interviews I conducted in Turkey with the military officials of this Iranian army.

It seems that the Iranian army in exile is making plans so that by next spring it would have 22,000 men or the equivalent of two divisions. Leaders of this army expect most new recruits to be escapees from the Iranian army who cross the borders into Turkey on a daily basis. As far as generals are concerned, there is absolutely no problem. The number of generals in exile is enough to lead an army of half a million soldiers. However, the number of lower ranking officers and the number of non-commissioned officers is still extremely limited. Over the past 3 years hundreds of junior officers and non-commissioned officers have fled Iran to Europe and the United States. The counterrevolutionary army hopes to attract most of them to its ranks when matters begin to move more swiftly.

It is also evident that Iranian military leaders in exile consider Iranian prisoners of war in Iraq an important source of manpower for their army. Information and estimates indicate that there are 100,000 Iranian prisoners in Iraq and that among them are 2,000 officers and non-commissioned officers. Iranian leaders in exile say that most of those prisoners would welcome the opportunity to fight against Khomeyni in the ranks of the liberation army which is being formed at the present time in Turkey.

Those military leaders consider tribesmen to be merely supporting forces and not members of the liberation army. In this regard Brig A.B. says, "Tribesmen have no value outside their areas. In addition, they have not had much training in the use of modern weapons."

#### The Mystery of the Airplanes

The presence of at least two of the best Iranian pilots of fighter-bombers amidst the ranks of those soldiers in exile is a mystery. Does this mean that the liberation army is making plans to use airplanes against Khomeyni? If the answer to that question is yes, who will furnish the airplanes and the airports where these airplanes will take off? There are conflicting answers to these questions, but it is evident that military leaders in exile believe that a large number of pilots who are now in Iran will fly their airplanes out of Iran when the "appropriate decisive moment" comes.

Therefore, the alternative plan may be summarized in smuggling the pilots, who are now being trained outside the borders, into the area of Tabriz in an attempt to seize the fighter-bombers that are stationed there. But these pilots, some of whom had won the world championship in air aerobatics, are content at the present time to stay in Anatolia.

But how serious is this operation? Does this army have any chance to succeed in overthrowing the present Iranian regime?

It is difficult for one to imagine two full divisions marching from Turkey to invade Iran and traveling almost 750 kilometers inside Iranian territory to reach Tehran without encountering any serious resistance. It is also doubtful that Turkey would take a chance and stir up disturbances on its most sensitive borders in such critical circumstances.

And what about the Soviet Union? It is evident that Iranian leaders in exile are relying on Washington to neutralize Moscow and to ensure that only Iranians will take part in the battle of Iran. But does the Reagan administration want to do this, or can it do this?

Iranian military planners in exile realize that their only chance for success depends on two factors: speed and the cooperation of army forces inside Iran. Speed is not difficult to achieve. The area between the borders and Tehran is guarded by only a small number of troops, and most army units and units of the Revolutionary Guard are preoccupied on the war front with Iraq and with ensuring the safety of Iranian leaders in the capital. A well-organized force of professional soldiers whose morale is high can make its way through these areas where a majority of the residents support Ayatollah Kazim Shari'atmadari, Khomeyni's principal rival among the ranks of religious leaders.

Is There Coordination with Iraq?

But what will happen if the army in Iran refuses to join the counterrevolution? Because of the war with Iraq the Iranian army has been reorganized. Estimates indicate that there are now 400,000 men in the Iranian army, but most of those are new soldiers with little combat experience. The best Iranian divisions are stationed on the front and will not be able to move as long as the war with Iraq continues. Nevertheless, Khomeyni will be able to gather an adequate number of men and munitions to stop the invading force that the revolution will send. He is also determined to defend his republic regardless of the cost. Therefore, he may issue orders to abandon Khuzistan (Arabistan) so he can mobilize the army to defend Tehran. In this case all that the liberation army would have accomplished would be to ensure a military victory for Iraq. There is of course talk about negotiations between the Iranian counterrevolution and Iraq to get Baghdad to agree to keep its forces on the present cease-fire lines as soon as the signal for rebellion goes out. Informed sources are saying that Shahpur Bakhtiar, the former prime minister who has had close relations with Iraq for the past 3 years, is presently working to achieve that [agreement]. If



Iraq makes such a promise, the groups that oppose Khomeyni in the other provinces will be able to join the liberation army immediately. Iranian leaders in exile are hoping that the present leaders of the army will join the forces of the counterrevolution and that they will join the generals in exile in leading the liberation army.

It is believed that the naval forces are partial to their former commander, Admiral Ahmad Madani. Leaders of the counterrevolution expect the navy to move at the same time toward the southern provinces while Baluchi tribesmen in southeast Iran rise up in rebellion. Those leaders also expect that the efforts and funds they spent on other tribes will yield results and that there will be a general uprising against Khomeyni in various parts of the country.

But the forces of the counterrevolution have not yet succeeded in forming a unified command, at least not in the military and diplomatic areas. I spoke to many people who belong to various groups, and they all said that as officers, they believed that the army should retain the unity of its ranks. Those officers refuse to take part in political discussions, but it is evident that they want power for themselves. They regard the Turkish army as their model, and they believe that the difficulties Iran faced are due to the fact that the army was kept out of the political arena in the Shah's age and in Khomeyni's age as well.

If these officers were to seize power in Iran, they will not do so merely to turn it over to some politicians. After discussions and meetings that lasted more than 1 week, I became convinced that those officers have nothing but contempt for political leaders. They are very sympathetic with royalty, and some of them go as far as to say that they do prefer royalty.

The feelings these officers have for older generals are not better than the feelings they have for politicians. The gap between the two generations is huge and insurmountable. General Bahram Aryana, for example, who is 75 years old and is called Iran's Napoleon enjoys the respect of other officers. He is the oldest four-star general, and the respect he enjoys is due to his age and his broad knowledge. But he lives in Ankara where his "personal command" is located. It seems that Gen Gholam 'Ali Oveysi who is 67 years old prefers life in his exile in Paris. At present his authority is diminishing rapidly. Oveyssi was Tehran's military governor in the Shah's administration. Gen Reza 'Azimi, 70 years old, is utilizing his vast experience and the large network of contacts he formed over 10 years as minister of defense in the Shah's administration, but he too lacks the personality of a commander who would be capable of "liberating" Iran. Gen Fereydun Jam, 70 years old, is living in London, but he receives a large number of Iranian officers who live in Turkey.

Shahpur Bakhtiar waits in Paris and works through Air Force Gen Amir Fazilli. Bakhtiar is considered an important source for financing military operations in Turkey. Many generals and high ranking officers also look to former prime minister, 'Ali Amini to be their political father in exile. But it is also unlikely that he will have any share in power if officers inside or outside Iran overthrow the Khomeyni regime.

## Secret Emissary From Bani-Sadr

On the other hand former Iranian president, Abolhasan Bani-Sadr also began establishing friendly relations with Iranian officers in exile, and especially after his predictions that the Khomeyni regime was about to end proved false. Bani-Sadr is becoming increasingly convinced that he will not be able to return to power with the help of only the **Mojahedin-e-Khalq** organization which is headed by **Mas'ud** Rajavi. That organization considers the former president no more than a token temporary leader who can be discarded at any time.

Today the Iranian political arena is a maze of illusions among which are those that are being entertained by politicians who imagine that other people will sieze power in Tehran and will then roll out the red carpet and invite them to rule the country. The chances that the officers and soldiers whom I saw on the Turkish-Iranian borders will succeed may not be great, but these officers and soldiers will not roll out the red carpet for anyone if they actually succeed. Col Behzad Mo'ezzi, Bani-Sadr's minister of defense in exile discovered this after a secret visit he made recently to Iranian officers in Turkey. The officers welcomed Mo'ezzi with great warmth--Mo'ezzi is the one who flew Bani-Sadr from Tehran to Paris--and they embraced him as they would a brother. However, when he asked them to proclaim their loyalty to the former president, they told him that the army should be loyal to no one but the nation and its duty.

Iranian officers living in Turkey have helped hundreds of politicians from various groups, parties and factions escape from Iran. Those officers say they do this as "an act of charity." One of those officers said, "As far as we are concerned, we see no difference between major political figures who want to escape and the hundreds of women and children who cross the borders into Turkey every week."

At the same time those men, who dream of a heroic role, are leading a difficult life. They get 2 weeks' vacation every 3 months they spend on active duty in Turkey or in areas inside the Iranian borders. Most of them go to Paris or West Germany where they meet with political leaders. Many of their families still live in Iran. Therefore, they worry a great deal about the safety of the members of their families.

Officially, these men live in Turkey like tourists. They are not allowed to appear in uniform except in remote areas. Turkish officials are making considerable efforts to deny that their presence in Turkey is anything but the presence of "friendly tourists spending a vacation in the country." But it must be that everyone wants this visit to come to an end as soon as possible. No one knows when the end will come, but many are hoping that this vacation will end in the spring when climate conditions improve. For them, work will begin then, and they will march against Khomeyni's regime.

## EXILE BULLETIN INTERPRETS CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS

## Mullah Power Struggle

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 55, 21 Jan 82 pp 1-2

[Text] Reports from Tehran continued to hint at an on-going power struggle among the country's mullahs during the past week. There was evidence that the section of the radicals which groups the allegedly most moderate of them, former premier Mahdavi-Kani, with Majlis Speaker Hashemi Rafsanjani and a number of other prominent figures, was busily trying to form up support among the leading ayatollahs and also trying to be seen as less harsh in their doctrine than president Ali Khamenei and his close aides.

If it is true, one report that three of the top ayatollahs in Qomi, the very conservative Marashi-Najafi and Mahallati have formed a grouping called the Hojateyoun (implying the supremacy of the logic of a group of authorities) could be of great significance. They are reported to have anti-bahaism and a demand that the velayat-e-faghih (supreme religious authority) should be invested only in a group of the clergy and not in one man as the main planks of their platform.

The latter call must inevitably bring them into conflict with Ayatollah Khomeyni, who now keeps the velayat-e-faghih authority for himself and is suspected of wanting to hand it on to Ayatollah Montazaeri, long regarded as his heir apparent; though Khamenei is also seen as a leading aspirant for that honour. Interestingly, the Hojateyoun are considered to be close to Mahdavi-Kani, who is seen as a rival to Khamenei. Rafsanjani is also known to be closer to Mahdavi-Kani; but the supposed friction between him and Khamenei may be due more to simple desire for power than any great moderation in the Majlis speaker's ideas. He has been constantly calling for blood since the revolution began.

Though Ayatollah Oomi has been a constant critic of Khomeyni from his stronghold in Mashad his two colleagues have hitherto not seemed publicly opposed to the now supreme ayatollah. Again, interestingly, if the report of the new grouping is true, there is no mention of the really moderate Ayatollah Shariat-Madari or others closer to him being involved.

Stories of a purge of Tudeh elements in administrative positions have surprised many observers, for it had been felt that Khamenei and his fellow, more extreme radicals needed the support of other real radicals like the communists and other friendly leftists badly. As some supposedly better-known Tudeh members are said

to be still in their posts, however, it may be, some observers suggest, that the purge has been undertaken in those sections of the administration which are more directly under Mahdavi-Kani and his Militant Clergy organisation.

Flattery of the revolutionary guards by both Khomeyni and Khamenei in the past week could also be seen as significant in the context of the power struggle, some Iran watchers suggest. Tacit in Khamenei's remarks to them was a plea for them not to act independently of the government. While the president did not go so far as to tell the guards they must be subservient to the government he said they must coordinate their activities with it. This is an obvious reflection of fears that the guards may be vulnerable to influences from the "rival" group of the clergy, observers say.

Meanwhile, hopes of any ceasefire in the war with Iraq rested for the moment on Turkey, which has been asked by the Arab League to mediate. Turkey's closer trade and other links with the Arab world in the past two years make some attempt on her part to negotiate obligatory, but reports from Iraq and the war fronts were not of the kind to influence the Tehran mullahs to listen at the moment.

Diplomats coming to Europe from Baghdad said there was every sign that Iraqi president Saddam Hossain was now really anxious to end the war. While it seemed that Khomeyni and his colleagues still had the Iranian people in some kind of mental paralysis over the appalling toll of their young men, and continued to scoff at the thought that death was not sought after by every good Iranian Muslim, Saddam was aware he just could not afford to spread any further distress among the Iraqi population by losing many more men, they said. The western press continued to headline stories of how the Iranian forces were now getting the upper hand. One report, based on information supposedly supplied by American analysts, implied clearly that the Iraqis had now lost the war.

The Iraqi army chief Taha Yasin Ramadan, however, insisted in a Baghdad interview that the Iraqi army's "superiority has emerged." The Iraqi armour had been the master since the war began, but since five months ago Iraq's air force had also gained the superiority. A complete transformation in favour of Iraq had taken place in the field of artillery and the Iranian navy had lost its impact because of heavy losses. Iraq's army strength was 380,000 and would reach 450,000 in 1982. Volunteers exceeded needs, he claimed.

Iraq also issued a new warning to shipping trying to use the north end of the Persian Gulf, pointing out the area had been mined and was under tight surveillance from its navy.

#### Piecemeal Tudeh Purge

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 55, 21 Jan 82 pp 2-4

[Text] During the past few weeks there have been conflicting reports in the western press about relations between the Moscow-oriented Tudeh party and the Soviet Union and the Tehran regime. The SUNDAY TIMES carried a report by Amir Taheri claiming that the regime was purging Tudeh members from its offices and that party chiefs Nureddin Kia-Nouri and Ehsan Tabari were in hiding.



On the other hand TIME Magazine reported that the Soviets had offered substantial aid to the Islamic regime in Tehran on condition that the regime signed a friendship and cooperation pact with Moscow--a move which the mullahs have so far shunned.

There is evidence to suggest that the SUNDAY TIMES report is not altogether accurate. Indeed, well-informed sources say that Ehsan Tabari has been inactive in the party for more than 2 years. Tabari, well over 70, took up a quiet life soon after his return to Tehran after the revolution, usually living at an unknown address.

He was billed as a Tudeh party candidate at the elections for the constituent assembly and also the Majlis from Tehran but received only just over 50,000 votes against the 2 million claimed for the mullahs' top candidate. Thus Tabari, a gifted poet and literary critic, was written off by the party long ago, even though he was close to the late Ayatollah Beheshti.

Kia-Nouri, however, remained active in the Tudeh party but many people claimed that his position as secretary-general was nominal and that, in fact, young but unknown members were in charge of the party's affairs.

In the spring of 1980, when the then president Bani-Sadr, carrying out Khomeyni's orders on making a cultural revolution, marched at the head of club-wielding mobs to close down Tehran University, the Tudeh rank and file asked for specific guidance on how to react to Bani-Sadr's move. Massoud Rajavi capitulated, ordering the Mojahedin-e-Khalq activists to surrender their positions inside the campus to the mob. The other non-Tudeh leftists (Fedayeen-e-Khalq, Paykar and others) dug in ready to fight the mob. The Tudeh members favoured staying on with the other leftists, but they were told by their organisers to leave.

This created dissension within the ranks. And it was at that time that a new face appeared among the activists trying to justify the party's position with regard to the university fiasco. He was known as Mr Khosravi (his first name is given variously as Hamid, Mohammad and Bahram). He appeared now to be well in control. He said that in view of the small number of activists the party had on the campus it was wise to instruct them not to endanger their lives for an ambiguous cause; it was the party policy to go along with the actions of the Khomeyni regime so long as it maintained its anti-imperialistic policies. Incidentally, the so-called cultural revolution claimed the lives of more than 200 professors and students.

At the time the rank and file did not realise that Khosravi was in fact pushing Kia-Nouri out of office; they thought he was trying to justify the party policy-makers, including Kia-Nouri.

But several days later party instructors at a briefing session were told by Khosravi: "The leadership are criticised by certain young or otherwise hot-tempered comrades as lacking in revolutionary spirit. It is now time to clear up this matter. Let us say that the party leadership from the very beginning in 1941-42 were not altogether revolutionaries in the strict sense of the word. So the party chose to conduct its campaigns through parliamentary methods up until the 1332 (1953) coup. The same leadership is now in office. The time for a revolution of the proletariat is yet to come."

Since this lecture the party activists have seen a gradual decline in the position of Kia-Nouri. It seems to them that the party is being run by unknown leaders, who hide behind a shroud of secrecy. The party has always been very secretive. However, it appears that, along with Khosravi, the most powerful man in the party now is a former officer, Rahim Amoui, who fled from Iran in 1953 and returned in 1979.

Thus the SUNDAY TIMES report that Tabari and Kia-Nouri are in hiding does not signify any important development. Both men have for a long time been associated with the Tudeh party's mistakes, corruption and subservience to Moscow. They were expendable and probably have been ditched by the party overlords who are planning to give a new, no doubt more revolutionary look to Tudeh.

There are other points to suggest that the regime's reported crackdown on Tudeh must be treated with some reserve, sources in Tehran say. A major point is that known members of Tudeh and its now-allied Fedayeen-e-Khalq majority section are still in some key positions in the administration. The top men at the military tribunal, including the prosecutor who has sent many nationalists to death, are members of Tudeh. At the Central Bank, Bank Tejarat, the Ministry of Labour and some sections of industry well-known Tudeh members have retained their positions and control the personnel offices. They are the ones who encourage their turbaned bosses to dismiss experienced officials on charges of having collaborated with the old regime.

Because of the indiscriminate and wholesale purges of the civil service and professional ranks and filling of the vacated ranks by Tudeh members, the mullahs run the risk of a total breakdown of their administration if they were to dismiss all their Tudeh allies. Moreover, the mullahs are not capable of identifying all of the Tudeh people unless they bring back to service remaining top Savak cadres. But this too is not feasible--Savama has managed to enlist the help of a few Savak men but none of them are among the top experts. Unless, of course, one is to include General Hossain Fardoust, but his position remains a mystery.

Similarly, many well-informed observers in Iran do not believe reports of the Soviets trying to talk the mullahs into signing a friendship and cooperation pact with them, because they say that the Khomeyni regime would lose all its credibility among its remaining supporters if it did so. And the Russians prefer to have Khomeyni without a formal pact rather than have a strong regime in Iran with a pact. If Khomeyni loses the remainder of his fast diminishing credibility he seems sure to lose power. In that case the Soviets would either have to face up to the prospect of a new regime which is certain to be against everything which Khomeyni stands for, including pacts with Moscow, or they must intervene directly to prop up a puppet regime.

As it is, the Russians can hardly bargain for anything better than Khomeyni on their southern borders. He is more anti-American than many of their client states (like Hungary, for example); he is more vulnerable to Soviet takeover than some longstanding allies like Assad in Syria, Qadhdhafi in Libya or Castro in Cuba; and his presence in Iran does not present the kind of headache for Moscow that Karmal presents in Afghanistan. Yet Khomeyni has managed to weaken Iran so much that, if Russia were ready to take the risk, it could walk into Iran tomorrow.

But for the time being the Soviets would prefer to prolong the life of the ramshackle regime of the Islamic republic, Tehran observers feel.

### 'Vicious Squad' Repressive Measures

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 55, 21 Jan 82 pp 4-5

[Text] During the past two months the mullahs have embarked on a series of repressive measures to enforce what they have termed as pure Islamic ethics, travellers arriving in Europe from Tehran said last week.

"An obscure roughneck by the name of Hojatoleslam Morteza Hossaini has just been appointed head of the office of Good Deeds Instruction and Prevention of Sinful Acts," one new arrival said. "His official task is to poke his nose into every citizen's private affairs to make sure that sinners are duly identified and punished according to religious rules," he said.

According to this informant, Hossaini and his armed followers raid houses, and search them to see whether people are playing cards or using alcoholic drinks or other "tools of sin." They also demand evidence from the occupants of the houses to show that they are not sinners.

"This mullah has been appointed to this office by Ayatollah Montazeri and has the blessing of Khomeyni," the new arrival said. "Ironically, he has begun his work at a time when the ruling jullahs are talking of the need for the rule of the law. Apparently, what they mean by rule of the law is that repression should be institutionalised."

In a newspaper interview Hossaini has said that he would seek and punish "every adulterer, homosexual, gambler and consumer of alcoholic drinks." He boasted that "no sinner in the realm can escape my punishment." He has even promised to extend the arm of his operations abroad to punish all sinners.

Another recently arrived Iranian told IPS, "In Iran we all are wondering who puts these absurd ideas into the head of these murderous mullahs. All types, knife-pullers and other criminal elements, in South Tehran are signing up with Mullah Hossaini's squad to obtain a licence to enter citizens' houses to find out vice. People are amazed to see the world remain silent in the face of the outrageous things Khomeyni does."

The Paris-based GHIAM-E-IRAN newspaper reported recently that children are taught at schools to write up daily reports on spare-time activities of their parents. The paper said that at every school special agents are posted who take simple-minded children in their confidence and encourage them to spy on their parents.

DEZHBAN, a weekly paper in Persian language published in Europe, reported that "special agents" often show playing cards or bottles of alcoholic drink at classrooms asking children to say what they are. "Those unsuspecting children who raise their hands to show off their knowledge are later called in for cross examination to say how and why they know what they are," DEZHBAN reported.

Informed sources said that the project was fostered by the Qom-based Faizieh theological school. According to Islamic teachings the faithful are ethically bound to deter other faithful from committing sins, and to encourage them to do good. This simple teaching has now been exploited by the politically motivated ruling mullahs, people feel, to intimidate the population further.

The new sin-watching office, dubbed popularly as the "Vicious Squad," is the latest in a series of repressive measures adopted by the regime to enforce fundamentalist ideas. Last November the regime decreed that women should be photographed wearing headscarves covering all their hair when they need pictures for official documents. This order has been posted on the notice boards of the Iranian consulates round the world.

Sources in Tehran say an increasing number of independent theologians, who make up the bulk of Shia clerics, have now come forward to protest to Khomeyni that many practices allowed in the name of Islam are seriously damaging to the image of the religion. But their voices are muffled.

"Khomeyni and his gang have hand picked the most criminally minded and rejected elements in the society and given them power and authority over the lives of people," the recently arrived traveller told IPS. "Those who today impose discipline, without any accountability to Iranians would, under any other conditions, find it difficult to hold down the simplest jobs. These are the least qualified and yet avaricious elements of society who have got guns and a licence to use them. They are allowed to humiliate and plunder the people provided they do it in the name of Islam and owe allegiance to Khomeyni. They know without Khomeyni they would still be the rejected members of the society, so naturally they are devoted to him," he said.

#### Plans of Amini Opposition

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 55, 21 Jan 82 pp 5-7

[Text] Veteran statesman Ali Amini appealed to all Iranians to join an Iran Liberation Movement which he launched in Paris on Tuesday as the culmination of several months of trying to unite the various opposition groups into a single effective front.

He said the movement comprised many people, including intellectuals, but he was able to divulge only three prominent names connected with it at this stage. They were General Bahram Aryana, a former armed forces chief who is thought to have a big following among the military, and chief of the powerful Qashgai tribe of southern Iran Nasser Qashgai, who was exiled by the late Shah but enjoys much respect inside Iran, who have agreed to join; and General Fereidoun Jam, another former armed forces chief of the late Shah reputed to have sizable following among the officer corps and whom Amini said had been giving his moral support and direction in formation of the movement.

Amini and the other three have all had their reported differences with the late Shah, which, rightly or wrongly, appears to supply some credentials for aspirers to power even in post-Khomeyni Iran. Many Iranians have tended to blame the conglomeration of yes-men around the late ruler for many of the shortcomings which finally allowed his enemies to destroy him.



Membership of Amini's movement is open to all groups, he says, who would preserve their own organisations and identity and merely come together in his movement to coordinate their activities to ensure the first aim--the toppling of the Khomeyni regime. Once this was done all institutions of the "so-called" Islamic republic could be dissolved and its laws abrogated; there would be a return to laws based on the previous constitution.

A council composed of "experienced, patriotic and popular individuals," which, he announced several months ago, leading political, religious and other figures inside and outside Iran had already agreed to join, would supervise affairs of state and government until a referendum or elections could be held.

Amini told a questioner at his press conference in Paris that although he was not in a position to give more than the three names above, he could say the movement already included intellectuals and other organisations and professional people. He also motioned to others seated near him, saying they were representatives of Bakhtiari, Balouchi and Kurdish tribes who were with him.

Shahpour Bakhtiar, who heads the main opposition group in exile, the National Iranian Resistance Movement, has not pledged his organisation to the Iran Liberation Movement so far. But sources said he had promised a "watching brief" during which he would help guarantee a climate for the Amini movement to develop as effectively as might be possible.

Independent sources in the French capital said, however, that Bakhtiar obviously had doubts about the new coalition really succeeding as an effective political weapon or he would have joined. Other observers said that Amini had been unable to add much to his previous appeals for opposition groups to come together.

But it seems the veteran statesman has decided it would be better to form the basis of a coalition organisation to "get the show on the road" after the long prevarication of different opposition figures.

Amini was also questioned about the role of the young Shah. He said he had no direct contact with him, but he had been told that he was a bright young man with a liberal outlook. He had not involved himself in politics, which Amini saw as wise. When the time came that the people wanted him then he could become king.

The former premier also told another questioner about the war with Iraq that the 1975 treaty between Iran and Iraq was valid. Pressed about whether Iraq would accept that he replied, "Iraq has no choice but to accept."

A tentative English text of Amini's statement "to the people of Iran" is as follows:

"In the life of a nation there are tragic times that threaten its historical continuity and territorial integrity. It is during such periods of adversity when the survival of the nation depends on the courage and spirit of sacrifice of a whole generation. It is such hours of trial that call on the conscience of all citizens to subordinate their personal desires and selflessly devote their means and lives to the supreme goal of saving their homeland from disintegration.

The hour of trial has arrived. And if our survival instinct proves inadequate, we shall find no place for life with dignity and liberty on the face of this earth.

"Today our fatherland is swept by an unprecedented wave of fanaticism, superstition, murderous cruelty and black reaction. Innocent people are tortured and slaughtered by the thousands, while an ancient culture so rich and a national character so proud are being destroyed in humiliation. Today the human and material resources that should have been allocated for schools, hospitals, factories, farms, and cultural and scientific institutions are spent on prisons. Today the reign of terror stifles all constructive activity and vengeful ignorance excommunicates the joy of living.

"To be bogged down in petty personal differences at such a critical juncture is a transparent sign of insensitivity, even where selfishness is disguised as conviction and ambition as principle.

"Accordingly, the purpose of this statement is to invite all Iranians to join hands in order to rid our country of this illegitimate, ignorant and blood-thirsty regime. Let us resolve--to seek no personal advantage of each other or others who may join us in this great effort, and to impose no ideology or partisan belief, and be driven by no ambition other than securing the freedom and independence of our ravaged people.

"In a spirit of unity and self-denial, let us dedicate ourselves to launching an historical movement in the pursuit of the following goals:

1. The mobilisation of all Iranians in common effort to overthrow the rule of corruption, cruelty and injustice.
2. The dissolution of all institutions and abrogation of all laws of the so-called Islamic republic, and the reestablishment of an independent judiciary vested with the responsibility of respecting and enforcing all laws based on the Iranian constitution to ensure due process during the transition to such conditions wherein the people of Iran could determine their own future in an atmosphere free of repression and deceit.
3. The assurance of fundamental human rights and dignity, which includes the inalienable rights of all ethnic and religious groups, and respect for the principle of free choice in all aspects of life without the pressure of alien ideologies.
4. Respect for the authentic principles of Islam and abolishing the black theocracy that destroys the honesty of worship and privacy of faith.
5. The restoration of Iran's national sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence, and respect for international law on the basis of reciprocity in order to bring Iran out of isolation and move towards genuine nonalignment, which shall be the cornerstone of our foreign policy.
6. Launching an energetic campaign against corruption and abuse of political or economic power.

7. Revitalisation of the economy in order to encourage production and offer basic public services by adopting measures to build confidence and attract the idle skills and lost capital.

"During the brief transition period between the present chaos and a regime chosen by popular will, a council composed of experienced, patriotic and popular individuals will supervise the affairs of state and those of a strong government which will be responsible for economic reconstruction and rebuilding the armed forces in order to guarantee the rule of law and secure Iran's territorial integrity.

"the first responsibility of this council will be the declaration of a general amnesty, while providing legal safeguards for the adjudication of civil cases and the trial of those accused of major crimes.

"The pace of Iran's disintegration permits no further delay. Let us spare no time, no effort in preventing Iran from sliding down the dark abyss of extinction. Let us join hands to give all Iranians the opportunity to enjoy a decent life once again. "This text contains the principles on which the Iran Liberation Movement is founded. All Iranians are invited to join the movement on the basis of these principles."

#### Increase in Mullah-PLO Friction

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 55, 21 Jan 82 pp 7-8

[Text] The rift between Iran's ruling mullahs and the PLO has now developed into an open warfare, according to latest reports from Tehran and Beirut. It seems streets of Beirut and villages in Lebanon have been turned into a battleground between Iranian backed terrorists and their Iraqi backed opponents, with the main PLO arm, Al Fatah, supporting the Iraqi side.

Bloody clashes between Iranian and Iraqi supporters in Lebanon actually predate the war between the two countries. But it is only recently that Al Fatah is reported to have joined more directly in the melee. Meanwhile, a top Fatah man, Khaled al-Hassan, has publicly denounced Iran's mullahcracy in an interview published in a Bahraini paper. The KUWAITI NEWS AGENCY reported a PLO denunciation of the plot against Bahrain as "irresponsible" and directed against all Persian Gulf states.

According to some sources the mullahs ordered their armed groups in Lebanon to turn against the Fatah when the Syrian government fell out with Fatah leader Yasser Arafat. Sources in Tehran believe that Khomeyni did so because he was anxious to please Syria's Hafez Assad. But even before the revolution there was animosity between Palestinians and the Lebanese Shia group, Amal, whose commanders are mainly Iranian fundamentalists.

Informed sources give the following reasons for friction between the Iranian mullahs and the PLO:

1. The PLO, which originally hoped to benefit from the Iranian revolution, was from an early stage disappointed by the narrowmindedness and obduracy of an ally like Khomeyni. This was all the more evident when Khomeyni refused mediation

efforts by Arafat to secure the release of the American detainees during the hostage drama. Arafat could have bolstered his prestige had he helped secure the hostages' release, but the Iranians showed that didn't concern them.

2. Iranian-backed armed groups in Lebanon have frequently created unnecessary trouble for the PLO. And when Iran failed to become a major source of funds for the PLO (Arafat had hoped Iran could be as good a source as Saudi Arabia to lessen his dependence on Saudis) the Palestinians realised an ally like Iran was a political liability with few compensations.

3. Iran's efforts to transform the Palestinian question from an Arab-Israeli confrontation into an Islamic issue proved to be counterproductive to the best interests of the PLO.

To these must be added the disturbances in Iran, especially the rift between the Mojahedin (supported by Palestinian leftist terrorist groups) and the mullahs, as well as Iranian efforts to inject yet a new element into the already complex rivalries among various Palestinian groups.

Arafat first earned the wrath of the mullahs when he refused last year to announce publicly that Iraq's Saddam Hossain was the aggressor in the war with Iran. Later, when Arafat gave a cautious approval to Fahd's peace plan, he was branded as an American stooge by the mullahs, which in their jargon, means he is a traitor to Islam and Palestine. And now Arafat's close aide, Khaled al-Hassan, and other official spokesmen have hit back. Several months ago another top PLO man, though not a Fatah member, Hani al-Hassan, roundly criticised the mullahs.

The mullahs have joined the Palestinian free-for-all at a time when the Syrian-backed As-Saiqa group has turned its guns against Arafat. One report actually claimed that gunmen in the pay of Syria had shot at Arafat, but he escaped unhurt. His driver was killed.

For the Khomeyni regime the latest rift with the PLO could be a major political setback both at home and abroad. Khomeyni's close ties with Palestinians had been hailed by the mullahs as the main feature of the Islamic revolution's international character. Now the regime will find it difficult to justify a breach with an organisation like PLO which was once both a benefactor and a beneficiary of Khomeyni's revolution.

#### Efforts for Supplier Credits

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 55, 21 Jan 82 p 12

[Text] Iran's government has been engaged in talks recently to obtain suppliers' credits from Japanese, West German and possibly British sources, reports indicated last week. The country's foreign exchange reserves are said to be almost totally exhausted.

Reports said that Iran offered to barter oil for \$200 million credits from Japan. But the Japanese have refused to negotiate. Instead, they have told Iran



to accept full financing for the Bandar Khomeini (Bandar Shapour) petrochemical plant. The mullahs were so enraged by the Japanese attitude that president Khamenei last week had to call them "worse than imperialists."

Meanwhile, a team of officials from Central Bank and the prime minister's office have been in West Germany, the Netherlands and Britain ostensibly to manage Iranian accounts with the American banks, but also trying to raise short-term credits placing oil as collateral. Nothing is known of their outcome.

Reports indicate that trade with Rumania and Hungary is not going on smoothly since they demand hard currency, which is short in Iran.

Iranians have also offered oil at discount prices to the spot market operators, apparently waiving guarantees that it should not be sold to such countries as South Africa. But to their surprise, there seem to be no takers. Officials in Tehran accused the Islamic republic's enemies in the West of creating obstacles to sales to weaken Iran.

Efforts to obtain credits from Libya have not met with success, either because Libyans are themselves in poor financial position. Now Iranians are trying to ship crude oil to Turkey to obtain Turkish-made manufactured hardware as well as agricultural raw materials. Turks are striking a hard bargain trying to obtain a freeze on their loans to Iran and discount on prices of oil. A press conference given by Plan chief Mohammad Taghi Banki after talks in Rome this week also gave strong signals that he had found little joy there. He denied Iran had asked for credits, saying they were discussing joint projects, and seemed touchy when he replied to a question on bartering oil.

CSO: 4600/225

CBI DIRECTOR DISCUSSES U.S. CLAIMS, CURRENCY RESERVES

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 21 Jan 82 pp 1, 3, 23 Jan 82 p 1

[Text] TEHRAN - "Most of the U.S. claims against Iran were baseless and proved to be wrong," said the governor of Central Bank of Iran yesterday while talking on the settlement process of Iran - U.S. dispute in accordance to the Algerian accord on the U.S. hostages issue.

Dr. Mohsen Nourbakhsh participated in an exclusive interview for the TEHRAN TIMES and responded to a number of question on Iran's assets and properties vis-a-vis the hostage issue and the situation of currency reserves of the country among other things.

The first installment of the interview follows:

Q: Please update the state of Iran's assets in U.S. banks and Iran's properties in connection with the hostage issue.

A: The last date upto which both the parties could have filed their petitions against each other in the international court of The Hague expired on January 19, but as a matter of fact, a stalemate has been established in this respect.

The developments throughout this period were concentrated on three phases. In the early stages, when our assets were transferred, a portion of differences remained, to be solved by us with the banks and this \$1,400,000,000 remained in London for negotiations with the banks, while \$ one billion stayed in Holland. Therefore, we have petitions against each other. And also

there were direct negotiations between the two claimants to solve the issues.

In London, negotiations still continue and I believe (it depends on how the other party deals with the issue) we can solve the differences and reach an understanding.

Of course, even if this issue is not solved, it will be referred to the arbitration for solution.

We have filed a wide range of all-inclusive petition in The Hague. This covers a \$480,000 claim of a driver whose tanker was set on fire by the aggressive U.S. imperialistic militarists in Tabas catastrophe as well as claims on the issue of 28th Mordad coup d'etat in the year 1332 and U.S. intervention in this coup and the major financial resources the Americans took from us which is estimated at \$ 12 billion.

In other words, the petition covers a very wide range of claims. We have tried, with all our possibilities and power, to compose all these combination in the form of a petition which is in fact the complain of our nation against the imperialistic U.S. government, and submit it for arbitration.

Also, during the negotiations, so far it has been proved that many of the U.S. claims were baseless and, pertinently we observed that their \$ 100 million claim dropped to \$ 5 million.

This indicates that most of the U.S. petitions lack the required truthfulness, whereas

what we filed as a petition is based on authenticity and reason, substantiated with required documents.

Right now the negotiations are centered in London and Holland, the main portion of the proceedings being in Holland, and we have tried to allocate the necessary staff there in order that we should tackle this issue more actively.

God willing, we will reclaim what belongs to this nation.

Q: How long do you think it will take?

A: Our aim is to seek a just decision whereby the deserving party would be paid. But when they have claims, some of which are ill-founded and groundless, well, we will certainly put up a strong resistance and that is when the proceeding of the court is foreseen to prolong for great lengths and may perhaps take even 50 years.

But in case we encounter a company which has a legitimate claim and is based on required reasons and authenticity, then we, the Islamic Republic government, will never withhold our compliance to legitimate demands.

However, I stress that the claims made by the Americans must be based upon facts, while it is not so. For example let us presume that a U.S. company brought a few rigs into Iran, worth \$5 million and the company is now demand-

ing damages equivalent to \$100 million. Well, we are certainly not going to surrender against such claims.

So this will prolong the process of the court, whereas, if they are straightforward, the issue will certainly be solved within a shorter period.

Q: Please describe the foreign exchange currency situation of the country.

A: The enemy experimented with all affairs in our country in an effort to deal blows in different ways. From the political as well as the military point of view, an example of which is Iraq's imposed war on Iran, and also the terrorism in the country.

The enemies saw the failure of all their plans and by spreading rumors, they portray Iran as a country which faces difficulties in regard to the currency reserves.

Thanks to Allah, the revelation of the enemy's grounds have proved to the people that such was not the case.

The situation is that Iran has been in the current war over a year. No government helps us for direct purchase of arms and we have to purchase the required arms indirectly. (The Wall Street Journal itself has announced that the Iraqi government was forced to take a loan of about \$20 (Twenty) billion to continue the war whereas Iran did not take loan of even one dollar from anyone).

I, as an authority of the Central Bank of Iran, announce that fortunately our people have proved in various respects that they are ready to accept hardships rather than to surrender.

We will certainly have no difficulties in foreign exchange reserves. The savings plans the government implemented in different fields, and accepted by the people, helped us to prepare the income and expenditure schedule of the foreign exchange in a way that keeps the currency reserves intact.

I once again announce that the level of the reserves is maintained and it has not decreased at all.

With our plan and way of programming the requirements, i.e. allocation of specific

amounts for specific tasks within the available foreign exchange revenues, we can continue the war in the long term even without turning to foreign sources and taking loans.

Well, such an action creates a series of limitations within the country. For example, chickens are not available now in the vast quantities that were available before the war, or the eggs and meat, might not be available in huge quantities.

But our nation accepts these shortages because the people know that the country's officials are struggling to safeguard the honor and prestige of the country in order to reach a stage of self-sufficiency in the long term with our own domestic resources.

We do not have any difficulties as regard foreign exchange because we have succeeded in limiting the level of expenditure of currency which keeps the currency reserves intact.

We can easily maintain ourselves and continue to do so until such time as the war ends and without having to worry about anything.

Q: What are the sources of income of the government? And can this income meet the economic difficulties of war, etc.?

A: Apparently, the country's sources of income in rials is based on oil revenues and taxes. Of course, these two sources have been the traditional sources of income for a long time and we are hoping to create new sources of income.

The sources of income now coupled with other domestic revenues i.e. utilization of required banking system, helped us to successfully spend the spring of the year 1360 without facing handicaps.

For the next year of 1361, the approved budget efforts towards programming of the budget will be based on the two sources of income, oil and taxes, and interest on foreign trade in a way that allocates the necessary sources required by the executive organs and to present a balanced budget to the Islamic Consultative Majlis (Parliament).

Our main sources of earning foreign exchange revenues

are the income from the exports of oil and carpets. Regretfully, the non-oil foreign currency revenues have fallen considerably within the last two years: the main reason being increase in the value of dollar in the black market.

The increase has been brought about by some people who regretfully sell carpets in order to sell dollars in the free market.

The Ministry of Commerce has charted out plans in this respect, and the CBI has also some encouraging plans, to be implemented throughout the year 1361, to correct the situation.

With these plans, we are hoping to encourage the non-oil exports as well and to earn more foreign revenue.

Q: Has CBI any specific plan to minimize the rate of dollar in the free market (each dollar currently being sold at about Rials 300.)

A: The black market comes about when the CBI winds up all sources that create currency income and allocates it for the government for distribution in accordance with the programs and policies determined by the government.

Well, the black market is destroyed when we supply a portion of dollars to the market to meet the requirements of those who buy dollars from the free market.

In such a case, the price of a dollar in the free market will reach the level of its official price. This was the policy of the former regime. But we look upon the issue from a different angle.

The foreign exchange earned from the oil revenues belong to the nation and is a public property and the foreign exchange, therefore, belongs to all people of the nation.

In order to eliminate the black market or to equalize the official and free market rates of the dollar, we cannot allocate foreign currency for a limited number of people who enjoy greater facilities.

The black market does not hurt us now. Of course, this does not mean an official recognition of the black market. It is the duty of the security officials to stop the

black markets with the help of CBI.

But, anyway, the black market situation is not so alarming that the CBI should pump dollars to stop the black market.

Q: Is there any authentic and specific embezzlement, sabotage, and conspiracies in connection with the former CBI governor and the Baniadr gang in general?

A: I can say that former CBI Governor Nobari planned to create hurdles in the way of Martyr Premier Rajai for his cabinet's development plans in order to fail him in his mission.

The CBI manpower and forces, who could have been utilized to serve the revolution, were put in that negative direction due to the mistakes of the management and Nobari's abuse of power.

When I was appointed to head CBI, first of all, almost the majority of the CBI manpower and forces mobilized themselves to serve the revolution. So, it was the policy of the former CBI governor who abused his power that had given CBI the wrong direction.

If I come across authentic legal cases regarding Nobari's sabotage, I prefer to refer them to the High Judicial Council for legal follow ups. I would have talked to the press about it at a suitable time.

Nobari, however, instead of using experts in the bank to support and mobilize the government to achieve the rights of the nation from America, used to ceaselessly search around for one contract and communicate or the other to hit the government by having every minor issue enlarged through the articles in the Enghelab-e-Eslami newspaper. He had made every effort to distort the fact.

Presently, there is no trace of his gang and we have succeeded in having CBI serve the government with the help of Allah.

Q: What is your message to the people of the world, especially the Moslems and the deprived?

A: My message to the Moslems of the world is to closely follow the correct information sources on what is really happening in Iran and not to be fooled by the news network of Imperialism.

I think our revolution has created a transformation in the history of the world and the Islamic Republic has offered a unique phenomenon of "Neither East nor West" philosophy.

During my travels to the Eastern and the Western blocs -- and also my travels to Singapore, Indonesia, Africa, Algeria, Libya and other countries -- I felt that the young Moslem generation is motivated by this independent policy.

Even the officials of the foreign countries complained to me on that score and rather announced with surprise as to how the youths in their countries welcomed and flocked towards the mosques and were following Islam.

The cause of such an upheaval in other parts of the world is nothing except implementation of this independent policy in Iran which inspires and infuses hopes in the Moslems that they, too, can bring an Islamic Revolution with an Islamic goal of "Neither East nor West" policy.

This is the hope that causes overwhelming enthusiasm in these countries, such as what we see in Sudan and many other Moslem countries.

I hope their efforts will be turned into reality and the next century will be a century of Islam.



IRAN

INDUSTRIES, AGRICULTURE TO BECOME COOPERATIVES

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 12 Jan 82 p 5

[Interview with Mohammad Hosseyn Tula'i, governor-general of Khuzestan]

[Text] The management of factories and large industrial and agricultural complexes through the cooperative method is a new step in the expansion of the cooperative system throughout the country. Presently, a few factories and large industrial and agricultural complexes in the Province of Khuzestan are managed through the cooperative method. The steel industries complex, with 12,000 personnel, implements the cooperative system by forming various technical and managerial groups in the factory. Large agricultural and industrial companies of Khuzestan, such as "Iran Shell Kat" "Iran California," and "Sherkat-e Galah," have also been managed, for about a year, in the form of large cooperative production companies. According to the governor-general's office, with which we had an interview, and the authorities of the Centers for Expansion of Production and Development Services, the greatest part of the developmental, industrial, and agricultural plans and projects must be implemented through the cooperative system, because the expansion of the cooperative sector in the national economic system is one of the primary principles of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic.

The activities of cooperative production companies are based on Paragraph 2, Article 43, of the Constitution. On the basis of this Principle, providing circumstances and resources for work for everyone in order to achieve complete employment and placing work tools at the disposal of all those who are able to work but do not have the means, in cooperative form, through interest-free loans or any other kind of legal loan, is one of the duties of the government. In

accordance with this law, this step must be taken with consideration for the needs governing the general economic planning of the country in every stage of economic growth. The expansion of the cooperative system in the production and development sectors prevents the accumulation of wealth in the private sector. The plan for the expansion of cooperatives also prevents the growth and excessive expansion of the government sector and prevents the government from being a large employer. To quote the authorities, many of the large development and industrial projects can also be managed through the cooperative method. Among them, the cooperative plan for the steel industrial complex can be used as a model for other large production projects. According to one of the experts of the Ministry of Interior, the expansion of the cooperative system in the production sectors must be established on the basis of the principle of God as owner in the economic system of the country. This principle can be implemented in all the industrial and agricultural sectors. Experts also believe that by strengthening and supporting the cooperative sector, many of the shut down factories and incomplete industrial and agricultural projects can be reactivated and the active and complete forces of specialists in the society can be used to revitalize the shut down industries. In order to familiarize ourselves with the way the cooperative system will be implemented in the large industrial complexes, such as the steel industries of Ahvaz, we spoke with one of the experts of this industrial complex and with the governor-general of Khuzestan concerning the methods for the implementation of the cooperative system. In this report, which is the third and last part of a series of reports about cooperative production companies, we will also become familiar with the views and problems of a few other persons involved in the Centers for Expansion of Production and Development Services. First, to obtain information concerning the activities of the steel factory, we spoke to one of the experts of this industrial complex about the implementation of the cooperative system in the steel industries of Ahvaz.

#### The Cooperative Management of the Steel Complex

Concerning the management of this industrial complex through the cooperative method, he said: Our purpose in implementing the cooperative method in the steel industries of Khuzestan was, firstly, to spread the cooperative culture and, secondly, to properly use the industrial resources of this large factory. I must say that after the victory of the revolution, nothing was being done in this factory; yet, this factory alone had a cost of 730 million rials in personnel expenses. In order to revitalize this large complex, we announced to the workers that they could get money for accomplishing the work and the workers and other employees of the factory should begin production in the steel industries through the formation of various cooperative groups. /According to the latest statistics available, 52 cooperative groups have been formed in the factory/ [in boldface] in such fields as electricity, painting, assembly,

construction, plumbing, soil testing, machinery installation, and building doors and windows. The quality of the work of these cooperative groups is to be evaluated at the end of every month. The workers of the steel complex of Ahvaz are paid for the work they do. I must say that in the steel complex of Ahvaz, we were not confronted with the critical issues and problems of cooperative production companies. In other words, we did not have the problem of specialists and technical training. The problem of lack of coordination did not exist in this factory and, most importantly, we were not faced with a lack of political support from the government. In any case, under the present conditions, the steel industry experts work closely with the cooperative groups and provide the raw material for the factory in the shortest possible time. Concerning the growth and development of production cooperatives throughout the country, I must say that the continuation of the work of the cooperatives is closely related to the political support for the cooperative sector. In any case, this political support will also have undeniable economic, cultural, and social effects throughout the society.

#### The Views of the Governor-General of Khuzestan

As was said in the previous issues, the Province of Khuzestan has had the highest employment in production cooperatives. Hence, we had an interview with Mohammad Hoseeyn Tula'i, the governor-general of Khuzestan, concerning the development of production cooperatives. First, concerning the number of production cooperative companies, he said: "As you know, the number of production cooperative companies in the country is 3,567, of which 1,050 cooperative companies are in the Province of Khuzestan. Of course, I must explain that a number of production and development cooperatives in the Province of Khuzestan have not been registered. If we also include all the cooperative companies which have not yet been registered, we have about 2,000 production cooperatives in Khuzestan. A number of large development and industrial projects are also managed through the cooperative system. Among them, the large project of the Port of the Imam, three large agricultural and industrial complexes in Dezful, and the project in Masjed Soleyman can be mentioned. In my opinion, the greatest services rendered in the province by the production and development cooperative companies are /firstly, eliminating unemployment; secondly, giving the work over to the workers; thirdly, eliminating middlemen; fourthly, stopping the large contractors; and fifthly, giving the work to educated unemployed individuals/ [in boldface].

"I believe that in the case of large projects in industrial and service areas by the cooperative method, we can obtain more favorable results, because the cooperative system has resolved the problem of leaving the work to labor and eliminates the problems of capital and middlemen. In the cooperative system, the government invests in various projects and offers its services to the society. I must say

that more than one-third of all cooperative projects are in the Province of Khuzestan. However, the budget allocated by the prime minister's office to the Center for Expansion of Production and Development Services in the province is only one-fifteenth of the total budget for cooperatives."

The governor-general of Khuzestan, concerning the reason for the growth of production and development cooperatives in the Province of Khuzestan compared to other areas, said: "Concerning the reason for the formation of production and development cooperative companies in the Province of Khuzestan, I must say that in the past, there were many contracting companies in Khuzestan in which Iranians and foreigners were partners. After the revolution, many of these companies were shut down and the percentage of unemployed increased. The unemployed in Khuzestan, considering the culture which governed the region, were interested in being employed by the government or working in the steel industrial complex. Of course, under such conditions, the government did not have the resources to employ all the unemployed people. Therefore, the government decided to implement a cooperative system in this province. With this issue in mind, production and development cooperatives were formed. Presently, these cooperatives manage themselves and are only supervised by the Center for Expansion of Production and Development Services. The expansion of cooperatives in the Province of Khuzestan enjoyed much political support. Under present conditions, these cooperatives are engaged in various agricultural, industrial, service, and development sectors. During the war, the greatest damages were inflicted on the production and development workshops in the Province of Khuzestan. However, over the entire period of the war, these companies, which were managed cooperatively, did not shut down. But several large private contracting companies stopped work immediately after the war began. The Province of Khuzestan has attracted more development funds by encouraging and strengthening production and development cooperative companies. /Presently, the steel industry, with its 12,000 personnel, is managed through the cooperative method. The management system of this company in the past was a mixture of American and French management systems/ [in boldface]. Concerning agricultural activities, I must also say that three large agricultural and industrial complexes in Dezful, called "Shell Kat," "Iran California" and "Sherkat-e Galeh" are now being managed cooperatively. /These companies have been able to bring \$200 million in profits to the government treasury, whereas, in the past, they had an annual loss of 500 million rials/ [in boldface] and the government was forced to make up their losses. In the first year that the cooperative method was implemented in these large agricultural and industrial complexes, these companies were able to make a profit. The unloading and loading in the Port of the Imam is also handled through the cooperative method. With the implementation of the cooperative system, the loading and unloading capacity of this port has increased and every day about 30-34 ships unload there. Concerning other



operational projects in the Province of Khuzestan which are handled through the cooperative method, I must say that in Masjed Soleyman, a base will be built for Havaniruz, the development project which is being implemented through the cooperative method. About this project, I must explain that this base had caused many problems after the revolution because the contractors of the project were Israeli. With the flight of Israeli contractors, the management of the project was disrupted and many workers were out of work. Through the cooperative system, a new form of management was implemented at the Masjed Soleyman base. Presently, this project is very active and the difficulties that the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development and the military of the Islamic Republic once faced in continuing this project no longer exist. /In our opinion, this project may serve as the first model of the very large national projects to be implemented through the cooperative system. Presently, the working brothers have formed 8-, 10-, and 15-member cooperatives to carry out this project. These people have legal status and are being paid while they are making evaluations/ [in boldface]. Technical services are also provided by the governor-general's office for these working brothers and technicians and engineers from the Centers for Expansion of Services cooperate with the working brothers. We hope the development of the cooperative system in small industries, agricultural industries, and other agricultural and development activities makes Khuzestan a model for other provinces."

#### The Problems of Cooperatives in Various Regions

Production cooperatives in various parts of the country face certain difficulties, which were, to some extent, referred to in the reports about the cooperatives in previous issues. Mohammad Hosseyn Tula'i the governor-general of Khuzestan, said, concerning the problems of the cooperatives: "Some of the problems of the cooperatives concern the operational charter. These problems were studied in various seminars of the Centers for Expansion and the offices of governors-general. A commission from the Ministry of Interior was charged with the responsibility of following up on the problems of the cooperatives. In the past, the supreme council of the Centers for Expansion examined the problems of the cooperatives; but, this council was not qualified to do so. Here, I will point out some of the problems of the cooperatives. The most important problem of the cooperatives is the shortage of funds. Along with this, I must mention the issues of the necessity for change in the charter, the insurance of the Centers for Expansion, and the extent of governmental supervision. At the present time, the limits on governmental supervision over the activities of the cooperatives is unclear. Concerning the reopening of closed factories and companies as well, the Center for Expansion of Production and Development Services has faced problems, which have been reported to the coordination council. We hope that with the reform of the charter of the cooperatives to be able to reopen factories which have been closed for four or even six

or seven years. Hence, the legal problems of cooperative companies can be eliminated with a change in the charter."

#### The Condition of Cooperatives in Some Other Provinces

To familiarize ourselves with the problems of cooperatives in other places in the country, we spoke to the authorities of the Centers for Expansion of Production and Development Services in the Provinces of Esfahan, Gilan, Mazandaran, and Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari. One of the authorities of the Center for Expansion of Production and Development Services of Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari said, concerning the problems of the cooperatives: "One of our problems is the lack of cooperation between some of the departments with the cooperatives and Centers of Expansion.

"Presently, we are faced with a shortage of cadre in the Centers for Expansion of Services and our needs must be provided for from other government departments. The shortage of training classes for the members of the cooperatives is another of our problems. Presently, a cooperative spirit does not exist among the members of the cooperatives, because they lack the necessary training. Numerous classes must be established for this purpose. We are also short of machinery and materials. We hope the Ministry of Commerce will provide us with the necessary cooperation. Concerning the problems of agricultural cooperative companies, I must say that most cultivated land belonging to these companies in Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari is rocky land with very little water. In the region of Chaharmahal, there are also poultry cooperative companies. The members of these cooperatives face many difficulties. For instance, when the members of these companies want to get one-day-old chicks, they must wait their turns for three or four days. But, at the same time, a person who owns a private poultry raising company gets the one-day-old chicks quickly and the members of the cooperatives must buy fourth- or fifth-rate chicks. About 25 percent of these chicks are wasted, which causes great losses for the cooperative companies. Other cooperative companies also have similar problems. One problem which can be mentioned is that of opening credit to purchase foreign machinery. Again, the private companies have advantages over the cooperative companies in this regard as well."

The director of the Center for Expansion of Production and Development Services of Esfahan also said, concerning the activities of production cooperatives of this province: "There are 207 agricultural cooperative companies in this province. Loans paid to them amount to 1,930 million rials. The Agricultural Bank paid 182.96 million rials. Also in this province, there are 33 development services companies and 90 industrial companies. The total number of production and development cooperative companies in this province reaches 330. The total loans paid through the Centers for Expansion to these companies is 3,734,160,000 rials. The problems that these companies

have concern insurance, shortages of raw materials, marketing, and the sale of products. Some ministries, such as the Ministry of Commerce, pay no attention to providing for the needs of the cooperative companies. Presently, about 4,500 people work in the production cooperative companies of the Province of Esfahan. This number has decreased in recent months, reaching 3,700 [as published]. If the authorities of the ministries do not attend to providing for the needs of cooperative companies, the members of these cooperatives will be disappointed in carrying out their work."

The director of the Center for Expansion of Production and Development Services of the Province of Mazandaran also said, concerning the production cooperative companies of this Province: "In the Province of Mazandaran, there are 93 projects related to agricultural and animal husbandry cooperatives, 26 industrial, 14 construction and establishment, and 8 development and service projects. The essential problems of these companies concern the shortage of raw materials and high costs, especially in the industrial section. Another problem of the Centers for Expansion of Services is insufficient funds. For this reason, a council has been formed in the Center for Expansion, with the participation of the directors-general of [the Ministries of] Agriculture, Industries and Mines, Education, Commerce, and Labor and Social Affairs, the Plan and Budget Office, the bank, and the construction crusade, to consider the projects of the cooperatives for subsidy loans."

The director of the Center for Expansion of Production and Development Services of the Province of Gilan said, concerning the activities of the cooperatives: "The Province of Gilan has a total of 34 active companies, including 4 agricultural companies, 8 animal husbandry companies, 4 road building and construction companies, and 19 industrial companies. A total of 1,000 people work in these companies. The Center for Expansion of Production and Development Services contributes about 99 percent of each of the loans paid to cooperative companies. Concerning providing funds for cooperative companies, the Center for Expansion has some restrictions. For instance, the maximum loan is 3 million rials, which can be given to members of the cooperative. But, this amount is too little to enable development and production projects to be carried out. Another problem the cooperatives have is the problem of getting work permits from various organizations. For instance, the members of agricultural cooperatives need to get permits from various organizations for digging wells and for other agricultural needs.

"The guidelines of various departments, such as Fisheries and Veterinary Medicine, differ for giving permits for agriculture, animal husbandry, and fishing. In my opinion, these organizations must act in harmony with the Centers for Expansion and cooperative companies. The members of industrial cooperative companies expect to

see a profit very soon; however, their subsidies are too restricted to reach this stage."

#### Production Cooperatives in Tehran

Production and development cooperative companies in the Province of Tehran also have their own particular problems. In this regard, Engineer Giveli, the supervisor of the Center for Expansion of Production and Development Services of the Province of Tehran, said: "The Province of Tehran is in a particular situation in regards to the establishment of production cooperatives because production companies, in accordance with the law, must not be established within a 120 km radius of Tehran. Hence, most of the production and development cooperative companies in the Province of Tehran have been created in the industrial city of Qazvin and the small industrial town of Saveh. In the city of Tehran, also, units to reopen industries have begun work. Presently, we have a total of 25 industrial cooperative units in Tehran. If we also count the production of clothing manufacturing workshops among the industrial units, five clothing manufacturing units will be added to the total number of industrial units. There are 20 agricultural units in Tehran, of which 19 are active. Concerning the problems of these cooperatives, I must say that in the industrial cooperatives, we are faced with a shortage of machinery. The high cost of agricultural raw materials is among the problems of agricultural cooperatives. In the area of marketing, the necessary resources do not exist for production cooperative companies, because private companies which have higher quality products and know more about marketing can sell their products much faster than production cooperative companies. In order for cooperative companies to be able to compete with private companies in offering their products, we have proposed that the Ministry of Interior create a distribution center through which to offer to the market all the products of the cooperative companies."

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CSO: 4640/117



## IRAN

### TURKEY DENIES EXISTENCE OF ANTI-IRAN GROUPS ON ITS SOIL

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 17 Jan 82 p 13

[Text] Political service: Following the recent trip of Engineer Hashemi, minister of industries, to Turkey and Syria, we arranged an exclusive interview with him. We questioned him on the results of his trip, the issues raised during it, and about a report by a French news agency which quotes MILLIYET, published in Ankara, as stating that Engineer Hashemi, the Iranian minister of industries, has agreed to Turkey's mediation in the war between Iran and Iraq. Engineer Hashemi responded to our two questions:

The authorities in Turkey dealt with us in an official, friendly, and diplomatic manner and we also dealt with them very strongly. Even the meetings we arranged were handled in such a manner that they were surprised, especially to see such a young group dealing so decisively with issues.

While we followed up on economic and cultural issues there, we also visited industrial factories and met with the ministers of industries and commerce and the deputy prime minister for two hours and we spoke mostly about the ideological and political issues of our own country. He also spoke about various issues and was very eager to have the relations between Iran and Turkey improve even more. Concerning the report of the news agencies, I must say that none of the authorities in Turkey spoke with us in this regard. But MILLIYET newspaper asked me whether (Shazli Qalibi) has proposed that Turkey mediate between Iran and Iraq, since Turkey is not an Arab country and since Iran, being non-Arab, is closer to them.

We answered that our closeness to the people of other countries is based on Islam and that such mediation cannot be accepted by the Islamic Republic of Iran. Basically, we have no enmity with Iraq that we should need to resolve. What we say is that Iraq has invaded us. If Turkey intends to mediate, it must convince Iraq to leave our country in order to establish peace. So, any such report is categorically denied.

The government of Turkey announced: Reports about conspiracies going on in this country against the Islamic Republic of Iran are quite unfounded, untruthful rumors. Bulend Ulusu, the prime minister of Turkey, after meeting with Mr Hashemi, the Iranian minister of industries, announced this statement in a communique given to the press: Turkey will not allow any organization to be formed on its soil against its brother nation of Iran. The prime minister of Turkey added: These unfounded rumors are spread by circles which intend to disrupt the very friendly and sincere relationship between these two neighboring countries.

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## IRAN

### LOAN FROM JAPAN, PURCHASE OF SOVIET ARMS DENIED BY MUSAVI

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 17 Jan 82 p 11

[Text] The rumor of loans has been spread by greedy capitalist circles and pro-American Japanese.

We are ready to fight with Molotov cocktails and other weapons but not to pay levies to foreigners.

Mediation is useless. The aggressor must leave our land in disgrace.

Engineer Musavi, the prime minister, expressed his views about the current issues in the country in an exclusive interview with the correspondent of the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC NEWS AGENCY yesterday afternoon.

First, concerning the rumor about Iran requesting loans from European banks, he said: This report is a pure fabrication spread by greedy, capitalist circles and the pro-American Japanese. We have no need of loans from Japan or anywhere else. Our present sale of oil is sufficient to enable us to run all of our economic programs. In spreading these rumors, I see a conspiracy by certain factions in Japan, which can seriously endanger the interests of Japan in the region and the Persian Gulf. These Japanese circles should have understood that Iran will not yield to blackmail. The Japanese companies must declare their position as soon as possible concerning the continuation or discontinuation of the completion of the petrochemical complex. We have the technological and financial power to start operations in some parts of this complex within a short period of time. There are those around the world who are willing to take our money to help us complete the remaining section.

The prime minister added:

I am surprised that these factions in Japan have not realized, during the three years since our Islamic revolution, that we will not have

relations with a country which intends to speak to us from a position of power or deception, no matter whether this power is Western or Eastern, French or Japanese.

Responding to the question of what he thinks about the imam's clear statements concerning the purge of the departments, the prime minister said: In this connection, the ministers and authorities must act decisively. Fortunately, the legal framework for this issue is ready. The committees for restructuring have been established in most ministries. Naturally, when the activities of these committees start, we will have to wait for the necessary reports. I hope, considering all aspects of this law, that no one's rights are violated, that those who are interested in their Islamic country and the revolution are established in offices, and that those who are corrupt or cause obstructions in any way are purged. Our nation cannot tolerate offices in which red tape takes the place of work or an individual, whether with little or large responsibility, causes disruptions.

The prime minister added: The people favor employees who serve the revolution, considering them one of their own, and hate those who cause disruptions in any way.

Concerning the reports of American newspapers stating that Iran will purchase arms from the Soviet Union, Engineer Musavi said: The plan involving the rumors of a purchase of arms from Israel failed, so now they say it is the Soviet Union. We do not value such lies. The reason behind our victory is not Eastern or Western missiles, but the faith of our fighters. Certainly, if we had more and better arms, we could end the war sooner.

The prime minister added: We are prepared to fight with our Molotov cocktails and other weapons but we will not pay levies to foreigners because of our needs. What will determine the war is faith and not an arsenal. If there are still those among the countries of the world who have not yet understood our views, they must be very stupid. In any case, when I hear or read these rumors by the Americans, I am reminded of the statement of the great religious jurist, Ayatollah Montazeri, who said: Do not forget "death to America" in your slogans.

Concerning the imposed war, the prime minister said to the correspondent of the IRANIAN REPUBLIC NEWS AGENCY: Our chain of attacks has not ended but will continue until the Ba'thist regime of Iraq is totally crushed. The war budget for the period 21 Mar 82- 20 Mar 83 illustrates the will of the government to fight until we achieve victory. We have taken possession of parts of Iraqi territory in the north.



concerning many rumors about mediation in the imposed war, Engineer Musavi said: Mediation is of no use. The aggressor must leave our land in disgrace and pay compensation.

Those who think about mediating or, in fact, think about their own survival or destruction should not add to the length of the war with their billions in aid. The longer this war lasts, the more detrimental it will be to them.

Concerning his views about the crimes of the Ba'thist army of Iraq in the south of the country, Engineer Musavi said: Those who commit such terrible crimes are not soldiers but beasts. We will take our revenge harshly. I send greetings to the souls of those oppressed and honorable women compatriots and I give assurance that our combative forces will give a harsh lesson to those bandits.

In conclusion, the prime minister added: The Voice and Vision [of the Islamic Republic], especially through its section transmitting abroad, should bring the depth of these terrible crimes to the ears of all Muslims and Arabs in the world and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs must expose them throughout the world.

9593

CSO: 4640/139

CHANGED ATTITUDE OF WESTERN MEDIA ON WAR CONSIDERED 'PLOT'

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 23 Jan 82 p 1

[Text]

TEHRAN (IRNA) — Following is a news analysis on recent trends in the international media:

"The propaganda retreat by the Western mass media on the coverage of Iranian war victories has attracted the attention of political and military experts in the region.

"The recent admissions by mass-circulation papers in the United States, such as Newsweek, the New York Times, the Washington Post and the Herald Tribune that the Iranian army is holding the upper hand in the warfronts as well as the coverage of these stories by the VOA and the BBC and other press organs of the West, is remarkable for several reasons.

"The same Western media which formally had tried their best to ignore the Iranian war victories in Abadan (Oct. 4th) and Bostan (Nov. 29th) suddenly began to praise the military power of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Iraqi imposed war, although in the past week there was no major development in the battlefields.

"This is happening at a time when indirect efforts by the U.S. through the Saudi regime, and its allies in the region, to establish an advisable ceasefire in the interest of the West, have borne no fruits.

"Political observers believe that this recent wave of propaganda is exactly a newly organized conspiracy launched to possibly scare smaller states in the Persian Gulf region with the imminent victory of Iran in the Iraqi imposed war. On the other hand, with regard to the grounds laid by imperialism in Bahrain, this new wave may aim to encourage the southern Persian Gulf states to conclude military-security acts with Saudi Arabia, the U.S. gendarme in the region, and to weaken the positions of certain countries in the region in their reluctance to join such U.S.-oriented pacts.

"Political observers also believe that the high morale being enjoyed by the Iranian military was

nothing new to the U.S. and that the West had assumed that Iran would finally emerge victorious in the imposed war. Furthermore, Washington had already been informed of Iraq's military defeats and had accepted them as inevitable.

"Nevertheless, to concede these defeats at the present time would be difficult for the United States. If we evaluate, first the U.S. efforts to equip some of the countries of the region with modern arms and to establish new military bases in Oman and several other countries in the Middle East besides Egypt, Sudan and Jordan, and second, its measures in paving the way for the full co-opting of the sheikdoms of the southern Persian Gulf with the Saudi regime, were evaluated together one may discern the new plot being designed by the U.S. leading enemy of the Moslems. Thus with the revealing of these facts it is the duty of the Moslems of the region to alertly thwart this intended alliance."

CSO: 4600/219

PAPER CLAIMS BAHAI'S NOT EXECUTED ON RELIGIOUS GROUNDS

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 24 Jan 82 p 1

[Article by Musavian]

[Text]

"IF IRAN is listening" was the title of an editorial which appeared in the New York Times (the prestigious American daily) some time ago. In that the paper severely attacked a statement of the Islamic Republic's Chief Justice Ayatollah Musavi Ardabili denying the execution of persons belonging to the Bahai community in Iran. The New York Times further claimed that they know the names and addresses of all Bahais executed in Iran and that the paper was ready to announce them "if Iran is listening!"

Since the propagations of international imperialism on the issue of "executions" in general and the execution of Jews and Bahais in particular has increased during the last year, it makes it necessary for us to express our views in order to enlighten the public on this issue.

Today there is nobody who is in doubt as to the fact of the ex-shah being a direct agent of the US and Zionists in Iran and also of the fact that the country's affairs were directly run by "dominating agents."

One of the treacherous policies which suited the US most at that time was to install in key positions only those who in addition to being 'sold-out', 'westernized', 'spy' agents were also characterized by another admired quality - their refusal to believe in, or outright rejection of pristine Islam. They had to be followers of religions which severely opposed Islam so that when it was needed they could more easily embark on a massacre of thousands of the Iranian Moslems in the nation.

It was at the hands of these same agents that over 4,000 Moslem women and children were slaughtered in "Black Friday" 1978, a crime which was unsurpassed for its savagery in history.

That explains why the ex-shah always tried



to employ mercenary and 'sold-out' Communists, Bahais, Zionists, etc. in governmental bodies. Such creatures were in fact the tools for spreading the economic and cultural domination of America over Iran.

To prove the accuracy of our claim, it will suffice if we only point to one of such elements. Amir Abbas Hoveyda, the shah's premier for 13 years was a Bahai, a man acknowledged as the closest accomplice of the defunct shah.

Probably, those Bahais who are not hostile to the Islamic Revolution and are peacefully living beside Moslems in this country will also be surprised to know that a Bahai was the prime minister of a country 98% of whose population were Moslems.

The reader can then imagine how many Bahais had been put in important positions by a Bahai who was the head of the shah's government during all those years.

After the victory of the Islamic Revolution, Hoveyda was executed by a just Islamic Court, and undoubtedly such a revolutionary execution is confirmed by all Moslems and the world's liberation seeking people. But most surprisingly, it was later observed that the western and Zionist propaganda machinery protested such executions and referred to them as 'inhuman acts.'

Yes, according to Western logic, the massacre of 4,000 people among whom there were many infants and pregnant women is not 'inhuman act' but the execution of those involved in such a mass slaughter is an anti-human action!!

New York Times had claimed that 111 Bahais have already been executed in Iran. Even supposing that such a baseless allegation is right, still it has to be admitted that this figure yet falls short of the numbers who may strictly 'deserve' to be executed, taking into account the fact that the agents of such men as the infamous Hoveyda proliferated the ex-shah's mansions and courtly offices.

Of course many of those elements did escape to the west before and in the beginning of the Revolution and only a few of them were caught in the grip of the Moslem masses and faced the consequences of their crimes.

Many are still perhaps lurking in hideouts but everyone of them who has been arrested by the people and the revolutionary forces have been handed over to the Revolutionary Courts to be tried.

The West must know that every single agent of theirs will ultimately be arrested and executed if need be even if their figure should tot up to a 111,000 people.

'Execution' is the only punishment corresponding to the crimes of those who killed 60,000

innocent Moslems and disabled and injured over 100,000 people in the course of the Revolution. The same fate awaits those involved in the killing and disabling tens of thousands of martyrs and disabled individuals after the Revolution.

All we wish to say to papers such as the New York Times is that you as loud-speakers of international Zionism are just making efforts to convince people around the world that these criminals have been executed because of their religious convictions and merely on account of their being a Bahai, Jew or Communist. In other words that they have been executed due to their faith and ideology beliefs other than Islam.

You propagate this with the following objectives in mind:

1 - To establish hatred and indignation among followers of other religions towards Islam and Moslems.

2 - To infuse enmity and rancor among the world's people toward the Islamic Revolution of Iran.

3 - To prepare the grounds for further aggressions of Israeli Zionists in the future.

4 - To instigate the majority of the world's capitalists who are Bahais and Jews against the Revolution, so that they will mobilize all their capabilities for inflicting economic blows upon Iran's economy.

5 - Above all, through such baseless propagations, you try to cover up for the crimes of your capitalist/Zionist masters and to distract the attention of the people from the real criminals.

You are certainly aware of the fact that if the world's people learn of the policies employed against the oppressed nations such as the Moslem suppressed Iranian nation, they will not allow your masters to continue their unscrupulous living and thus there will also be an end to your receiving of billions of dollars from them.

You certainly know that on learning the truth, the people from all around the world (Africa, Asia...) will proceed bare-footed to the White House, Kremlin, Elize..... and bring them down on you and your masters and indeed such a day is not too far.

The crux of our contention is that nobody has or ever will be tried, imprisoned or executed simply because of his beliefs. It must be remembered that the number of Moslems who have been executed on charges of terrorism, bombings and committing treason against Islam adds up to several times more than the numbers claimed by the New York Times in regard to executed Bahais.

Despite their overwhelming majority Moslems

who form 98% of the population within the Iranian nation are living in real peaceful co-existence with Christians, Jews, Communists and even Bahais who do not plot against the Islamic faith and the Revolution of the people. There are many individuals and even groups of such people who have fought in the war and thus sworn allegiance to Iranian nation and to concepts of honor and freedom. The graves of such people can now be seen side by side with those of Moslem martyrs in Tehran's Beheshte Zahra cemetery, and that in fact is the profoundest testimony to our claim.

At the same time it must be borne in mind that in the name of the Iranian nation, the Islamic Republican Government will not let anybody whether Moslem, Jew and or Bahai to conspire against the Islamic Revolution.

The Islamic Republic's Chief Justice, Ayatollah Ardebili has also recently reiterated this while he denied the execution of Bahais on account of their convictions.

We are sure that our arguments are bound to be accepted by all free-thinking and humanitarian people of the world regardless of the religion they may belong to and this of course 'if Washington is listening.'

CSO: 4600/222

## TEHRAN CRITICIZES BAHRAIN FOR 'UNSCRUPULOUS STATEMENTS'

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 24 Jan 82 pp 1, 3

[Text]

TEHRAN - No sooner did the Foreign Affairs Minister of the Islamic Republic Dr. Velayati announce the necessity for cooperation of countries of the Persian Gulf region with Iran for a war against the U.S. and the Zionist regime (Israel) than the Prime Minister of Bahrain in an interview with the weekly magazine Al-Mustaqbal is quoted by the AP as saying "Iran is the Israel of the Gulf!"

The Bahraini Prime Minister makes such unscrupulous and bold statements at a time when it (Bahrain) not only has chosen to stay silent on the annexation of the Golan Heights by Israel and on the veto of the U.S. on sanctions against Israel and in addition its teacher, Saudi Arabia has also chosen compromise with Israel in an announcement issued with regard to the U.S. veto.

In its announcement, Saudi Arabia has asked Arab states to be conciliatory because no profit can be gained by struggling against Zionists. Saudi Arabia has also announced that it would never participate in an oil boycott on the U.S. while (Saudi Arabia) has selected just the opposite stand against the Islamic Republic of Iran and is determined to mobilize countries of the region to launch a war on Iran.

Amidst these events, Hussein the King of Jordan is busy implementing U.S. plots and with this purpose in view has arrived in Bahrain after visits to King Khaled, Fahad and Saddam Hussein.

The U.S. is busy meanwhi-

le in stirring up the calm and security of the Persian Gulf to save itself from destruction by agitating the political equilibrium prevailing.

The Bahraini Prime Minister should have carried out actions against Israel if he has believed his statement, saying "Iran is the Israel of the Gulf" but his lie surfaces when it is observed that he has not stated even a single word against the stubbornness and aggressions of the U.S. and Israel. So, it is crystal clear that the statement of the Bahraini Prime Minister has percolated via Tel Aviv.

While the Prime Minister of Bahrain has announced his support for the Fahad Plan on the recognition of Israel, he announced yesterday that Bahrain had cut its relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran, let it be noted.

In regards to these sinister measures adopted by the US and as advice to the region's countries the Iranian Foreign Minister said that in the event of chaos in the region, it will be the region's states before any others, who will be harmed most.

"It is so," Velayati said "due to the fact that the countries which have based their economy primarily or solely on oil cannot benefit from their oil and thus they will automatically be toppled."

Velayati added, and this is important, that, "while being supported by 36 million faithful Moslems and with its vast economic and agricultural resources, the Islamic Republic can surely survive without its oil export."



CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS PROCEED IN AUTONOMOUS REGION

Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 19 Dec 81 p 5

[Article: "366 Major Development Projects Implemented in the Autonomous Region At a Cost Of 105 Million Dinars: Apartments, Hospitals, Clinics and Agricultural Facilities"]

[Text] Irbil--During the current y there has been intensive building and construction activity in the autonomous region, encompassing various facets of day to day activities, despite the circumstances created by the battle our proud nation is waging against the racist Persian enemy.

During the year the bureaus of Employment, Housing, Internal Affairs, Agriculture, Agrarian Reform, Social and Cultural Affairs and Youth implemented 166 separate projects at a cost of 13,296,000 dinars in the governorates of Irbil, al-Sulaymaniyah and Dahuk.

Among the projects that have been completed are a large number of hospitals, clinics, warehouses, schools, apartment houses, buildings for youth groups, agricultural, social and service projects and government office buildings.

These bureaus are currently implementing more than 200 projects in various parts of the region at a cost of 92,134,000 dinars. These include construction of 300 homes and apartments; 106 buildings for health, educational and social organizations; 12 sites for grass-roots organizations; 32 government offices; 149 buildings for agricultural projects; 8 veterinary clinics; 2 guidance centers; 5 meteorological stations; and 21 youth centers.

The detailed reports issued monthly by the above-mentioned bureaus emphasize that work on all these projects is proceeding smoothly, and that they are being completed more quickly during the war than in the periods that preceded it. This is a sure indication that the projects' executive personnel and workers have been eagerly making every effort to increase their participation in the war effort and in implementing the aspirations of the Party and Revolution leadership, and the directives of our defender and leader, Saddam Husayn, with regard to the importance of balancing our victories on the battlefronts against our reckless enemy with our victories in building, construction and continued development.

9123

CSO: 4404/213

COMPUTER CENTER ADMINISTRATORS' CONFERENCE OPENS

Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 19 Dec 81 p 4

[Article: "Computer Center Administrators' Conference Opens Today"]

[Text] A conference of computer center administrators in Iraq opens in Baghdad today to discuss plans for the coming year.

The conference will discuss plans for using general purpose microcomputers and setting up computer-to-computer networks.

The plan includes setting up computers to fully automate the domestic and foreign operations of al-Rafidayn Bank, and to fully automate the warehouses and facilities of the business sector. The plan also includes putting 45 systems into operation during the coming year, designing 25 others, and studying 62 new systems.

The plan also includes the logistics of putting salary and personnel systems into general use, implementing a standardized computerized accounting system, increasing the number of computer specialists by 40 percent and opening new computer centers in addition to the 75 existing ones in various parts of the country.

Dr Hilal 'Abbud, the director general of the National Computer Center, said that he anticipates a continuous increase in the number of computer installations, particularly in administrative, business and service applications, aimed at providing optimum service to the citizens, and a reduction of routine. He also foresees an increased labor force in the computer field.

9123

CSO: 4404/213

## BRIEFS

ROAD PROJECTS--During the current year the State Road Construction Company in the north completed 15 major roads with a total length of 281 km. Three of the roads were in the Governorate of Dahuk, four were in Nineveh, six were in Irbil, and two in al-Ta'mim. At the beginning of this year the company began construction of 980 km of major roads at a cost of 166 million dinars. The total length of roads being constructed by the company is thus 3,110 km at a cost of 290 million dinars. [Text] [Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 20 Dec 81 p 7] 9123

CSO: 4404/213

## 'KYODO' INTERVIEWS PLO'S 'ARAFAT ON MIDEAST

OW121047 Tokyo KYODO in English 0820 GMT 12 Jan 82

[Text] Beirut, Jan 12 KYODO--Yasir 'Arafat, leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), said Tuesday Israel's annexation of the Golan Heights is part of the Jewish state's attempt to "build an empire between the Euphrates and Nile Rivers."

"They (the Israelis) are now massing three military divisions against South Lebanon," 'Arafat said in an interview with KYODO News Service.

The annexation of the strategic Golan Heights in southern Syria drew international protest, including a critical resolution by the U.N. Security Council last month.

Israel has occupied the rugged terrain since the 1967 Middle East war.

'Arafat accused the U.S. administration of President Ronald Reagan of extending "unlimited support" to the Israeli action.

The U.S. Government "is supplying Israel with military, financial, political and other helps," he added during the interview at a PLO office here.

Asked if the Israelis would take further action, 'Arafat said, "their aim is further expansion and they are aiming to build an empire between the Euphrates and Nile Rivers."

"They are looking for further annexations in their challenges not only to the Syrians but also to the whole Arab nation," the PLO chief added.

'Arafat said he expects another round of confrontation between the Jewish state and the Arab world, namely, an Israeli invasion of Lebanon.

"Nobody can escape this destiny," he said. "So we are preparing ourselves to face the new aggression just as we faced others in the past."

While admitting that Arab countries are not in harmony on their approach to Israel, 'Arafat said, "but no doubt in the end we will find a way to deal with the invaders of our Arab land, of our Palestinian land."



'Arafat was apparently referring to the breakdown of the Arab summit conference at Fes, Morocco, in November.

The four-day conference fell apart only five hours after it opened in a dispute over a peace proposal put forward by Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Fahd last August.

The eight-point proposal called for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital. It also recognized Israel's right to existence.

Describing the Fahd proposal as a "constructive platform for a lasting and comprehensive solution to the Middle East problem," 'Arafat said, "I appreciated this proposal then and I still appreciate it."

In particular, he said, the proposal recognized the rights of Palestinians, including "our right to return to our homeland."

"Without putting these rights to the forefront, no security, no solution, no stability can be implemented in the Middle East as the Palestinian question is at the core of all Middle East issues," 'Arafat added.

CSO: 4400/119

## EBAN ON AUTONOMY PROBLEMS

TA150938 Jerusalem POST in English 15 Jan 82 p 6

[Commentary by Abba Eban: "Facing Up To Autonomy"]

Prime Minister Begin's original autonomy plan of December 1977 was envisaged as a permanent solution, implying perpetuation of Israeli control in all of Judaea, Samaria and Gaza. The agreement that emerged at Camp David in 1978-9 was quite different; it was specifically defined as a "transitional arrangement" for the purpose of "ensuring a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority." The underlying assumption was that a sharp transition from total hostility to total peace would be impossible.

The Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty would never have been concluded without the prior interim agreements of 1974 and 1975. They had created a contractual atmosphere in the relations between the two adversaries and enabled them to test each other's intentions. A period of cautious evolution would be even more necessary in the Israeli-Palestinian context.

In the meantime, the Camp David agreements opened new horizons to the Palestinians. Their diplomatic history is replete with rejected proposals, conceived largely in their interest, which they later tried to revive. The Palestinians have never lost a chance of missing an opportunity.

The PLO's recent "all or nothing" syndrome was supported irresponsibly and energetically by Jordan, whose monarch had created the Israeli military control in Judaea and Samaria by his entry into the 1967 war. King Husayn has now resolved to prevent a solution of the crisis which he himself brought about. Anwar as-Sadat, with greater sobriety and imagination, made an audacious effort to unravel the complexities that an-Nasir and Husayn had bequeathed to the Arab world.

It is true that the Camp David agreement did not ensure immediate independence of the Palestinians from Israeli rule. But it is also true that the violent opposition to Camp David by the PLO and the rejectionist states has kept the Palestinians stuck more deeply in more backward positions than if they had put Prime Minister Begin to the test of fulfilling his signed commitment. They could now be in the third year of "full autonomy," entitled to negotiate an agreement on the "final status of the West Bank and Gaza," with Jordan and Egypt at their

side and with the knowledge that very large sections of Israeli opinion--favours a solution that would reconcile Israel's security with Palestinian rights.

More than 2 years of "negotiation" have not moved the parties an inch closer to such a solution. All three governments--Egypt, Israel and the U.S.--have left a trail of communiques in some of the world's more agreeable hotels, announcing "constructive discussions" in a "frank and friendly atmosphere." This is illusion.

It is a law of modern diplomacy that all meetings are successful. If this is not strictly true, language can always be used to give harsh reality a glittering coat of verbal paint. All three governments have had other priorities, and for most of the period of the negotiations they have been represented by people who lacked the authority to move from one position to another--who lacked even that minimal degree of flexibility which is necessary for serious negotiations.

If the U.S., Egypt and Israel are all ready for a more concrete approach, they would do well to examine what full autonomy does and does not mean. The Camp David accords leave many issues open to diverse interpretation, but they are not entirely permissive, and their signatories need to be held firmly to what they have agreed.

Autonomy does not guarantee complete independence for the population of the territories, but it leaves the period of complete dependence and subjection far behind. In the Camp David agreement, the heart of the problem is the institutional provision.

The ideological rhetorics is not unimportant, but the success of the autonomy idea will depend on the success of the "self-governing authority," which has to be elected freely by the inhabitants of the "West Bank and Gaza." As soon as this has been done, "the military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn" and will be "replaced" by the self-governing authority.

It is clear that the election of the "self-governing authority" would introduce totally new conditions in the areas concerned. Nothing would be the same. The inhabitants would have a new stature, a new responsibility and a new dignity.

The Israeli presence would consist of Israeli armed forces who would be "withdrawn" and "redeployed into specified security locations." There would be such a sharp increase in the powers of the inhabitants and such a diminution in those of the Israeli administration that the change could accurately be described as revolutionary.

The effects would be felt not only in Judaea, Samaria and Gaza, but throughout Israeli society. Israel, free of the image of coercion in territories outside its sovereign jurisdiction, could look inward on its own Jewish vocation, drawing strength from an intensive development of its human and intellectual resources.

Israel's right to negotiate secure boundaries in place of the vulnerable armistice lines of 1949-1967 would be assured both by its military presence in the "specified security locations" and by the fact that the future status of the territories, including "the location of the boundary," would be open to negotiation after the autonomy period.

Under the terms of Camp David, it is true that Israel may not annex any part of Judaea, Samaria or Gaza without the consent of Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinian representatives; but it is also true that Israel's veto applies to any assertion of Arab sovereignty to which we would object.

Since Camp David rules out any unilateral or extreme solution, it may be said to be objectively in favour of a negotiated compromise. Labour party members who opposed the idea of autonomy as an interim arrangement were not on strong ground. In pure logic, Camp David is much closer to territorial compromise than to the Likud dream of total annexation.

If the next stage of the negotiation is concrete and serious, Camp David will be vindicated as the only realistic basis for the continuing peace process. Abstract polemics and procrastination will result in a universal tendency to regard Camp David as a spent force. The vacuum will be filled with sterile initiatives such as the Venice declaration and the Fahd plan.

Israeli public opinion, with the labour opposition in the forefront, should address the Israeli Government with a simple appeal: "Carry out the Camp David agreement, not merely because you have given commitments to Egypt and the U.S., but principally because you have made a commitment to the Israeli nation. The faithful implementation of Camp David is not a 'concession' by Israel to other nations, but a service that Israel owes to its own national interest."

There are several themes in which a balanced Israeli position could be taken with broad public support:

-- An attempt should be made to accelerate the pace of the negotiations. But there should not be an ultimative approach to April 26. I do not believe that our government should accept the idea of threatening "reappraisals" such as that implicit in Yitzhak Rabin's proposal.

-- Since the military administration is to be "withdrawn" and "replaced" on the establishment of full autonomy, it clearly cannot linger on as the source of legal authority. The agreement defining the powers of the self-governing authority must itself become the legal basis on which the system will work.

-- The administrative powers of the self-governing authority (administrative council) should be broad. Israel's aim should be the minimal involvement compatible with Israeli security. Powers reserved by the Israeli Government should be restricted to such crucial domains as foreign affairs and security. The mass of appeals, complaints and expectations that the population now addresses to the Israeli Government should in future be diverted to their elected representatives.

-- We should not be afraid of a widely constituted administrative council. On the contrary, Israel has an interest in ensuring that the autonomous body is representative as well as functional, thus undercutting the pretensions of the PLO. The original idea of limiting the membership to 11 or 15 functionaries should be revised.



-- Autonomy implies a power of enactment. So does "the principle of self-government," which as-Sadat and Begin endorsed in the Camp David text. An Israeli authority has written: "Self-government denotes the exercise by a group of governmental functions in all their unusual forms, including especially the enactment of legal rules, policy decisions and administration. Autonomy relates more specifically to the enactment of laws by the group itself. In both cases the qualifying adjective 'limited' should be implied..."\* The fact that the power of enactment is "limited" does not mean that it is non-existent, or that regulations may not be allowed.

-- Camp David speaks of autonomy, both in a personal context ("the inhabitants") and in a territorial context ("self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza"). These definitions should be respected. The Jerusalem problem is separate and distinct and should on no account be introduced into this context. The "West Bank" is defined in the Camp David agreement as an area whose permanent status has not yet been decided. Israelis cannot possibly want Jerusalem or part of it to fall under that definition.

-- The logic of a transitional agreement is that it leaves each party with the right to dream or hope that the final settlement will be in its favour. A degree of rhetorical abstinence about what lies beyond the transitional period would serve negotiations well. The Israeli Government's objection to Egyptian statements about a Palestinian state would be more convincing if the Israeli Government were to abstain from predictions about applying Israeli sovereignty to the whole of Judaea, Samaria and Gaza.

Regarding each of the seven themes cited above, an Israeli delegation can examine more possibilities than are stated in the original cabinet guide-lines of May 1979.

It is not certain that resourcefulness on these and other points would be sufficient to secure Egyptian and American agreement; it is still less certain that cooperation will be forthcoming from Jordan and the Palestinians in the actual fulfillment of an autonomy plan. But Prime Minister Begin's initiative in projecting the autonomy principle was a statesmanlike act.

The Camp David text carries imposing risks. It is not reconcilable with Begin's dream of a unified Eretz Yisra'el under Israeli sovereignty. It therefore places him in a predicament between his domestic aim and his international commitment. But having jumped into the river, the only intelligent course is to swim in it--and not to dream of forgotten shores or to pretend that Israeli policy has exactly the same room for maneuver as if Camp David had never been signed.

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\* State and Nation by Benjamin Akzin, London 1964, p 141.

## BANK OF ISRAEL RELEASES ANNUAL REPORT

TA280823 Jerusalem POST in English 28 Jan 82 p 6

[Report by economic affairs correspondent Shlomo Ma'oz]

[Text] The country's commercial banks last year replaced the government in export financing to the tune of \$592 million, the Bank of Israel announced yesterday.

Releasing its annual report to the press, the Central Bank explained the development as having been made necessary because foreign currency transfer by the government and Jewish agency from abroad fell from \$1 billion in 1980 to only \$260 million in 1981. The bank financing breaks down into two components: \$313 million for the import of components used in production for export, and \$279 million to fund shipment of exported goods. The banks were involved in both areas for the first time.

Despite the growth in bank financing, Israel's foreign currency reserves rose in 1981 by \$67 million to \$2,847 billion, only \$300 million was withdrawn from the reserves by the banks, down from \$900 million in 1980. This is the other side of the bank-financing coin.

The Bank of Israel's income from interest and linkage differentials on the country's foreign currency reserves was only \$112 million in 1981, down from \$210 million in 1980. The drop stems from the revaluation of the dollar during the year--13 percent against the German mark--which made for \$293 million "loss" on paper.

Bank Governor Moshe Mandelbaum announced that the Bank of Israel has recently begun to increase its dollar holdings in an attempt to prevent additional losses from the holding of marks. But Finance Ministry adviser Prof Ya'qir Pelsner yesterday expressed an opposing view, predicting that lower interest rates in the United States will cause European currencies to strengthen this year.

Mandelbaum also said that the Bank of Israel intends to continue its shrinkage of credit to the diamond industry, and also to cancel the subsidy on export shipments. These will be paid in Eurodollars, which will be made available to exporters.

Nevertheless, the government plans to continue helping exports, or at least not to hurt them, since they constitute the basis of growth and improvement in Israel's balance of payments. The Central Bank will determine the form of its aid to exports only after decisions are made concerning possible aid of other sorts, such as exchange-rate insurance, lower taxes on labour, or other proposals for the coming year now being discussed.

Outstanding credit in the economy, after having been contracted of late, now stands at the same level it was at the end of 1980, he said.

The Bank of Israel report indicates that the public was 16 percent better off in 1981 than it was in 1980. Total private assets reached ls353.4 billion, or \$22.6 billion. Intermediate term property holdings grew by 28 percent to ls247.9 billion, while liquid holdings were down by 5 percent to ls105.5 billion.

CSO: 4400/119

## GALILEE RESTRICTED AREA REOPENS TO ARAB AGRICULTURE

TA240944 Jerusalem POST in English 24 Jan 82 p 3

[Report by Yo'el Dar]

[Text] Nazareth--Arab farmers will not be permitted to cultivate thousands of dunams in a formerly restricted military zone in the Bet Netofa Valley, authorities in the area recently decided.

The area has been off-limits for agriculture since 1948, and all entry to the area, known as the No 9 fire zone, has been forbidden since the IDF started holding live-ammunition exercises there.

The Arabs have consistently claimed that this land was tilled by generations of their forefathers, while the army contends that this is state-owned land which was closed off to agriculture even during the British mandate for military reasons.

Arab farmers in the area also claim that they have lost their traditional grazing land since the Jewish agency fenced off all the hills surrounding the village of Sakhnin and established six lookout settlements in the area over the past three years.

On Friday, Mk Hamad Khalaylah (Alignment) met with representatives of the Israel Lands Administration to request more grazing land for the villagers' 3,000 head of cattle. The villagers grazed their livestock on some 37,000 dunams until 1964. Khalaylah said and today many are forced to take their herds into olive groves or onto cultivated land.

The Jewish agency admitted that the fences were intended to prevent Arab farmers or villagers from taking over state-owned land being held in reserve for further development projects or as locations for more Jewish settlements. The Jewish presence in this part of lower Galilee now stands at less than 1 percent of the population.

In another dispute between Arab residents and authorities in the north, the Interior Ministry on Friday demolished four sheds built without permits by Badouin near Nazareth.

The minister acted after obtaining a court order for the demolition said Israel Koenig, the ministry's northern district representative.

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ISRAEL TO PAY MORE FOR U.S. GRAIN IMPORTS

TA280855 Jerusalem POST in English 28 Jan 82 p 6

[Report by Ya'akov Friedler]

[Text] Haifa--The U.S. Government's decision to use American ships to carry half the grain it sells Israel under its foreign aid scheme is causing grave concern to shipping companies here.

The move will cost Israel an extra \$35 million in cargo charges during the year. In addition, it will cause serious employment problems and losses to the shipping companies, the Jerusalem POST has learned.

Israel imports about two million tons of grain annually, largely from the United States. Only about 200,000 tons come from Canada. Under long-term contracts the Industry and Trade Ministry, which handles the imports, pays the Zim, el-Yam and Aharon Rosenfeld companies \$24.70 per ton for freight.

The American ships, on the other hand, charge \$60 and more per ton. Their rates are set by the Federal Maritime Commission to cover the higher crew expenses of U.S.-flag ships. These high wages are maintained, without regard to the world shipping market, which after six years of crisis has now come near to collapse. As a result, foreign shippers use American vessels only if they are forced to.

The United States reserves the right to use U.S. vessels for up to one half of all cargoes brought under the favorable terms of its foreign aid act. In the past the U.S. Government has not enforced this rule strictly for grain shipments to Israel, because the U.S. Merchant Marine was not short of cargoes. Successful lobbying by Israel for its own fleet was also a factor.

However, last year the United States almost doubled--to 623,000 tons--the amount of grain shipped in its own vessels. This year the United States intends to raise this figure to the full limit of one million tons, Arye Ayali, general manager of Aharon Rosenfeld Shipowners Ltd., told the POST.

As a result his company has already been forced to divert its 30,000-ton bulk carrier Dalit from the Israel grain run to Britain, at \$10.50 per ton of grain, "losing about \$400,000 on a single trip," he said.

Mordekhay (Chovers), manager of Zim's bulk carrying division, told the POST that the situation has created the tough problem of finding alternate employment for the company's bulk carriers. During the past few weeks the bulk market has fallen to a low unprecedented since World War II, he said.

The Israeli purchasing mission in Washington is reportedly "doing all it can" to keep as much of the grain as possible for Israeli ships, but with little success.

Shipping officials explain that as a result of the cuts in foreign aid by the Reagan administration U.S. ships have lost part of their employment and therefore pounce on the Israeli trade. In addition, the American Seamen's Union was one of the first to back Reagan's presidential campaign. This has given its lobby such clout in Washington that Israel's counterlobbying is ineffective.

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## 'JERUSALEM POST' INTERVIEWS ARENS

TA220635 Jerusalem POST in English 22 Jan 82 p 5

[Report by diplomatic correspondent David Landau on interview with Israeli ambassador-designate to the United States, Moshe Arens; date and place not given]

[Text] Things could have been very different for the ambassador-designate to Washington, Prof Moshe Arens, had the government made a firm decision, say 6 months ago, to go ahead with the new-generation Lavi warplane. He would eagerly have thrown up his political career, to direct that project, he says. He would have lobbied and fought for the post, and there is a good chance that, as one of Israel's top aeronautical engineers (with political clout, too) he would have got it.

Today, the decision on the Lavi has still not been made; and anyway, for Arens it is too late. Having undertaken the ambassadorship, he is committed to it for at least the next three years. But his "general frame of mind," continues to be that his whole political career, including the ambassadorship, "is long leave without pay from designing planes. And I'd still like to go back to the drawing board before I'm too old."

Moshe ("Misha") Arens, now a spry-looking 56, was a relative latecomer to politics. But he rose fast through Herut and is today a leading figure in the party. His candidacy for minister of defence after 'Ezer Weizman resigned, though nothing came of it in the end, was taken seriously by politicians and pundits alike. The fact that he has served throughout Menahem Begin's premiership as chairman of the Knesset foreign affairs and defence committee, despite his opposition to the central plank of the prime minister's foreign affairs and defence policy—Camp David--attests to his political strength as well as to his ability.

His appointment as ambassador to the United States is something of a first in Israel history. In the past, "political appointments" in the foreign service have meant either second-rank politicians in second rank embassies, or personal favourites of prime ministers in plum diplomatic posts. Now, a top-flight politician whose star is still rising in his party, is moving out of the recognized political trajectory for a spell as a diplomat. What is this likely to mean for Arens' political career?

"I have no ambition to be prime minister of Israel," he says firmly. "I daresay all successful politicians harbour such ambitions, feel the need to use their elbows to climb up to the top of the greasy pole. I have never felt it; in that respect, I'm not a successful politician.

"Not that I lack ambition. I was quite ambitious in my professional career. I badly wanted to get to the top. I have great confidence in my ability to design aeroplanes and missiles, and indeed become director of all development projects at the Israel Aircraft Industries.

"But the question of how the ambassadorship will affect my political career honestly doesn't concern me. I don't view it as a stepping-stone. What I'm looking for is satisfaction, the satisfaction of a good job well done, just as I feel I handled the committee chairmanship well and got satisfaction from it."

Plainly, though, Arens does not intend--or even pretend to intend--to change from politician to a political diplomat for the duration of his ambassadorship. He hopes to retain his input and influence in Herut decision-making. He plans to attend the party conference in the summer, and seems upset to hear that civil service regulations will preclude him from being prominently active in that event.

As ambassador, of course, he will "make every effort to act as the ambassador of the state of Israel, and not of any party." He will not favour politically-sympathetic Jewish groups and leaders at the expense of others. Will he raise money for Herut's "Tel-Hay fund" in his free time? "I won't have any free time," he replies carefully.

Arens believes, however, that the fact that he is an active politician, with political promotion still in prospect, will enhance his status and help his work as ambassador.

The fundamental purpose of diplomacy as he sees it is to provide communication and thus avoid misunderstanding between governments. "If you can go on to achieve a positive understanding by each side of the other's motives--that is a step higher. And if you can attain actual agreement--that is the highest goal."

Being a ranking politician in Israel's ruling party "will improve the likelihood that I shall be a good channel of communication," he ventures. The Americans will know that he has "many contacts and a certain degree of influence" back home, that he is on close terms with the prime minister and with the foreign minister, that he has a following within Herut.

He is anxious to avoid making comparisons between himself and other ambassadors, but he acknowledges that he will have "a different relationship" with the top policy-making echelon in Jerusalem from the normal one between a foreign service officer and the home capital.

Sometimes, he says, governments send a special high-level emissary to deal with a particular problem. "In many ways, I'll be like such an emissary stationed in Washington permanently." After all, Begin and Shamir have for many years been his senior colleagues: "We have worked together, tried to convince one another."



The idea of his holding formal cabinet rank while serving as ambassador (as Britain's Lord Halifax did during World War II) was broached by one Israeli newspaper, but it "never came up" in his conversations with Shamir and Begin, and he has "no particular interest in it."

Arens was plainly hurt by the spate of unfavourable media leaks and comments coming from Washington when he was appointed. He is concerned to put the record straight on one key point: He did not oppose the memorandum of understanding on U.S.-Israel strategic cooperation. On the contrary, he spoke in favour of it, wrote in favour of it, and voted for it in the Knesset.

What actually happened was that when the United States suspended it (as "punishment" for the Golan law) Arens said that in that case, since Washington clearly regarded it was a favour to Israel rather than a boon to both sides, Israel would be better off without it.

As to the prediction, voiced by some Israeli commentators in Washington, that the United States will incline to "bypass" the Israeli Embassy because of Arens' known hard-line views, and deal with Israel through Sam Lewis in Tel Aviv, he dismisses this as "somewhat infantile." For the United States to act in that way would be cutting its nose to spite its face, and therefore it is entirely unlikely to do so.

An ambassador's views need in no way impinge on his fundamental function as a consistent and creditable channels of communications, and governments should be interested in keeping such channels open. It is "not important" precisely what proportion of U.S.-Israeli business will be transacted through him and what through Lewis. What is important is that both channels be open and operating.

Arens similarly dismisses the argument that his hawkishness will be a drawback in his work. In one important area, that of Hasbara, [information], it will be a positive asset. It will be both easier and more effect for him to defend the peace treaty now, to stress Israel's resolve to honour all of its commitments, to demand the same from Egypt, because "I was among those who opposed Camp David at the time, believing the risk was too great."

In his diplomatic work, too, his past voting record will cast no shadow--just as Shamir's similar background casts no shadow over his performance as foreign minister.

"There is a vast difference," he explains, "between taking a position at a particular time and developing one's position in accordance with developing circumstances." He, like Shamir, believed that "the ticket was too expensive. But now, having bought the ticket and paid the price, we must do everything to ensure that we get to our destination."

CSO: 4400/119

## 'JERUSALEM POST' ON SINAI WITHDRAWAL

TA150955 Jerusalem POST in English 15 Jan 82 p 16

[Commentary by Hirsh Goodman: "Strategy of Withdrawal"]

[Text] One can understand, if not agree with, those who oppose the Sinai for religious or sentimental reasons. And one can understand, if not agree with, those who are opposed to the withdrawal for pecuniary reasons. But one is hard put to understand or agree with those who oppose the withdrawal for security or strategic reasons.

It is not by chance that the peace treaty with Egypt was never openly opposed by any Israeli military figure of stature. Chief of Staff Mordekhay Gur may have voiced apprehensions about the late President as-Sadat's motives in coming to Israel; and his successor, Refa'el Eytan, may have expressed some anxiety about Egypt after as-Sadat's assassination; but there has been no strategic, tactical criticism of the withdrawal. On analysis, the security arrangements in the post-Camp David reality seem immeasurably better than those that existed before the peace agreement was signed. This conclusion would still hold true if the peace process were to collapse to a point short of war, and even during an actual conflict.

There were generals who bemoaned the loss of training and maneuver areas; and there is no question that the reduction of the strategic depth of the Sinai has placed an additional burden on Israel's intelligence-gathering apparatus. But the security clauses have given Israel the most important strategic advantage it could desire. This is a trip-wire system which provides the necessary time not only for calling up the reserves, but also for launching a pre-emptive strike, which is the cornerstone of Israel's response to an Arab threat. The clear and multiple infraction of the Sinai accords by Egypt would legitimize an Israeli pre-emptive response in the eyes of the international community--something sorely lacking on the eve of the Yom Kippur war, when Israel was forced to wait to be attacked before it could take any action.

Let us suppose that the peace process breaks down after 27 April. For the Egyptians then to go to war against Israel, they would first have to cross over the Suez Canal with forces over and above those allowed in Zone A, in direct contravention of an internationally guaranteed treaty.

They would then, again in contravention of the treaty, have to penetrate Zone B, which allows for the presence of police-type personnel armed only with light weapons. They would then have to step over the heads of the international observer force and the UN. Only after all that could they cross the Israeli border.

What better guarantee of security could Israel wish for? Isn't the current situation despite the loss of control of the Gulf of Suez and the Mitla and Gidi passes better than it was when our forces were in a nose-to-nose confrontation at the Suez Canal?

By withdrawing from the Sinai the IDF has shortened its lines of supply. It has rearranged its forces in the Negev and in other parts of Israel, from where they can be quickly and easily concentrated against a threat from either direction: it has eliminated the need for the call-up of reserves, paralysing the economic, any time there is a hint of emergency—something which provided an understandable incentive for the Arabs to escalate tension periodically as an element in the ongoing war of attrition. Intelligence gathering has been impaired; but then, what is intelligence gathering? Mordekhay Gur, when he was chief of staff, answered this question by saying that 40,000 Israelis in the streets of Cairo as tourists was the best early warning he could wish for. He was right. Surely this indicator is as good as, if not better than, anything picked up by the electronic wizardry of Umm Khashiba.

The airfields have been lost, and it now takes longer to reach strategic objectives in Egypt than it did in the past. But this did not seem to impede the conduct of the six day war despite the fact that the aircraft used in 1967 were of another generation, and aeons away in terms of technology. Moreover the 'Ezyon and Etan air bases have been replaced. True, they were among the most sophisticated bases in the world. But so, apparently, are the new ones.

The navy will be redeployed, mainly to the Mediterranean, where it can devote more of its capability to protecting the northern border from maritime infiltration; observe any potential naval threat from Syria and/or Libya; and best defend the bulk of Israel's shipping and the country's vulnerable seaboard, which houses 80 percent of Israel's population and industrial infrastructure.

It would seem too, that aircraft deployed at either of the two new Negev bases are better placed to handle a multi-dynamic threat, whether from the eastern front or from Egypt or Libya.

One could argue that with the loss of control of the Sinai, Israel's strategic stores have been exposed to greater danger by virtue of an encroaching border. This would have been true had not one of the major conclusions drawn from the Yom Kippur war been that Israel's stockpiles should be positioned nearer the borders, and thus closer to fields of future conflict.

Increased vulnerability as the price of rapid deployment was a tactical decision taken before anyone ever dreamed of as-Sadat's visit to Jerusalem.

Where the real dangers lie in the post-peace reality is not in the return of the Sinai but in the political process which was unleashed by the peace agreement. Here there are all manner of traps and pitfalls which could cause tremendous harm to Israel's over-all deterrent capability. The implications in terms of Israel's relations with the international community in general and the United States in particular would be grave indeed if, for whatever reason, the Sinai were not returned on 26 April. The damage to Israel's security would be real.

Judging by America's reaction to the Golan Heights law, one could only anticipate unrestrained anger. If a signed and sealed strategic agreement could be suspended, and Israel's right to export \$220 million in weapons to the U.S. nullified, over the extension of Israeli law to the Golan Heights—an act which was coupled with an assurance from Begin that the area is still negotiable—what could be expected if Israel unilaterally went back on an American-guaranteed peace treaty?

Surely those counselling Israel not to withdraw from the Sinai must be aware of this. How then can they take upon themselves the responsibility for the lives of soldiers whom they may be sending back into battle to defend an area the return of which has not only not harmed Israel's security, but actually enhanced it?

Has there been one rational strategic argument put forward by any of the opponents of the withdrawal which has been debated seriously in any quarter?

Is it not clear that the withdrawal from the Sinai is essential if Israel's defence budget is to be contained within manageable limits, especially at a time when the aid package from the U.S. is shrinking in real terms, and when by 1983 the annual repayment of loans will exactly equal the net aid package.

And will not a victory by these opponents provide just the catalyst a divided and tension-ridden Arab world needs to unite it in its battle against Zionism? What is to be gained from destroying a chance of peace with Israel's biggest and most powerful neighbour?

One cannot argue with dreamers and romantics but one should resist demagoguery which rejects rational analysis and exploits fear.

The return of the Sinai is not happening in a vacuum. The return of the area is being made in a political context, and under security guarantees. A violation of either the political process or the guarantees will place Israel in a better military position than before. An adherence to them will mean peace, the most important imperative for Israel's survival in an era when the balance of power in the region is uncertain and the weapons on the other side are improving all the time.

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## BRIEFS

**COMPANIES COMPETE FOR SALES**—Tel Aviv—Private companies and government-owned industries will have an equal opportunity to compete for sales to the defence establishment, Defence Minister Ari'el Sharon has told the Manufacturers Association. This means that bids of government-owned enterprises will no longer have preference, the association said yesterday. An association press release said the decision was made at a meeting on Sunday between Sharon, Manufacturers Association president Eli Hurwitz, its director-general Arnon Tiberg and Zalman Shalev, managing director of A.E.L. Ltd, a telecommunications company. Sharon also favoured letting private industry benefit from defence establishment research and development projects. [Text] [TA260834 Jerusalem POST in English 26 Jan 82 p 2]

**BANNING ORDER**—The head of the central command has issued a banning order against a mathematics professor at Bi'r Zayt University near Ramallah. Mrs (Qamilia Armanius) is not being allowed into the territories for 1 year for security reasons. The vice rector of the Bi'r Zayt University, (Gabi Baranka) denies that Mrs (Armanius) was engaged in political activity. He also told reporter, Jerry Cheslow that Israeli soldiers have been searching the university for posters and had stopped only when told that they were violating an undertaking. Military sources denied that the soldiers went into the university, saying they only asked staff to remove posters outside. [Text] [TA281312 Jerusalem Domestic Service in English 1200 GMT 28 Jan 82]

CSO: 4400/119

VOLUNTARY DISARMAMENT OF FACTIONS DISCUSSED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1305, 6 Nov 81 pp 21-22

[Interview with Nabih Barri, Chairman of the Amal Movement Command Council by Shirbil Zughayb; date and place of interview not specified: "Nabih Barri Tells AL-HAWADITH, 'We Agreed on Voluntary Disarmament and Giving the Deterrent Forces a Free Hand against Violators' "]

[Text] I went abroad to rest and relax; the government did nothing to make us change our attitude. The future of Lebanon will be determined by the personality of its next president; we are opposed to amending the constitution.

The Lebanese al-Afwaj Resistance Movement, which is known as Amal, has recently become the subject of discussion among all people in West Lebanon as well as East Lebanon. Its positions are distinct and different from those of its allies. The Amal movement has problems, and in some cases it has been involved in military clashes with more than one organization and party in the western district, beginning with the Iraqi wing of the Socialist Arab Ba'th party and including the communist party and some Palestinian organizations.

We took all these matters to the chairman of the Amal Movement Command Council, Attorney Nabih Barri. We wanted to dot the i's and cross the t's, especially after the formation of the Supreme Coordinating Committee. This is the committee that has been charged with solving the problems and difficulties that exist among the organizations in the western district.

Mr Barri was sitting among some members of his movement. He was explaining to them the danger of the coming period and the conditions that accompanied the reconciliation which took place with the communists. [He was explaining] the need to abide by this reconciliation and to remove the signs that discredit the communist party, especially those that were placed on the graves of members of the Amal movement who had lost their lives in clashes with communists.

Suddenly the telephone rang. Minister Rene Mu'awwad was calling. Mr Barri

took the receiver and addressed the minister as, "Your excellency, Mr President." He reviewed a few southern matters with him, and the two men reached an agreement before hanging up. I asked in an audible voice, "Will 'the excellency' of certain people assume 'the state' of others?"

Mr Barri laughed but did not comment. Then he said, "All right, go ahead and read your questions."

After I finished reading my questions to him, he looked at me and said, "What are you fishing for? At any rate, go ahead and start writing." This was the interview.

[Question] It has been noticed that the Arab Follow-Up Committee is interested in the subject of security in Beirut only. Nevertheless, its resolutions have not yet seen the light of day, and the roads are still blocked. What are the unforeseen obstacles that this committee is facing?

[Answer] Ever since the Arab Follow-Up Committee was formed and ever since it began pursuing its activities, the attitude we in the Amal movement have had toward that committee has been that any partial solution that turns around Beirut alone cannot lead to anything whatsoever.

The South is "the dam" for the entire question. Any attempt to separate the matter of the South from a comprehensive solution and to be satisfied with a partial solution will cause this dam to overflow into remaining Lebanese territory. This idea of a partial solution was actually the idea that was prevailing on the field with the members of the Follow-Up Committee as far as Beirut was concerned. But then Israel launched its "July" attacks from the south on the bridges and on the al-Fakahani district, and everything the Arab Follow-Up Committee had done came to naught.

In view of this situation the Arab Follow-Up Committee thought that the matter of the South should be discussed at the next Arab summit conference and that the committee should devote itself to a treatment of other conditions without forgetting the matter of south Lebanon. We felt that this was nothing more than a delaying [tactic] until the Arab summit conference should convene. We may not reap any real benefits from that conference because previous conferences made us become accustomed to irresponsible resolutions, in the full sense of the word, to resolutions that cannot be implemented or to resolutions that are stillborn. The Arabs are dealing with the question of south Lebanon as though it were a humanitarian question. They are forgetting the fact that south Lebanon is the gateway to their nation and that the people of south Lebanon are the ones who are shouldering the responsibility for the whole cause by themselves.

With regard to the fact that resolutions in Beirut were not being implemented, [let me say this]: After al-Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil made his statement to the committee, promising to suspend relations with Israel, this statement had to be converted into action on the field. All Lebanese ports were to be monitored, and all the transit gates until all the contact lines were to be opened, beginning with the port and all the way to al-Shuwayfat.

It was there that an agreement was reached that all armed personnel of all divisions were to withdraw 1 kilometer from these lines so that these lines can be out of the range of sharpshooters. Ambassadors of the Follow-Up Committee made several contacts and obtained the approval of all parties on this subject. And here the question was raised: who will fill the security vacuum?

The Arab deterrent forces had been charged with the matter of security in the western district. As far as the eastern district was concerned, a suggestion was made that the internal security forces take over security there. The reply [to that suggestion] came from the eastern district: these forces would not be enough. I suggested then that a unit of the Lebanese army be placed under the command of the minister of interior and that the internal security forces handle the matter of inspecting the international highway. At the same time the matter of the ports and the agency that can monitor these ports was to be studied.

It was here that the dispute occurred because the Arab deterrent forces are rejected in one area, and the Lebanese army is rejected in another. It was thus suggested that it would be necessary to form a force [representing] the countries of the Follow-Up Committee. This force would take over this operation, and a political committee would also supervise these forces.

At this stage there were major security breaches that turned the attention of the Follow-Up Committee from its work. And here we are now going back to the maelstrom since there is no firm agreement on who will monitor the ports and how that operation will be carried out.

[Question] You are asking for the army in the South, but in Beirut you are refusing the army. Is the army patriotic there and separatist here?

[Answer] This is a matter of principles. The Amal Movement was the only movement that called for a national and a capable army. When the process of deliberations which preceded the 14 articles began, the Amal Movement agreed to these articles, but it asked that political sectarianism be abolished, at least in two areas at first: in the army and in education. The term, a balanced army, is in our opinion a sectarian term because it means that the army is to be formed on a Muslim-Christian basis. A national and a capable army is to be built on the basis of defining the identity of enemies and friends and preserving the boundaries of Lebanon. The patriotism and capability of the army are evident only in the South. I told army chief, Gen Victor Khuri, "If I were in your shoes, I would put my entire army in the South." This international outlook which allows us only 1,500 soldiers is wrong because we ask where is the agreement in return for that? The Lebanese army in the south is embarrassing everybody, and no one after that can outdo the army. Therefore, we said the army was acceptable there. Here, however, if we wanted to re-organize the army according to the inside mentality of Beirut, we will go back to a sectarian assumption, and we will go back to the sensitivity of positions in the army. We reject this makeup.

[Question] The Amal Movement has had numerous problems with more than



one party, most recently with the communists. As a result of these problems the Supreme Coordinating Committee was formed. Was this committee formed after each party gained control over its positions on land? What has this committee done so far?

[Answer] This is truly a gripping question. The Amal Movement is the only movement that does not have a fixed territory in Lebanon. This is because we are actually in various parts of Lebanon. Division into mini-states or areas of influence is not in our interests. I personally cannot define an area of influence for the Amal Movement because it is a movement that is trying to organize the masses. Amal is widely spread, and the common saying, "Amal is everywhere," applies to it. This slogan is to a large extent a true expression of the status quo. The fact is that the Coordinating Committee did not find any basis for [the statement] you referred to in your question. The Coordinating Committee is more than 1 year old. It was established after violent battles occurred between us and the Iraqi wing of the Socialist Arab Ba'th party. After these events, which spread to some wings of the Palestinian Resistance, matters developed almost on the basis of the fact that the battle was one between Amal and the Palestinians. It was imperative that matters be straightened out, and an expanded meeting was held in Damascus. The Coordinating Committee grew out of that meeting, and it was based on the fact that the national mainstream there consisted of three factions: the Palestinian Resistance, the National Movement and the Amal Movement. Each faction was to be represented by two members on the committee.

This committee, as well as the subordinate committees that sprang from it, did perform a few services. Now, however, if I wanted to evaluate it, I would say quite frankly that although in some instances the committee was able to curb some situations, it was not able to forestall some matters before they occurred.

Now, about 1 month ago a trilateral committee sprang from the Coordinating Committee to take care of and to control intra-Lebanese relations. This committee is made up of Walid Junblatt, Muhsin Ibrahim and myself. Another committee [was formed] to control Lebanese-Palestinian-Syrian relations; it consists of Minister 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam, Brother Abu 'Ammar, Mr Walid Junblatt and myself. This trilateral committee is trying now to bring about matters on the scene that would forestall incidents. Every time we would sit down to discuss any plan, an explosion would occur [somewhere], and it would break up [our discussion], the plan and everything else along with it.

Talk about reconciliations, about statements and about gathering people together in a broad front is all useless unless the security situation on the national scene is settled. This can be done by preventing the appearance of armed personnel [on the scene] and turning all party offices into cultural, informational and social centers.

[Question] You made a decision to collect weapons. Who will carry it out?

[Answer] This decision is a voluntary decision for all organizations. We agreed that a specific date, Monday, 2 November would be the deadline for the voluntary execution of this agreement. After that and after a general meeting of all the factions in the coordinating committees, the deterrent forces were to be given a free hand. This would be based on the fact that after the aforementioned date we would not be responsible for any armed person, and the deterrent forces were to shoulder their full responsibilities toward this matter.

[Question] Who will take over security inside the national area?

[Answer] When there are no more weapons and armed people disappear from the scene, I believe that a single policeman by himself can preserve the peace in three streets together.

[Question] The National Movement is in the process of establishing a military police [force] to preserve the peace in the area. Are you members of that?

[Answer] We made no agreement as far as the military police is concerned. We did make an agreement to collect weapons, gather armed people and turn over the responsibility of the peace to the deterrent force. The fact that internal security forces will assume the responsibilities with which they have been charged precludes the need for a military police [force]. It may be that the National Movement decided to create a military police [force] after the outbreaks that occurred and before this agreement was reached. At any rate this is the plan, and the matter does not concern us.

[Question] After the series of explosions, charges were made by one rank against more than one agency. Some of you accused Israel, and some accused the intelligence department in the army and the Phalangist party. Some of you accused well-known Arab intelligence. Where is the truth and where do you stand on this truth?

[Answer] I do not have clear information about security to be emphatic in my accusations. I was not in Lebanon during the period of the explosions, but the method that was used was an Israeli method, and Israel was the first and foremost beneficiary of these explosions. I believe that statements were issued in my absence charging Israel with these operations. At any rate, we reject this method, and we condemn every explosion wherever it takes place and regardless who is responsible for it.

[Question] As far as your trip abroad is concerned, it is being said that you met with some Lebanese parties on the other side so as to unify the Lebanese military.

[Answer] This question is a trademark for AL-HAWADITH because I am hearing this for the first time. I work above board, and I do not have a hidden agenda. I always take responsibility for what I do, and I do so courageously. My trip abroad was purely for relaxation because after 16 months of [dealing with] problems and difficulties I needed some kind of rest. I

didn't even read newspapers on this trip. Not only that, I also did not attend meetings with anybody.

[Question] You were opposed to the government when it was formed. Are you still opposed to it even after Speaker Kamil al-As'ad withdrew his minister from it?

[Answer] The government did nothing to make us reconsider our basic view of it. Our anger with the government continues even though anger is considerable when it begins and it diminishes gradually, even though its effects linger. We do not have any barriers in politics. Our attitudes toward any party may rather change with the conduct of that same party. So far the government has done nothing that is very significant for the situation in the south and for living conditions in general. I challenge any person of modest means to try and get married. It is impossible. Some domestic courts require [a couple] to have a lease before their engagement can be declared. It may be that the government is not dealing with this situation because it wishes to control the growth of the population. We are always trying to see the country's public interests, that is, we overlook living conditions in the hope that the country may succeed in the general field and in the matter of the accord. Our attitude toward the government has not changed, but we did not pursue the course of opposing the government and ask for its resignation.

[Question] As far as the elections for the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies are concerned, your position on that was not clear even though the Lebanese Front could have reached an agreement with you about one candidate.

[Answer] Our position was clear as far as principles are concerned, but it did not pertain to people. We support democratic competition, and we oppose monopoly. This was our attitude from the very first moment, even though, as the Amal Movement, we did not have the adequate number of deputies to ensure standards for success now. We are hoping for better in the future.

[Question] In the eastern district there is almost one negotiator. If the Arab Follow-Up Committee were to propose the idea of direct dialogue between the parties, who would take part in the dialogue on behalf of the western district?

[Answer] First of all, I must know how you define the eastern district, geographically and politically. If by eastern district you mean the Christians, the Arab Follow-Up Committee will be forced to talk with more than one Bashir. It must talk with President Camille Sham'un, with Prime Minister Sulayman Franjiyyah, with Brig Gen Raymond Iddih, with the independent Christians and with others. Al-Shaykh Bashir cannot claim to represent all the Christians of Lebanon just as I cannot claim to represent all the Shi'ites of Lebanon. All the factions in all the areas have to be taken into consideration so that the dialogue can be comprehensive and lead to a result, especially since the dialogue must stem from the 14 principles, and all the political, parliamentary and military activists who were called

to take part in the deliberations which preceded the appearance and declaration of these principles are to be summoned.

[Question] In an interview with AL-HAWADITH Mr Ibrahim Qulaylat announced that he was prepared to meet with al-Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil but that there were conditions for such a meeting. Is he prepared for such a meeting?

[Answer] I have said from the beginning and I repeat [what I said]: the Lebanese people must come to an agreement, and they must define the identity of Lebanon and its helpers. That question must be settled. On the basis of these 14 articles I am prepared to meet with all the parties, and especially at the presidential palace. Nothing will stand between me and these meetings if they spring from the aforementioned articles.

[Question] There is a call to amend the constitution in order to advance the date for the next presidential elections. Do you support this call? What in your view are the characteristics of the next president?

[Answer] We support the opinion that states "no advance and no delay" in the presidential elections. The constitution must be obeyed. We do not need to create a new problem on the Lebanese scene.

The next president must be fanatically enthusiastic for the south because his fanaticism for the south will mean that he is fanatically enthusiastic about Lebanon and about all the causes of all Arabs. He must have the qualities of decisiveness and the courage to take the necessary initiatives. As far as names are concerned, this matter has not yet been brought up to the leaders of the movement because no one yet has proclaimed his candidacy for that position, even though the presidential election this time is not an ordinary one and the person who will be elected will serve for 6 years. It will be in the light of those elections and in the light of the personality of the new president that the entire future of Lebanon will be determined. Lebanon will either survive or not.

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CSO: 4404/134



APPREHENSIONS ABOUT ISRAELI INTENTIONS DISCUSSED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1307, 20 Nov 81 p 30

[Article by 'Adil Malik: "Israel's Violation of Saudi Air Space Affirms It Is More Dangerous Than the Soviet Danger; Council of Cooperation Decides To Build Unified Military Power for the Gulf"]

[Text] The Saudi Council of Ministers held a session last Monday evening that was headed by the crown prince and deputy prime minister, Prince Fahd ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz. At the beginning of the session Prince Fahd informed the princes and the ministers that "This afternoon the airplanes of the Israeli enemy violated the air space of the northwestern region of the kingdom. Saudi fighter airplanes intercepted the Israeli airplanes and forced the enemy airplanes to return to the occupied Arab land."

This was not the first time for Israeli airplanes to violate Saudi air space, but the seriousness of this provocation from the air lay in its deliberate timing. The violation occurred a few hours before the second Gulf Summit Conference was to convene. It occurred at the same time the ministers of foreign affairs of the countries of the Council of Cooperation were discussing the final text of the recommendations that had to be made to the summit leaders who would approve or amend them. Israel's violation of Saudi air space also followed the violent campaign that was launched by Israel on the Saudi peace initiative which was proposed by Prince Fahd. The [virulence of that] campaign had peaked after Saudi Arabia got the AWACS airplanes.

Israel's provocation from the air strengthened the point of view of those who have been calling for giving the security aspect at this stage precedence over other aspects. The Omani paper that was presented at the Riyadh Conference focused on defense matters "since a discussion of the dangers surrounding the Gulf was not enough to prevent those dangers." Since the ministers of foreign affairs were not able to reach an agreement on the matter of security in the course of four working sessions and decided to take the matter up to the summit, and because the defense aspect involves considerable effort and exchange of ideas inside the Council of Cooperation, Gulf leaders [at the summit] decided to turn the matter over to the ministers of defense. Accordingly, the ministers of defense of the

countries of the Council of Cooperation were invited to meet soon "to determine the priorities needed by the countries of the council to ensure their independence and their sovereignty."

At a time when the debate about the priorities of the Council of Cooperation are still going on, the sources of danger are also varied. While the Sultanate of Oman is focusing on the Soviet threat in the area--a threat that is growing out of "the Soviet zone" which stretches from South Yemen to Afghanistan--Saudi Arabia is focusing on the Zionist threat which has no boundaries and which may strike at any moment and slip in from all borders.

In the resolutions that were reached by the Gulf Summit at Riyadh, the words of the final communique were chosen carefully. The communique stated that "The Council discussed all the attempts that are being made by other forces which are seeking to establish positions for themselves in the Gulf area to threaten the safety and sovereignty of the Gulf. The Council announced that it rejects these attempts which constitute a threat to the security of the area and its people. These attempts seek to ensure the influence of foreign forces in the area."

These words contain more generalities than specifics. This is because going into details and calling a spade a spade could lead to a division of opinions. At a time when some countries of the Council of Cooperation raised the matter of U.S. maneuvers [in the area] and the participation of some countries of the area, such as Oman, in operation Bright Star, the Omani response to that question was made by the undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Yusuf al-'Alawi. [He said], "The country that is carrying out these maneuvers is a country that is friendly with all the countries of the area. Accordingly, it is not the enemy of any country in the area and, therefore, the maneuvers cannot be construed to be directed against any Gulf country."

What then is the connection between these words and those in the final communique [which stated that] "The Council of Cooperation has affirmed the need to keep the area in its entirety out of international struggles, and especially the concerns about military fleets, foreign bases, etc.?"

The response to this contradiction comes from Prince Sa'ud al-Faysal and from the secretary general of the Gulf Council of Cooperation: Every country in the Council of Cooperation may practice the principle of national sovereignty. What every Gulf country does in its foreign policy falls under this principle.

Amidst the presence of more than one opinion about the matter of defense and the aspects of security, an idea emerges which states that the fact that the people of the Gulf are involved in protecting the security of their country affirms that building a joint Gulf force is inevitable. This is the force created by the Gulf which can actually be relied upon in cases of self-defense. This is the task of the defense ministers of the Council

of Cooperation at their anticipated meeting. They are to begin outlining the principal rules for building the Gulf's unified force.

The political aspect of the Riyadh Summit was taken over by a discussion about the Saudi initiative to solve the crisis of the area. The discussions focused on a review of Arab and international reactions to this initiative. Half an hour before the summit was opened, Prince Sa'ud al-Faysal was unequivocal in saying that the Gulf states had approved the plan. Thus the Saudi peace plan was no longer a Saudi plan; it had become a Gulf plan, and it was believed that everyone hoped that it would win unanimous Arab approval at the next summit conference in Fez.

But what about the Palestinian reaction?

Sa'ud al-Faysal replies, "Mr Yasir 'Arafat said he considered the plan appropriate. He said it could be a basis for a solution even though we heard other statements were being made on the Palestinian scene. I am hoping that the plan will be discussed carefully in Palestinian circles because it deserves consideration."

Prince Sa'ud al-Faysal expressed his wishes that "everybody's opinions on the plan, especially those of the Palestinians, be unequivocal."

While some people expected that an unequivocal text would be issued by the summit of the Council of Cooperation considering the Saudi plan a Gulf plan, the following statement was mentioned: "The council reiterates its request to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to include the principles of peace declared by Saudi Arabia on the agenda of the Twelfth Arab Summit Conference in Morocco for the purpose of formulating a unified Arab position on the Palestinian question."

Opinions varied about whether this statement was made in that form and whether this proposition signified that the initiative was being adopted as had been decided, or whether the national interest and concern for Arab sensitivities required that this formulation be used. This formulation kept the door open to other Arab countries that had expressed reservations on the initiative so that they could reconsider their position in preparation for the convening of the Twelfth Arab Summit Conference in Morocco. Riyadh is not forgetting on this occasion to remind [others] that when it proposed the peace plan, it did not do so unilaterally and that the fact that there had not been prior consultation should not be construed as it has been construed here and there.

While coordination between the promised European initiative and the Saudi initiative that was proposed was underway, after [Lord] Carrington's recent visit to Riyadh, a new obstacle emerged. Some European countries were inclined to participate in the peace-keeping force in Sinai. Arab countries threatened that the participation of these countries, especially Britain and France, would have numerous negative effects on the European role which had gone a long way in supporting the Arab position. And here a new problem emerged, and a difference in analysis and in outlook [also became evident].

European countries think their participation in the international force in Sinai is [one way] of helping an Arab country, Egypt, regain its land. Arab countries, however, think European participation to be an endorsement for or a revival of the Camp David accords. Therefore, the stage of getting out of this crisis requires "a gradual proclamation" that the Camp David accords have failed and that their time has come to an end. This trend was strengthened by the new failure which struck the autonomy talks between Egypt and Israel last week.

In the discussion about significant political changes with a special meaning which occurred recently, one must refer to Saudi Arabia's appeal for the participation of the Soviet Union in solving the crisis in the area by way of convening an international conference. Although Riyadh has strongly denied any relationship between the announcement of Soviet participation and the establishment of diplomatic relations with Moscow, this is considered a significant indication in the status of "the new balanced view" for solving the Middle East crisis.

The discussion about relations with the Soviets, whether it is conducted openly or quietly, is common among most of the countries of the Council of Gulf Cooperation.

At present the prevailing feeling in Riyadh is that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has for the first time launched this view of a solution to the crisis of the area. Everything in these principles is subject to a discussion that would serve the final objective, provided that those who reject these principles come up with alternative solutions other than rejection and what is more than rejection.

Between the Gulf Summit at Riyadh and the Arab Summit in Fez there will be a period for contemplation to ease [a situation] that is closest to being an Arab consensus for peace, if the hour of peace in the area approaches, or to mitigate [a situation] that is closest to war, for whoever can sound the drums of war "will go to the battlefield."

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CSO: 4404/208



BACKTRACKING FROM KUWAIT AGREEMENT REPORTED

Beirut AL-HURRIYAH in Arabic No 1044, 21 Dec 81 p 29

[Article: "Rulers of San'a' Violate Kuwait Agreement"]

[Text] A high-level delegation from the Yemen Arab Republic headed by Col 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, the president of the republic, went last 30 November to Aden at the invitation of President 'Ali Nasir Muhammad. The delegation's visit lasted 3 days. The delegation had gone to Aden to take part in the celebrations commemorating the 14th anniversary of national independence of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and to conduct talks with the leaders of Democratic Yemen.

It is worth noting that this is the first time in modern history that summit level Yemeni meetings are held in Aden, the capital of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. This is because this is the first time for a North Yemeni leader to visit the south and conduct talks with its leaders. On 14 October 1978 the late president, Ibrahim al-Hamdi was supposed to have visited Aden. But he was assassinated on the eve of his visit to Aden by clients of Saudi reactionaries in North Yemen. It is believed that President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih informed the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia before al-Hamdi was to set out on his visit to Aden.

The Accomplishments of the Kuwait Summit

On the eve of the Fez Summit a quadrilateral summit was held in Kuwait. It included the presidents of both Yemens, the president of the Democratic National Front in the Yemen Arab Republic and the Prince of Kuwait. An agreement was reached between the leaders of North Yemen and the leaders of the Democratic National Front. The agreement stipulated that there be an immediate cease fire between the forces of the government and the forces of the National Front. The fact that the government in North Yemen complied with this agreement and signed it was a result of the fact that its forces were being routed by the fighters of the Democratic National Front, especially in the battles of the central region of North Yemen. This had weakened the government militarily and, accordingly, forced it to conduct talks with the leaders of the National Front. President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih's visit to Aden came in this context. He wanted to get concessions

from the front and, at the same time, to prepare for a new confrontation with the forces of the front.

After the Kuwait Agreement was signed, which stipulated that there be a cease fire, a relative truce was established between the forces of the government and the forces of the Democratic National Front. However, the government is still preparing itself for a military confrontation with the front. It has carried out mandatory conscription and has imposed it on numerous areas. It is trying to assemble forces to confront the areas where the front has effective influence so as to begin the war that would eliminate the positions of the front. With the exception of the temporary and relative truce, the government did not abide by any one of the articles of the Kuwait Agreement and other agreements, especially those that have to do with releasing political prisoners, removing the restraints on public liberties and democratic liberties in the country, withdrawing army forces to camps and entering into a face to face dialogue with the leaders of the front to bring an end to unresolved problems.

On the eve of the delegation's departure to Aden, it was learned from sources close to the delegation that the government did not intend to carry out the agreements that had been reached, especially with the Democratic National Front. The government was going to hold the Democratic National Front and Democratic Yemen responsible for not carrying out these agreements so that San'a' could wash its hands of any responsibility for not carrying out these agreements.

#### Three Factions in the San'a' Government

It is to be noted that the delegation was divided into three factions.

The first faction was that of the hard-liners; it included elements loyal to the Saudi-Iraqi alliance. The most prominent member of this faction was Mujahid Abu Shawarib, deputy prime minister. He is the one who, during the talks, held Democratic Yemen responsible for the battles, the instability and the loss of security in the north.

The second faction was that of "the compradors" in government. Its most prominent members were 'Abd-al-'Aziz 'Abd-al-Ghani, the vice president and 'Abd-al-Karim al-Aryani, the prime minister. This faction thought that the regime was being threatened and that the danger to it will increase if the battles and the instability in North Yemen were to continue. Accordingly, this faction was trying to find ways that would preserve for the regime its awe.

The third faction was the national liberal faction, the weakest faction in the government. Its most prominent members were 'Ali Lutf al-Thawr, the minister of foreign affairs and Hasan Makki, deputy prime minister for foreign affairs. This faction was promoting a settlement of the problems in a manner that would please everyone. This faction is flexible; it is calling for recognition of the status quo and negotiations with the National Front to settle problems and carry out agreements.

The faction of hard-liners may force matters into an adventurous course, toward a military confrontation with the forces of the Democratic National Front and toward preparations for an attack against the government prodded by reinforcements of the Saudi-Iraqi alliance and the support of imperialism. This would be done to overthrow President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih. This faction has its military and political forces which are well known in the country.

It has been learned that the position of the Democratic National Front is still that of adhering to the program of peaceful, democratic development and abiding by the set of agreements [that were reached], chief among which is the agreement of 30 January 1980 which constitutes the foundation for all subsequent agreements.

#### San'a' Changes Its Mind about the Kuwait Agreement

After the delegation's return it was learned that Col 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih had renounced the agreement to withdraw the army to the camps. This was one of the articles of the Kuwait Agreement which was signed to establish the Ta'izz Agreement. The renunciation was justified by the fact that the state had sovereignty over all areas of North Yemen. As far as exchanging prisoners for political detainees from the front was concerned, the government insisted that the exchange take place either in the border areas with Democratic Yemen or in Aden. The front, however, suggesting that the prisoners were in the north and that some were in areas close to the capital, insisted that the exchange take place in the areas where the prisoners were located. In making this proposition, the government in the north hoped to affirm that the war was being fought on the borders with Democratic Yemen and with the Democratic National Front.

The agreement to develop cooperation and coordination between both parts of Yemen was issued after Col 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih's visit to Aden and the talks he conducted there with President 'Ali Nasir Muhammad. However, it has been noticed that the media here in San'a', including radio, ignored the following points in the joint communique--"agreement:"

1. The paragraph that proclaimed approval and support for Syria.
2. The paragraph that criticized the policy of the United States of America.
3. The paragraph that denounced all plans to do away with the Palestinian question after Camp David. What was intended here was Fahd's initiative so that the dear neighbor, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, would not be alienated.

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